【作者】 孙妮娜；

【导师】 王福胜；

【作者基本信息】 哈尔滨工业大学 ， 企业管理， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 会计准则是会计确认、计量、报告等工作的依据,从契约角度看,会计准则具有不完全契约的性质,对企业提供了在会计核算原则、计量方法、价值估计等方面的选择范围和自主判断的弹性空间。会计准则并未规定在企业中具体由谁掌握会计准则的剩余控制权,而不同主体拥有剩余控制权会有不同的运用方式、导致不同的核算结果,进而影响企业各利益相关者的利益,因此会计准则剩余控制权由谁控制、所产生的价值如何分配是会计准则不完全契约各缔约主体之间的根本分歧。剩余控制权分配不当,会削弱会计准则作用的发挥,也是导致管理层机会主义行为和会计信息失真的主要因素。从不完全契约的角度研究会计准则剩余控制权配置,对完善会计准则的制定程序,提高会计信息的决策有用性,协调各契约方之间的利益分配,促进资源优化配置具有重要的现实意义。会计准则剩余控制权配置的研究有利于构建会计准则不完全契约的完整理论框架、延伸剩余控制权分配理论的应用领域,同时不完全契约的经济学思想可以为会计学研究盈余操纵的产生和抑制提供充分的理论支撑。首先,建立了会计准则剩余控制权配置研究的理论基础。按照不完全契约理论的研究思路,界定了会计准则剩余控制权配置研究的前提假设,从理论上分析了会计准则的缔约过程和经济后果,深入剖析了会计准则的不完全契约性质对企业活动的影响机理,界定了会计准则剩余控制权的相关概念。其次,实证检验了会计准则弹性空间的经济后果。检验了会计准则剩余控制权的运用对企业市场价值的影响,验证会计准则的剩余控制权是否成为企业操纵利润的手段;检验了不同主体掌握会计准则剩余控制权的情况下,其权利的运用效果及企业在盈余操纵上的特点。从会计准则剩余控制权运用的市场影响和不同主体拥有剩余控制权的差异两方面研究了剩余控制权运用的经济后果,旨在论证会计准则剩余控制权配置研究的必要性。再次,从内生性契约的角度出发研究影响会计准则剩余控制权配置的因素。资本结构对管理决策和公司治理效率有决定性作用,因此对会计准则剩余控制权的运用也会产生影响。分别从股权契约、债权契约和薪酬契约的角度考虑企业剩余控制权分配对会计准则剩余控制权配置的影响。通过三个一般均衡模型,分析了在股权集中和股权分散的情况下,所有者对企业剩余控制权的掌握程度是否影响企业会计准则剩余控制权利用的整体效果,在股权契约约束下如何减少会计准则剩余控制权的代理成本。通过理论模型论证债务契约、薪酬契约对会计准则剩余控制权运用的影响,并实证检验债务契约、薪酬契约的监督、激励作用能否有效发挥。通过股权、债权、薪酬契约与会计准则剩余控制权运用之间相关性的研究,为在不同契约条件下如何配置会计准则剩余控制权、如何最小化交易成本并减少代理问题提供依据。最后,采用进化博弈模型分析了多方参与会计准则剩余控制权配置的利益冲突和均衡结果。契约的不完全性导致产权的界定不清和控制权的如何配置问题,企业中各契约方的目标函数不同,为了最大化契约目标,各自都希望能够尽可能影响会计准则剩余控制权配置。因此,分析契约方及利益相关者相互之间的力量对比和权力较量,充分考虑各自的学习和调整能力,多阶段动态地分析契约方参与会计准则剩余控制权配置的进化博弈过程,融合公司治理和纵向一体化两种解决契约不完全的方法,找到会计准则剩余控制权的最佳配置结果。研究结果显示,会计准则弹性空间具有经济后果。在股权较集中的企业,大股东持股比例与盈余管理存在显著的负相关关系,控股股东拥有剩余控制权有利于减少利润操纵行为。债务比例越高、长期债务比例越大的企业,利润操纵的比例越小,长期债务契约较短期债务契约对会计准则剩余控制权的利用有更强的监督作用。管理者持股比例越大,盈余管理的可能性越大。多契约方参与会计准则剩余控制权配置的进化博弈结果说明,多方共同参与和监督,能够使会计准则弹性空间所产生的利益分配问题达到均衡状态,有利于整体价值的最大化而不是某一方价值最大。研究方法上突破了以往只停留在分析会计准则契约性质的局限,将不完全契约的思想与微观会计政策选择相结合,构建了会计准则剩余控制权配置的研究框架。将会计准则与微观企业内部特征以不完全契约理论作为共同的基础研究,建立了企业契约因素与会计准则剩余控制权配置关系的模型,并进行实证检验,突破了以往不同契约因素之间相互分割的研究状态。以进化博弈的方法研究多契约方参与会计准则剩余控制权配置的过程,也是对不完全契约分析方法的创新。更多还原

【Abstract】 Accounting standards are the basis of accounting recognition, measurement and reporting. From the perspective of contract, accounting standards have the character of incomplete contract, providing a flexible space of choice range and self-judgment in some aspects, such as accounting principles, measurement methods, value estimate and so on. Accounting standards don’t determine precisely who have the residual control rights of the accounting standards in companies. Having the residual control rights, different subjects will use different kinds of ways and lead to different accounting results, which will affect the interests of all stakeholders further. Therefore, the fundamental divergence among every subject in incomplete contract is who should have the residual control rights of accounting standards and how to distribute the value. The misallocation of residual control rights will weaken the effect of accounting standards and lead to managers’opportunistic behavior and distorted accounting information. It has important practical significance to research allocation of residual control rights of accounting standards based on incomplete contract theory. This research can perfect the development process of accounting standards, improve the decision usefulness of accounting information, coordinate the benefits among various subjects of contract and promote optimal allocation of resources. This research also can make great contribution to constructing the theoretical framework of incomplete contract of accounting standards and extending the application fields of residual control rights, where the economics idea in incomplete contract theory provides the full theoretical support to study on earnings manipulation.First of all, this paper established the theoretical foundation of the research on allocation of residual control rights of accounting standards. In accordance with incomplete contract theory, this paper defined the assumptions of the research on the allocation of residual control rights of accounting standards, analyzed the contracting process and economic consequences in theory, further analyzed the impact mechanism of incomplete contract on the business activities, and defined the related concepts of residual control rights of accounting standards.Secondly, this paper examined the economic consequences of the flexible space of accounting standards. This paper tested the influence of the application of the residual control rights of accounting standards on enterprises’market value, verified whether the application effect could be a way of earning manipulation for enterprises, and examined the application effect of its rights and the characteristics of earning manipulation of an enterprise when different subjects had residual control rights of accounting standards. This paper studied the economic consequences of the use of residual control rights from two aspects: the impact on the market by using residual control rights of accounting standards and the distinctions among different subjects taking up the residual control rights. All the studies were used to verify the necessity of the study on allocation of residual control rights of accounting standards.Thirdly, this paper studied the factors influencing the allocation of residual control rights of accounting standards from the perspective of endogenous contracts. Capital structure has a decisive effect on managerial decision and corporate governance efficiency, and it also has impact on the application of the residual control rights of accounting standards. To find out the influence of residual control rights distribution of the company on the allocation of residual control rights of accounting standards, this paper studied from three views: equity contracts, debt contracts and compensation contracts. In the case of the ownership concentration and dispersion, this paper, by means of three general equilibrium models, analyzed whether the owners’allocation degree of residual control rights can influence the overall effect of the use of the residual control rights of accounting standards. The paper also analyzed how to reduce the agency costs of residual control rights of accounting standards with the constraint of equity contracts. The paper also verified the effect of debt contracts and compensation contracts on the use of residual control rights of accounting standards through a theoretical model, and empirically tested whether the debt contract and compensation contracts play supervisory and motivation roles effectively. According to the correlation study of equity contract, debt contract or compensation contracts and allocation of residual control rights of accounting standards, this paper provided a basis for the allocation of residual control rights of accounting standards and the reduction of transaction cost and agency cost on different contract conditions.Finally, the paper analyzed the conflict of interest and equilibrium outcome by evolutionary game model when multiple parties participate in the allocation of residual control rights of accounting standards. Incomplete contracts will make property rights unclear and the problem of allocation of control right. Because different contracting parties in the enterprise have different objective function, and all of them wish to influence the allocation of residual control rights of accounting standards as much as possible in order to maximize their contract goal. Therefore, the paper must give full consideration to the parties’learning and adjustment capacity when it analyzed the strength and power among the contracting parties and stakeholders. The paper also used evolutionary game theory to analyze the process of contract parties participating in the allocation of residual control rights of accounting standards by multi-staged dynamic. The analysis combined corporate governance and vertical integration, which were two methods to solve incomplete contract, to find the optimal configuration results of residual control rights of accounting standards.The results showed that the flexible space of accounting standards had economic consequences. In the enterprises with ownership concentration, there was a significant negative correlation between the proportion of large shareholders’shareholding and earnings management. It was helpful to reduce earning management for controlling shareholder to have residual rights of control. The enterprise with more debt contracts, especially more long-term debt, will reduce more earning management. Long-term debt contracts played a stronger supervisory role for the use of residual control rights of accounting standards than short-term debt contracts. Managers with more shareholding ratio had more possibility to conduct earning management. And the evolutionary game result showed that the participation and supervision with various parties could make the distribution of benefits reach equilibrium state, which was useful to maximize the overall value rather than only one party’s value.The research method of this paper made a breakthrough by combing the idea of incomplete contract and micro-accounting policy choice, which not only analyzed the limitations of the contract nature of accounting standards, but created a research framework of the allocation of residual control rights of accounting standards. The paper made incomplete contract theory as a common research foundation to study accounting standards and micro-enterprises’inner features, establishing a model of the relations between contract factors and the residual control rights allocation of accounting standards. And then it made an empirical test, which broke the previous research making different contracts separate. In this paper, it was also innovation of incomplete contract method to research the process of multi-party participating the allocation of residual control rights of accounting standards by evolutionary game theory.更多还原