【作者】 周军；

【导师】 赵息；

【作者基本信息】 天津大学 ， 会计学， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 公司并购作为公司资源优化配置的最重要手段,可以有力地促进我国产业结构的调整,全面提高我国企业的创新能力和竞争力,在我国社会主义市场经济中发挥着越来越重要的作用。但是困扰企业并购绩效提升的核心问题——代理问题,迄今悬而未决。如何区分公司并购中纷繁复杂的代理问题并有针对性地实施有效措施来抑制代理问题,一直是理论界和实务界共同研究的问题。因此,研究资本结构对上市公司并购中代理问题的影响,具有重要的理论意义和现实意义。本文在全面综述国内外相关研究成果的基础上,根据我国经济发展的客观要求,基于我国特定的市场经济环境,综合运用资本结构理论、委托代理理论和公司并购理论等前沿理论中的最新研究成果,采用理论分析与经验实证相结合的研究方法,沿着“文献综述——背景分析——理论模型分析——实证研究”的研究路线,围绕选题“资本结构对上市公司并购中代理问题的影响研究”,展开理论与实证两方面的研究和探讨,主要工作如下:首先,构建了资本结构对公司并购中代理问题影响的理论分析模型。本文从对公司并购的分析和归纳中概括出基本的理论假设作为逻辑分析的起点,先以单一代理问题为研究对象,建立理论模型分别探讨资本结构对并购中经理人和控股股东私利行为的影响,并将模型进一步扩展为双重代理问题的情形,研究公司并购中经理人与控股股东之间的博弈,以及资本结构对两者私利行为的影响,为双重代理冲突下防止经理人和控股股东利用并购活动实施私利行为,提供了新的理论依据。其次,实证检验了不同股权集中度下上市公司并购中的代理问题。实证结果表明:股权分散上市公司并购中主要代理问题是经理人和股东之间的代理问题;股权较为分散或股权较为集中的上市公司并购中存在着经理人和股东、控股股东和中小股东的双重代理问题;股权高度集中上市公司并购中主要代理问题是控股股东和中小股东之间的代理问题,这类代理冲突随着现金流权对控制权的偏离而加剧,不利于并购绩效。最后,实证分析了资本结构对上市公司并购中代理问题的影响。实证以2006-2008年沪深两市发生并购的上市公司为研究对象,通过实证研究发现,资本结构对上市公司并购中代理问题影响显著,合理的资本结构可以抑制公司并购中的代理问题,并且在不同代理问题和产权性质的上市公司中资本结构对代理问题的影响存在差异。更多还原

【Abstract】 As the most important means for optimizing allocation of corporate resources, Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) can effectively promote the adjustment of China’s industrial structure, comprehensively improve the innovative capacity and competitiveness of Chinese enterprises, and play an increasingly important role in China’s socialist market economy. But the agency problem, which is the core problem troubling M&A performance improvement, is unresolved so far. How to distinguish the complicated agency problem in M&A and implement effective measures to solve the agency problem in a targeted manner has been the joint research for theory field and practice field. Therefore, research on the influence of capital structure on the agency problem in M&A of listed companies has important theoretical and practical significance.According to China’s economic requirements and its specific market economy, and based on a comprehensive overview of domestic and foreign research results, this paper integrally used frontier theories such as Capital Structure Theory, Principal-Agent Theory and M&A Theory, adopted the combining methods of theoretical analysis and positive experience, followed the research line of "Literature Review - Background - Theoretical Models - An Empirical Study" and discussed the topic of " the influence of capital structure on the agency problem in M&A of listed companies”in both theory and experience method. The main work and innovation are as follows:Firstly, building the theoretical analysis model about the influence of capital structure on the agency problem in M&A of listed companies. This paper derived the basic assumptions from analyzing and summarizing corporate M&A and took it as the starting point of logical analysis. It first used“single agency”as the research object, established theoretical models, studied the effects of capital structure on self-interest behavior of managers and controlling shareholders separately, and then expanded the model to dual agency problems. It provided the new theory evidence for preventing managers and controlling shareholders’self-interest behavior from M&A on conflict of a“double agency”by studying the game between manager and controlling shareholder and the effects of capital structure on self-interest behavior of managers and controlling shareholder. Secondly, empirically testing agency problem of different Concentration Ration of listed companies under M&A. The empirical results show that, in the listed companies of dispersed shares, the agency problem is between managers and shareholders, in the listed companies of relatively dispersed or concentrated shares, the agency problem is focused on double agency problem between managers and shareholders, controlling shareholders and small shareholders, and in the listed companies with high concentration ownership, the main agency problem is between the controlling shareholders and small shareholders and such agency conflict increases with the deviation of the cash flow to control and is not conducive to M&A performance. Finally, empirically testing the influence of capital structure on the agency problem in M&A of listed companies. Through empirical study of Shanghai and Shenzhen market in 2006-2008, this paper found that the capital structure of listed companies significantly affected of the agency problems in M&A, reasonable capital structure can inhibit the agency problem, and the capital structure has a different impact on the agency problems in M&A of the listed companies with different agency problems and property rights.更多还原