【作者】 柏高原；

【导师】 陈士俊；

【作者基本信息】 天津大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 风险投资通过为创业企业提供资本支持和管理服务,成为支持企业技术创新的强大引擎,有助于推动一国的科技创新和经济发展。我国自引入风险投资以来,已经经过了20余年的发展,但仍然处于初级阶段,并且发展缓慢。与美国、以色列等风险投资发达国家相比无论在风险投资机构数量、投资规模和被投资中小企业数量方面还存在很大差距。由于风险投资的高风险性,单纯依靠市场配置风险投资往往面临市场失灵问题。我国当前风险投资呈现出“红苹果”效应,即风险投资主要集中在投资成长期或成熟期创业企业。从而导致处于种子期和初创期的创业企业通常得不到风险投资的支持,直接阻碍了科技成果转化。为解决上述问题,在风险投资发达的国家和地区,都通过设立政策性风险投资引导基金来引导民间资金设立各类商业性风险投资基金,从而促进风险投资形成,并引导私人部门投资者投向种子期或初创期企业。因此,进行有关引导基金运作机制的研究,具有非常重要的理论意义和现实意义。基于共同代理关系的视角,本文就引导基金运作机制开展了研究,主要包括以下几个方面的工作:1.基于共同代理理论,分析了引导基金参与下,引导基金和私人部门投资者与风险投资家构成了共同代理关系。本文指出,因共同代理关系的存在,委托人与代理人之间,以及委托人之间因效用最大化目标的不一致,产生了三类代理成本。2.引导基金参与下,风险投资家同时承担了两类任务,第一类任务是投资于处于成长期或成熟期创业企业,第二类任务是投资于处于种子期或初创期的创业企业。第二类任务具有较差的可观测度。基于多任务委托代理模型,本文就引导基金参与下如何设计针对风险投资家的激励机制进行了研究。3.由于引导基金的参与,在引导基金、私人部门投资者和风险投资家之间呈现出了共同代理关系的特点。传统的治理机制一定程度上可以解决委托人与代理人间因利益冲突而导致的代理成本,但无法委托人之间因利益冲突而导致的代理成本。因此应设计并发挥冲突管理机制,以解决共同代理关系下的委托人之间利益冲突而产生的代理成本。本文以模型分析了冲突管理机制在降低代理成本方面的作用。更多还原

【Abstract】 Venture capital (VC) is a new kind investment vehicle, and it provides capital and non-capital services to venture company, and becomes an important power to promote innovation of technology and accelerate economic development. VC has been introduced into our country for almost 20 years, however the development of VC is still in the preliminary stage. Compared with USA and Israel, the number of VC, investment volume and the number of portfolio are smaller. Because of the high risk of VC, market failure exists. There is a phenomenon called“red apple effect”in our country, and that means VC mostly invest into entrepreneurs which are in later stage. As result, the seed-stage and start-up entrepreneurs cannot achieve enough capital, and the shortage constrains the transition from research to actual production. Many countries establish the leading fund to resolve the problem, to attract the investment from private sector. The leading fund and venture capital investors will incorporate a hybrid fund, which mainly invest into seed-stage and start-up entrepreneurs.Based on the sight of Common Agency, this paper researches the operational mechanism of venture capital leading fund, and achieves conclusions as follows:1. This paper points out that there is a kind of Common Agency relationship among leading fund, private sector investors and venture capitalist. There are three agent costs.2. The venture capitalist gets two tasks, one is to invest the enterpreises which are in later-stage, and the other is to invest the ones which are in early-stage. The second one is hard to observe. Based on the multi-task principle-agent model, this dissertation does researches about how to inspire the venture capitalist.3. Because of the common agency, so the traditional governance mechanism could not solve the conflict between leading fund and private sector investors. This paper points out that the mechanism of conflict management is important, and could induce the agency costs among the leading fund, private sector investors and venture capitalist.更多还原