【作者】 赵国宇；

【导师】 王善平；

【作者基本信息】 湖南大学 ， 会计学， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 审计合谋严重损害了证券市场的基本秩序与声誉。严惩合谋者虽然给受害者带来心理安慰但补偿效果甚微,投资者、债权人等利益相关者更加关注如何尽早发现审计合谋并及时予以制止,并且希望有效惩治以防止类似事件的重复发生。审计合谋的预警和防治仍是重要的研究课题。本文首先运用经济学、管理学、法学、博弈论等多学科的基本理论工具分析审计合谋的形成机理,然后从上市公司的财务状况、股权结构和治理结构、审计师特征、审计收费等视角获取审计合谋的特征指标,再以这些特征指标为变量采用多种方法构建审计合谋预警模型。最后,对防治审计合谋的奖惩对策的有效性进行理论分析和实证测度。本文共安排六章从三个大的方面研究审计合谋的预警与防治问题。第一,运用经济人假设、信息不对称理论、声誉理论、博弈论等基本理论,规范研究制度安排缺陷、声誉机制作用微弱情况下合谋者机会主义动机如何向机会主义行为转化,通过建立多方博弈模型研究合谋各方的行为特点和制度在防范审计合谋中的作用,为后续审计合谋预警与防治的数理论证、实证检验提供理论基础;第二,采用实证的方法研究上市公司的异常财务状况、特殊的股权结构和治理结构、审计师特征、异常审计收费等与审计合谋之间的关系,通过多元回归分析获取构建审计合谋预警模型的特征变量。然后,在此基础上,分别运用单变量判定、主成分分析、线性概率回归、LOGIT回归和PROBIT回归等方法建立了预警效果较好的审计合谋预警模型。经验检验发现,在预警效果上,多变量预警模型大大优于单变量判定模型,且Logistic模型依次优于PROBIT模型和LPM模型;第三,拓展Tirole(1986)、Kofman和Lawarree(1993)、Fahad(2006)等审计合谋研究模型,对奖、惩审计师以防范审计合谋的有效性问题进行博弈分析和数理论证。进一步运用实证方法从股票市场的异常反应、上市公司的市场价值、审计师声誉、审计质量和审计独立性等方面测度惩罚机制对防治审计合谋的效果。研究结果表明上市公司的市场价值和会计师事务所声誉未受到实质影响,但惩罚措施在一定程度上促进了审计质量和审计独立性的提高。论文的主要创新在于:(1)从制度安排、治理结构、法律责任压力和声誉机制等方面系统研究审计师合谋动机向合谋行为转化的作用机制,为审计合谋的研究提供理论基础平台。(2)在财务报告舞弊预警研究的基础上,充分考虑审计合谋的特点,从不同视角进行实证分析获取审计合谋的特征变量,构建了效果较好的审计合谋预警模型,弥补了审计合谋预警缺乏实证模型的缺陷,为我国的监管机构预警审计合谋提供操作性更强的方法;(3)理论论证奖惩措施对于防治审计合谋的效果问题,并采用实证的方法测度惩罚对策对于防治审计合谋的有效性,为较科学地评价和改进现有防范审计合谋制度提供科学的理论支持和经验证据。更多还原

【Abstract】 Audit collusion seriously damaged the basic order and reputation of the securities market. Although severely punish those who conspire to bring psychological comfort to victims but compensation effect is little. Investors, creditors and other stakeholders more concern about how to detect early and stop it timely, and hope that the Punishment Strategies is effective to prevent similar incidents from recurring. How to identify and prevent audit collusion is still important research topic.The thesis use the basic theory such as economics, management science, law and game theory to analyses the formation mechanism of audit collusion. The thesis gets Characteristic variables of audit collusion from perspective of the listed company’s financial condition, ownership structure and governance structure, the characteristics of accounting firms, auditing fees, then constructs the audit collusion discerning model by using a variety of methods.The thesis has organized a total of six chapters from the three major aspects to study the problem of identification and governance of audit collusion. First, the thesis uses the basic theory such as economic man hypothesis, asymmetric information theory, the reputation theory, game theory, to analyses the collaborators how to transform his opportunistic motives to opportunistic behavior when there are deficiencies in institutional arrangements and reputation mechanism works weakly. By constructing a multi-game model, the thesis analyses the characteristics of collusive behavior and the role in the prevention of the audit collusion. These studies provide a solid foundation for the following theoretical analysis and empirical testing. Second, using empirical methods to study the relationship between anomalies listed company’s financial situation, special ownership structure and governance structure, accounting firm characteristics, abnormal audit fees and collusion, and then obtain the characteristic variable of audit collusion by multiple regression analysis. On this basis, the thesis use the methods of single-variable model, principal component analysis, LPM, LOGIT and PROBIT regression methods to construct the model of discernment of audit collusion respectively. As audit collusion is highly concealed, it is not ideal to discern by single-variable model, but multi-variable model is better than single-variable model greatly. The discerning accuracy rate of PROBIT model is higher than LPM model, but Logistic model is higher than PROBIT model. Third, expanding the model constructed by Tirole (1986), Kofman and Lawarree (1993), Fahad (2003), the thesis carries on reasoning and demonstrating to analyze the validity of preventing collusion by rewarding or punishing the auditor. Then uses empirical methods to test the effectiveness of punishment mechanism in the fight against collusion from the aspect of abnormal stock market reaction, the value of listed companies, the reputation of auditors, audit quality and audit independence. The results show that the market value of listed companies and the reputation of accounting firms had not been impacted substantially, but punishment mechanism enhance the independence of the audit quality and the audit independence.The main innovation of the thesis lies in: First, the thesis analyses the collaborators how to transform his opportunistic motives to opportunistic behavior from the aspect of institutional arrangements, governance structure, legal liability and reputation stress, which provides theoretical foundation of the research. Second, based on the research about identification of financial reporting fraud, the thesis fully considers the characteristics of the audit conspiracy and constructs the identification models of audit collusion, which provide a better approach to identify the audit collusion case. Third, the thesis analyses the effects of preventive measures and tests it by empirical study, which provide theoretical basis and evidence to improve the existing system for preventing audit collusion.更多还原