【作者】 朱军；

【导师】 谭清美；

【作者基本信息】 南京航空航天大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 本文主要研究信息不对称条件下股东均衡管理问题:股东在监督成本、激励费用、剩余损失和总的代理成本之间的冲突权衡中,寻求一个均衡解,使得股东财富最大化。研究分技术和制度两个层面:技术层面着眼于信息不对称下的逆向选择问题;制度层面着眼于监督制衡与利益博弈的制度安排。研究了逆向选择下委托人通过信号辅助改善信息结构后所面临的信息租金抽取与配置效率的均衡决策问题。针对代理人类型概率分布先验信息的不足,基于贝叶斯规则分析了后验分布下的均衡变动:高质量信号,有利于填补双方信息差距、改进契约;针对信号搜集成本,给出了可行预算集。研究了委托人不同审核策略改善逆向选择信息租金抽取与配置效率的变动情况。与逆向选择下的次优契约牺牲配置效率减少信息租金不同,审核可以减少信息租金并提高配置效率,二者同步改善的情况与高效率代理人谎报被核实概率成正比;核实概率趋于1时,逼近完全信息下的最优结果,趋于0时,接近次优契约的情况;审核附带成本,是核实概率的增函数,这限制了委托人对审核方式的应用程度,最优的核实概率是审核成本与审核带来的信息租金减少、配置效率改善比较权衡的结果。混合审核策略博弈存在惟一的混合策略纳什均衡;混合审核策略可以阻止高效率代理人信息租金抽取,但有配置效率损失和审核成本支出,配置效率的损失情况与次优契约中的情形不同,损失与代理人最优谎报概率成正比。研究了代理人状态不可验证契约纳什实施惟一性问题。代理人逆向选择导致委托人无法直接识别代理人类型状态,造成委托人契约无法与代理人类型状态直接关联。通过建立信号空间上的纳什均衡与有效配置的映射关系,并推广到逆向选择问题中的类型空间,将股东契约与代理人状态联系起来。研究表明,委托人提供的完全信息下最优契约不具备纳什实施惟一性,而满足代理人激励相容约束的次优契约具备纳什实施的惟一性,为合理、有效的激励契约设计提供了检验途径。研究了股东降低信息不对称优化技术性配置的制度保障问题。针对现代公司内部控制人与代理人的交叉融合,以及股东的外部化、分散化,给股东降低信息不对称优化技术性配置带来的阻碍,结合我国实际,研究创新与完善三大制度保障机制,即公司治理制衡、监督与利益博弈机制。最后研究了信息不对称下股东均衡管理的实务应用,以国内证券公司发展为例,探讨了股东的技术层面策略与制度层面策略。更多还原

【Abstract】 Stockholders equilibrium management with asymmetric information is researched in the dissertation. The key point is that stockholders need to find the equilibrium on supervisory costs, incentive costs, surplus loss and the total agency costs trade-off for maxmizing their wealth. The study has two kinds of perspective, one from adverse selection with asymmetric information, another one from supervisory institution.The optimal choice on information rent extraction-efficiency trade-off with adverse selection by improved information structures is researched. Compared with prior beliefs about agent-type distribution, the equilibrium decision with Bayesian posterior beliefs is presented. As a result, the signal of unquestioned quality is good for reducing the information distance between principal and agent, and improving the contract. Finally, the constraint of signal procurement costs budget is described.The improvement on information rent extraction-efficiency trade-off with adverse selection under two kinds of auditing is researched. First, the information rent extraction and allocation efficiency can be improved through auditing, it is different from the second-best contract, but the auditing cost constrains principal to use widely, the optimal audition proving probability is depending on auditing cost and its benefit. Second, the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium under mixed-strategy audition game is unique, the mixed-strategy audition can put information rent extraction to zero, but auditing costs must be paid and allocation efficiency is lost, it is different from the second-best contract in allocation efficiency change, and it is positive linear to the optimal cheating probability of agent.The Nash equilibrium implementing uniqueness of contract with nonverifiable agent types is researched. Based on Nash equilibrium in the signals space, the contract and the agent type is connected, then the uniqueness of Nash implementation on the first-best contract and the second-best contract is researched. As a result, the second-best contract can be Nash implemented uniquely in nonverifiable agent types, but the first-best contract can’t be done.The corporate governance problems in Chinese Listed State-owned Enterprise are researched from institutional perspective, such as the corporate governance supervisory system, independent director system, voting mechanisms, etc. With the new reforming environment of domestic capital market, some proposals for the supervisory system in Chinese listed SOE have been provided. In the end, for an example, the securities company developping policy in efficiency is represented.更多还原