节点文献

反垄断法律责任制度研究

A Study on the Liability System of Antimonoply Law

【作者】 丁国峰

【导师】 王先林;

【作者基本信息】 安徽大学 , 经济法学, 2011, 博士

【摘要】 法律规范所调整的社会关系和所构建的法律秩序,离不开具体权利义务规范的创设,更需要构建健全的责任制度以保障法律的实施。设置科学合理的法律责任制度,约束、制裁违法行为者,确保法律规范得以贯彻、遵守与实施,这是法律制度不可或缺的重要组成部分,是维护秩序和实现正义的必要环节因素。强制性的法律制裁和责任追究机制更是法律制度得以存在的重要条件。法律责任在约束和遏制国家权力滥用的同时,还表达了对个体行为自由的限制与否定,也彰显了对个体行为自由的维护、保障和尊重。法律责任制度的根本目的在于实现立法的核心内容与基本理念,具体责任制度在反垄断法中占据着不可忽略的地位。自由公正的竞争秩序是市场经济良性运行的基本前提,是提升国家整体经济实力的重要保障,更是反垄断法所追求的基本立法目标。若无完整统一、科学可行的反垄断法律责任制度,反垄断法实体规范和程序规则将难以切实遵循,反垄断立法目标将无法得以实现而逐步沦为一纸空文。综合全面、完善合理的反垄断法律责任制度有利于保障反垄断立法目标的实现,在很大程度上,反垄断法的权威地位取决于其责任制度的精心设计和具体安排。衡量与评价反垄断立法价值和制度内容的恰当与否,主要体现于反垄断法所反映与维护的法权意志和利益取向。然而垄断行为扭曲市场竞争机制,破坏经济良性运行,损害相关市场主体的经济收益,特别是使消费者丧失公平交易权、自由选择权等权益而不能成为真正的市场选择者和评判者,减损社会整体的消费者福利。反垄断法实施效果的评价与其责任制度的构建息息相关,如何将白纸黑字的反垄断法条文真正变成阻隔垄断行为的利剑,其关键因素是对反垄断法律责任制度的完善与适用。反垄断法律责任制度对违法垄断行为提供适当的、灵活的救济措施。反垄断法律责任不仅仅是对托拉斯和垄断行为的谴责、阻却和遏制,更重要地是运用强制性、法定性的制裁手段阻却实质性限制竞争行为,对受害者的损失提供合适救济,威慑其他潜在违法行为者,预防、避免和减少其他市场主体从事垄断行为的意图,以维护自由公正的竞争秩序。目前,世界上100多个国家和地区都相继颁布了反垄断法,并相应设置了反垄断法的责任制度。我国反垄断法第七章专门对垄断行为法律责任作出具体规定,但反垄断法律责任制度尚存在许多不完善的地方,主要体现为关于反垄断民事法律责任方面、反垄断行政法律责任方面、反垄断刑事法律责任方面等多层次、多领域的责任问题。垄断行为一般接受反垄断民事责任、反垄断行政责任和反垄断刑事责任等综合性法律制度的调整,其制裁方式分别为民事制裁、行政制裁和刑事制裁三种情形,但原则性、宽泛性的反垄断法律责任制度并不能实现各责任制度之间的合理衔接、充分协调,也不能有效实现其价值目标。因此,构建我国科学合理、协调统一的反垄断法律责任制度体系,需从多个方面入手进行探讨。首先,应运用科学可行的方法对反垄断法律责任制度进行研究。具体研究方法主要包括唯物辩证法、比较分析方法、逻辑推理法、历史分析法、案例分析法、图表数据法、经济分析法、整体主义分析法等,尽量做到法学研究方法与专门研究方法的结合。其次,应从历史发展角度对各主要国家和地区的反垄断法律责任制度进行具体描述、深入分析,努力寻求可兹借鉴的立法经验。最后,应对反垄断法律责任制度体系、反垄断法律责任制度的执行方式进行深入探讨。特别展开对民事责任、行政责任和刑事责任的全面阐述,并提出完善我国反垄断法律责任制度的具体建议。以损害赔偿为核心的民事责任,以行政罚款为重点的行政责任,以及以刑事监禁为中心的刑事责任共同构成了我国反垄断法律责任的基本体系。反垄断法民事责任以民事法律责任为理论前提和内容基础,有着其自身的特殊性和显著不同于民事法律责任的特征,是民事法律责任的细化与延伸。我国反垄断法民事责任应引入惩罚性损害赔偿制度并不断完善受害者实施反垄断民事责任制度的激励机制。惩罚性损害赔偿制度的功能在于惩罚、报复垄断行为者的恶性行为,并预防未来相似垄断行为的再次发生。完善反垄断私人诉讼制度,特别应明确反垄断私人诉讼中原告资格范围,原告资格的主体范围不应只限于与违法行为有直接利害关系的经营者,还应赋予其他受竞争影响市场主体的诉权。反垄断民事责任制度的设置应采用成本收益比例原则和动态量化原则,对市场主体或其他经营者因损害行为而连续遭受的损害结果应在最高额度内给予赔偿,从而激励受损的市场主体提起反垄断损害赔偿诉讼,以维护各类市场主体的竞争利益。我国反垄断法行政责任应不断规范与优化行政制裁责任。反垄断行政法律责任主要是针对垄断行为者设置的,既包括一般经营者、竞争者等市场主体所应承担的行政制裁责任,还涉及行政机构实施限制性竞争行为所应承担的行政法律责任,但并不包括其相应的民事责任和刑事责任。对垄断行为设置行政责任,强化各类行政制裁措施,规范反垄断执法机构的职责与权限,阻却、威慑和遏制各类违法行为者,以实现反垄断法社会公共价值目标。应强化反垄断执法机构实施行政罚款的威慑力,特别应提高其对垄断行为的发现机率,以增加行政罚款责任的实施效力。从最优威慑理论可知,行政罚款数额与罚款责任实际承担的可能性(被处罚的可能性)之间往往是紧密联系、相互补充的,应科学计算行政罚款的限额范围。应进一步明确责任承担主体的范围,应增强行政制裁责任内容的宽度和力度,还应适当增设行政责任制裁的方式和手段。应明确将行政性垄断行为纳入行政诉讼的受案范围,构建其具体的司法审查程序,特别还要规定一定位阶条件下的限制竞争的抽象行政行为应允许接受司法审查并承担相应责任。我国反垄断法刑事责任应进行合理创建并做到适用谨慎。世界上多数国家反垄断法设置刑事责任制度的做法逐渐得到普遍接受。追究严重垄断行为刑事责任是不可避免的,创设刑事责任制度可提升刑罚制裁的可预见性,最具威慑性、严厉性的刑事处罚措施可最大限度遏制、阻却甚至预防垄断行为对社会的危害。刑罚谦抑性要求在社会生活中应尽量减少刑罚的适用范围,只有在其他法律责任手段不足以制裁违法行为时,才有必要动用刑罚制裁措施。刑事责任制度重点制裁的对象不是垄断状态而是垄断行为,特别是严重违法的垄断行为。刑罚制裁的责任范围应严格限制在那些具有严重性、明确性的垄断行为身上,特别应表现为固定价格、分割市场、限制产量等本身违法的联合限制竞争行为、滥用市场支配地位及行政垄断等,刑罚制裁对象应只限于违法性明显、破坏性严重的垄断行为,而不包括一般性、非重要性、非本身违法的垄断行为。应借鉴发达国家反垄断法垄断行为“应刑罚性”理念,采取严重垄断行为入罪的立法措施,进一步明确与细化垄断行为罪与非罪的界限,大力增强刑事责任制裁的力度。

【Abstract】 The adjustment of social relations and the construction of law order are inseparable from the establishment of specific norms of rights and obligations, but also depend on the building of a sound liability system to protect law enforcement. To maintain order and justice in a country, it is most essential for its legal systems to set a scientific and rational legal liability system, for the purpose of restraining, punishing violations, and ensuring the legal norms to be implemented, complied and enforced. A mandatory legal sanction and accountability system is even one of the Prerequisites for the existence of a legal system. Accompanied by the functions of constraining and curbing the abuse of state power, legal responsibility also expresses a restriction, denial, protection, security and respect for the individual behavior freedom. The fundamental purpose of the legal liability system is to achieve the core content of the legislation and basic concepts, whose detailed responsibility systems are an indispensible part of the anti-trust law systems. A free and fair competition order is the basic premise for the sound operation of the market economy, a security for the enhancement of a country’s overall national economic strength, and fundamental goal of antitrust laws. Without a complete, scientific and feasible antitrust liability system, antitrust Substantive norms and procedural rules will be difficult to strictly adhere to and anti-monopoly legislation targets will not be truly achieved. Therefore, it can be seen that the construction of a comprehensive, complete and rational antitrust liability system will help protect the goals of anti-monopoly legislation, more conducive to the effective implementation of anti-monopoly law. Even, we can say that, the authoritative status of antitrust law, to a large extent, originates from the well-design and specific arrangements of its liability systems.In a market economy, the antitrust law is the patron saint of economic freedom and democracy is an important initiative in regulating the market competition order. Measurement and evaluation of the value and appropriateness of the anti-monopoly legislation contents are mainly embodied in reflected in the legal will and interest orientation reflected and protected by the anti-trust law. However, monopolistic behaviors tend to distort market competition mechanism, undermine the healthy operation of the economy, and damage the economic benefits of market players involved, causing, particularly, consumers’loss of the rights of fair trade right and free choice as to fail to play their roles as a market selector and jury, and the impairment of the overall social consumer welfare. Evaluation of the implementation of AML system is closely related to the construction of its liability system, and how to convert a black-and-white anti-monopoly provisions into a sharp sword to block monopolistic behavior, the key factors are the improvement and implementation of antitrust law liability systems. And any anti-competitive practice in the market should bear its corresponding responsibility. For the illegal monopoly behaviors, antitrust liability systems provide the corresponding appropriate, flexible relief measures. The functions performed by the antitrust liability systems are the condemnation, negation, and containment of trust and monopoly behaviors, and more importantly, is the use of mandatory and law-based sanction measures to negate substantial restriction competition behaviors, and to provide appropriate relief to the loss of the victims, and deter other potential violation players and to prevent, avoid and reduce the monopoly of other market players so as to maintain a free and fair competition order.At present, more than 100 countries and regions have enacted anti-monopoly laws, and accordingly set their liability regimes. In China, Chapter VII of its anti-monopoly law just specifies in antitrust liability, but there are still many imperfections in it. The problems are mainly reflected on the aspect of civil liability, of administrative liability, of criminal liability, and other multi-level, multi-areas of liability. Monopoly behaviors usually receive adjustment from the comprehensive anti-monopoly legal system such as civil liability, administrative liability and criminal liability, the sanction forms including civil sanction, administrative sanction, and criminal sanction. However, if the liability system just stays in the principle and broad-nature level, it will not achieve the rational, well-coordinated link between the liability systems, and its value targets either. Therefore, to build our scientific and rational, coherent liability systems of antitrust law, we should start off from the following aspects. First, in doing the research, scientific and feasible research methods should be applied. The Specific research methods adopted in this paper include dialectical materialism, comparative analysis, logical reasoning, historical analysis, case analysis, chart data, economic analysis, holism analysis, with a combination of the specialized research methods and law research methods. Secondly, specific and in-depth description and analysis of the anti-monopoly law liability systems from major countries and regions should be made, from the perspective of the historical development, for the advantage of learning from the legislative experience of other countries. Finally, discussions on current China’ antitrust law liability system and its implementation forms are done, including an in-depth and comprehensive exposition in its civil, administrative and criminal liabilities, and concrete suggestions on how to improve China’s current anti-monopoly law liability systems.Antitrust law possesses property of private and public law fusion, which determines the liability system has the features of being integrated, comprehensive, systematic, compensatory, deterrent, punitive. The damage compensation-cored civil liability, the administrative fine-cored administrative liability, and the criminal detention-cored criminal liability together constitute the basic system of our country’s antitrust liability systems. Antitrust civil liability, with civil liability as its theoretical premise and content base, has its own characteristics and significantly differs from the characteristics of civil liability, and is a refinement and extension of the civil liability. China’s anti-monopoly law civil liability should introduce the punitive damage compensation system and continue to improve the incentives of victim implementation antitrust civil system. The function of punitive damage compensation system is to punish and retaliate malignant monopolistic behaviors and prevent any future recurrence of the similar kinds. To improve the private antitrust litigation, the scope of the plaintiff should be specified, and the plaintiff’ main qualifications should not be limited to the operators who are directly offended by the violations, and appeal right should also be given to other market players who have been affected by the monopoly action. The design of the antitrust civil liability should follow cost-benefit ratio principle and dynamic quantification principle and the compensations for the market players or other operators who have suffered consecutive damages should be within the maximum compensation amount, so as to encourage market players bring the damaged antitrust action for damages and to protect the competitive interests of various market players.In its administrative liability part, China’s anti-monopoly law should continue to regulate and optimize its administrative sanction responsibility. Antitrust administrative liability is mainly for monopoly actors, and includes both administrative sanction responsibility to be assumed by common managers and competitors and administrative liability to be assumed by administrative bodies who have performed restrictive competitive practices, but excludes their matching civil liability and criminal liability. The functions of administrative liability are to strengthen various types of administrative sanctions, to regulate the duties and powers of the anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies, and to negate, deter and contain various types of violations, in order to achieve the social and public value goals of antitrust law. The deterrence should be strengthened of anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies to implement administrative penalty, and in particular, their probability of discovery of monopolistic behavior improved, to increase the effectiveness of the administrative fine implementation. Generally speaking, excessive administrative fines exceeding the damage caused by monopoly behavior may be considered unfair, but if the fine is only for part of the monopoly actors, it may also be considered unconscionable. We know from the theory of Optimal Deterrence that the amount of administrative fines and the possibility for penalties actually being enforced (the possibility of punishment) are often closely related to and complemented with each other, so the maximum range of administrative fines should be computed and set scientifically. The scope of responsibility undertaking body should be clarified, and the width and intensity of the administrative sanction responsibility content be strengthened, and ways and means of sanctions be properly expanded. Acts of administrative monopoly should also be explicitly included in the scope of administrative litigation cases, with its specific judicial review procedures to be built, and in particular, to the abstract administrative acts restricting competition under certain positioning order should be clearly defined to be subject to judicial review.In its criminal liability part, China’s anti-monopoly law criminal liability should be reasonably made and carefully applied. It has become a widely-accepted practice for a country to set its anti-monopoly criminal liability system. Criminal accountability for serious monopoly acts is inevitable, and the creation of criminal sanctions can improve the predictability of criminal penalty, and the most deterrent and severe criminal penalties can, to the maximum extent, curb, negate and even prevent the harm to society caused by monopolistic behaviors. Penalty Modesty principle with the criminal law requires the minimization of the scope of criminal penalty, and is only applied when other means of legal responsibility fail to achieve the intended effect. Focus object of criminal liability sanction is not the monopolistic state, but the behavior, especially serious illegal monopolistic behavior. Responsibility scope with criminal penalties should be strictly limited to those with a serious, clear nature of monopolistic behaviors, in particular, to those such as joint restricting competition expressed as a fixed price, market division, output restriction, abuse of dominant market position, and the administrative monopoly. The sanction object should be limited to those with obviously illegal, destructive and serious monopolistic behaviors, but not the general, non-important, and non-illegal monopoly behaviors. Besides, we should learn from developed countries’concept of Deserving Penalty, take legislative measures of serious monopoly acts deserving serious and further clarify and refine the boundaries of crime monopoly and non-crime monopoly, so as to enhance the intensity of criminal sanctions.

  • 【网络出版投稿人】 安徽大学
  • 【网络出版年期】2012年 03期
  • 【分类号】D922.294
  • 【被引频次】16
  • 【下载频次】2208
  • 攻读期成果
节点文献中: 

本文链接的文献网络图示:

本文的引文网络