【作者】 卢山；

【导师】 周军；

【作者基本信息】 武汉理工大学 ， 产业经济学， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 公司治理模式是公司制度长期发展演变的结果。良好的公司治理模式能够保证股东、债权人及相关利益主体的收益,提高公司的经营业绩和公司价值,同时也有利于一国经济的持续稳定增长。东亚经济发展的一个显著特点,就是大规模的公司制企业在经济起飞和高速增长中发挥过重大的作用,而这些公司的发展又与其治理结构是分不开的。东亚地区公司治理的特点主要体现在两个方面：其一是公司是由“大股东”(银行、政府、家族等关键人)控制的,他们直接或间接地掌握着公司的实际控制权,对公司管理者形成重大制约；其二是诸如股票市场、职业经理人市场、公司控制权市场等公司外部市场难以对管理者构成有效制约。这种非市场约束型的公司治理模式对东亚经济发展起到过举世瞩目的成效,推动了经济的高速增长,创造了享誉世界的“东亚奇迹”。然而,东亚地区公司治理模式所暴露出的弊端也不断出现,如公司中小股东和公司的利益受到“关键人”的侵害,公司经营绩效和价值的低下,公司缺乏竞争力,国内经济发展受到严重的阻碍。这些问题是日本“泡沫经济”破灭,经济陷入长达十年的萧条以及亚洲金融危机爆发的主要原因之一,以至于部分学者认为东亚危机实质上是一场公司治理危机。这样,东亚地区公司治理模式的特点和作用,其存在的问题及改革的方向和途径,成为一个有待探讨的重大问题。全文共分为七章。第一章为导论。主要介绍了本文的选题背景和意义,从一般理论层面上界定了若干基本概念和辨析了公司治理相关基本理论,并指出了本文的主要研究内容、框架和主要研究方法。第二章为东亚地区公司治理研究文献述评。本章从家族约束型治理、法人约束型治理和政府约束型治理模式三个角度对目前东亚地区公司治理的研究现状进行了回顾,在此基础上作一简要的评论。第三章考察了东亚地区公司治理模式演变的三个阶段,概括介绍了亚洲金融前几种具有典型代表的公司治理模式以及亚洲金融危机后东亚公司治理模式的完善,为具体研究东亚地区公司治理模式提供了一个参照系。第四章以日本公司治理为例,对东亚地区法人约束型治理模式的基本特征、作用、存在的问题及成因进行了全面、深入的分析,认为相互持股、主银行相机治理和终身雇用的“三大法宝”在维持公司经营、节约监督成本等方面起到了积极作用,但这种模式也暴露出“内部人控制”和公司外部治理市场发展滞后的缺陷。第五章论述了东亚政府成为公司治理主体的原因以及政府约束型治理模式的特征。认为政府一方面在市场失灵和法律法规缺失的条件下积极介入公司治理在一定程度上推动了公司的发展和壮大,是东亚奇迹产生的根源；另一方面,规范分析了政府过多地干预公司不利于公司治理水平的提高和公司绩效的提升。这一章还以中国上市公司的实证研究为例,研究结果显示：政府对公司经营活动的控制越小,对公司的法律保护程度越高,越有利于公司经营绩效的提升。第六章分析了东亚地区公司治理改革的方式、途径以及取得的成效。这一章以中国上市公司的实证研究为例,研究结果显示：并购在一定程度上能够改善公司的业绩,市场主导型并购对公司绩效的影响优于政府主导型的并购。基于上述分析,本文认为未来东亚地区公司治理模式转型的方向仍然是以市场约束型治理模式为主线：既要从公司内部提高董事会和监事会的独立性和发挥其职能；更要从公司外部加快外部治理市场的建设,完善和加大相关法律法规的执行力度和转变政府在公司治理中的角色。第七章主要概括了全文的主要研究结论和创新点,指出了全文研究中存在的不足和对后续研究提出了具体的设想。更多还原

【Abstract】 The mode of corporate governance is the results of corporation’s long-term evolution. A good mode not only ensures the benefits of shareholders, creditors and stakeholders associated with improvement of the company’s operating performance and firm value, but also is conducive to continued and steady growth of a country’s economy. A remarkable characteristic of East Asian economic development is that the large-scale enterprises play an important role in the period of economic take-off and growth. However, the company’s development and their governance structure are inseparable. The characteristics of corporate governance in East Asia are mainly reflected in two aspects:one is that corporation is controlled by "substantial shareholder" such as banks, government, family, and other key person who hold the actual controlling rights of the company directly or indirectly and restrict corporate managers, the other is the external markets such as stock market, market of professional managers, corporate controlling market are difficult to constitute an effective constraint on managers. This type of corporate governance based on non-market constraints plays a remarkable performance during the period of East Asian economic development and promotes rapid economic growth as well as create "East Asian miracle." However, corporate governance in East Asia has exposed many shortcomings such as minority shareholders and company’s interests are expropriated by "key person", company’s poor operating performance and value, the lack of competition associated with the domestic economy development is severely hampered which is one of the main reasons of Japan’s "bubble economy" burst economic depression and the Asian financial crisis so as that some scholars believe that the East Asian crisis is essentially a corporate governance crisis. The features and functions of corporate governance in East Asia, its problems and the direction of reform and ways which are major issues to be further explored.The dissertation is organized as follows:the first chapter is an introduction. In this chapter, it introduces the research background and significance, defines several basic concepts and discriminates the basic theory of corporate governance from theoretical level as well as points out the main contents of this paper, the framework and the main research methods. ChapterⅡis review of corporate governance in East Asia. It reviews the current status of corporate governance of East Asia from three aspects related to family-constrained governance, legal person-constrained governance and government-constrained besides a brief comment on them.The next chapter is the three stages of evolution of corporate governance in East Asia. It overviews some typical models of corporate governance before Asian financial crisis and improvement of corporate governance mode after the Asian financial crisis which provides a frame of reference for researching corporate governance in East Asia.In chapter IV, it analyzes the basic characteristics roles, problems and causes of legal-constrained corporate governance mode in East Asia comprehensively based on Japanese corporate governance. It points out that cross-shareholdings, contingent governance by main bank and lifetime employment which are called "three magic weapons" has played a positive role in the maintenance of company operation and savings of supervision cost. However, its deficiencies of "internal control" and development lag of external corporate governance market have been exposed.In the following chapter, it discusses the reasons for East Asian government as the main governance body and characteristics of government-constrained governance. On one hand, the government active involvement in corporate governance promotes the company’s development and growth to some extent under the condition of market failure associated with the absence of laws and regulations which is also the causes of the East Asian miracle; on the other hand, the massive intervention in the company by the government is not conducive to raising the level of corporate governance and company performance improvement. The empirical study results coming from China’s listed companies show that the smaller control of business activities of the companies and the more degree of legal protection for the company by government, the more conducive to business performance improvement.Chapter VI analyzes the corporate governance reform, approaches and results achieved in East Asia. The empirical study results coming from China’s listed companies show that mergers and acquisitions can improve the company’s performance to some extent and the influence on firm performance by market-oriented mergers and acquisitions is better than that of government-oriented. Based on above analysis, this paper argues that the future direction of transformation of corporate governance in East Asia is still a market-constrained governance mode. The independence of board of directors and supervisors are to be improved as well as their functions need to be exerted. Moreover, the construction of external governance market should be accelerated, the enforcement of relevant laws and regulations should be improved and strengthened associated with the government’s role in corporate governance is need to be changed.The last chapter summarizes the main conclusions and innovation, which pointes out the shortcomings of the dissertation and proposes the specific ideas of further research.更多还原