【作者】 戴春爱；

【导师】 唐小我；

【作者基本信息】 电子科技大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 文献回顾表明,关于项目合同管理的文献与关于EVM的研究文献孤立地在各自的领域内进行讨论。针对这一问题,本文假设项目的工作分解结构已经作了适当定义和项目权威得以适当配置,使用EVM系统下的两个基本的业绩指标(进度差异(SV)和成本差异(CV))定义项目委托人向项目代理人提供的合同,建立项目委托人与项目代理人之间的在不同决策情形下的委托代理模型,并求解了相应的委托代理模型。进一步,对这些模型的解进行比较静态分析以揭示各种外生变量的变化对最优激励合同和项目业绩的影响。通过这些分析,获得了如下具有创新性的结论。(1)注意到项目目标的多维属性,在一个(简单的)最优综合激励合同下,证明了项目期望业绩与项目代理人的能力之间正相关,但与项目代理人的风险规避程度和项目环境的风险负相关。(2)基于项目目标的多维属性,在最优的差别激励合同下,给出了对SV和CV两个业绩的最优激励强度之间的关系:当代理人两种努力相互替代(互补,独立)时,相应的激励强度之间也存在着替代(互补,独立)关系。进一步,证明了最优激励强度之间替代(互补)程度随着代理人努力之间的替代(互补)程度、项目代理人风险规避程度和代理人用于降低实际成本努力的边际相对风险的增加而增加,但随着项目代理人用于提高挣值努力的边际相对风险的增加而减小。(3)基于一个加权综合业绩测度,给出了最优综合激励合同与最优差别激励合同之间的等价性条件:项目委托人在综合激励合同下通过业绩评估的相对权重与在差别激励合同下相对激励强度相等。(4)建立和求解了一个相当一般的委托代理模型框架,揭示了中国背景下的隐性“关系”对委托人和代理人之间的行为互动、最优显性激励合同和显性经济业绩的影响,并证明了如下结论:(I)关系双方的关系行为对关系利益系数、关系利益分享系数和委托人关系行为成本变化的反应具有协调性,但对代理人关系行为成本的反应不协调;(II)关系利益系数增加(关系利益分享系数增加,委托人的关系行为成本减小)将倾向于降低显性业绩分享系数和期望显性业绩,但是,代理人的关系行为成本增加(减小)不会影响显性业绩分享系数,但会增加(降低)代理人用于生产显性业绩的努力,从而增加(降低)期望显性业绩;(III)当关系存在时,与不考虑关系的委托代理模型合同相比较,考虑关系合同时的委托代理合同的激励效果是否优于前者取决于显性业绩生产所涉及到的经济特征、关系合同性质和关系行为成本。(5)将EVM系统的两个业绩指标(SV和CV)引入到(4)中委托代理模型框架,基于“关系”背景下的最优综合激励合同,证明了项目期望业绩(I)随着项目代理人的能力水平的增加而提高;(II)随着项目代理人的风险厌恶程度的增加而降低;(III)随着项目环境的不确程度的增加而降低;(IV)随着关系为项目委托人和项目代理人带来共同利益大小的增加而提高,但与“关系”的互惠性特征无关。最后,总结了本文的研究结果,并指出了一些可能的扩展研究。更多还原

【Abstract】 A literature review shows that the research on project contract management and the research on EVM go separately in their own fields. Focusing on this problem, this paper assumes that the work breakdown structure is properly defined and the authority in project operations is well allocated, builds principal-agent models between a project principal and a project agent for different decision-making contexts where the corresponding contracts that the principal offers to the agent are defined via the schedule variance and the cost variance in EVM, and solve those models. Further, the comparative statics on those solutions are conducted to explore the impacts of exogenous variables on the optimal incentive contracts and the induced project performance. With these studies, we draw a couple of new conclusions as follows.(1) Faced with the multi-dimensional property of project objectives, we show under an optimal (simple) synthesized incentive contract that the expected project performance is positively related to the competence of the agent, and negatively related to the agent’s degree of risk aversion and the envirmental risk.(2) Based on the muti-dimensional property of project objectives, we give under an optimal differentiated incentive contract the relationship between the incentive intensities on the schedule variance and on the cost variance: When the agent’s efforts are substitutes (complements, independents), the corresponding relationship between incentive intensities is substituting (complementary, independent). Further, we show that the degree of substitution (complementation) increases as the degrees of the agent’s substitution (complementation) between efforts, the magnitude of his/her risk aversion and the marginal relative risk of his/her efforts to reduce the actual costs of the project increase, but decreases as his/her the marginal relative risk of his/her efforts to raise the earned value of the project increases.(3) Based on a weighted synthesized performance measure, we give the condition under which an optimal synthesized incentive contract and an optimal differentiated incentive contract are equivalent: the princpal’s relative weight for evalutatin different performance indicators under a synthesized incentive contract is equal to the relative incentive intensity under a differentiated incentive contract.(4) We build and solve a very general principal-agent model, explore the impacts of the implicit Chinese guanxi on the ineraction between the principal and the agent, the optimal explicit incentive contract and the resulted explicit economic performance, and then prove the following conclusions. (I) the guanxi parties harmoniously respond to the changes of the coefficient of guanxi benefits, the sharing coefficient of guanxi benefits, and the cost of the principal’s guanxi actions, but their responses to the changes of the cost of the agent’s guanxi actions are not harmonious; (II) an increase of the coefficient of guanxi benefits (an increase of the sharing coefficient of guanxi benefits, a decrease of the cost of the principal’s guanxi actions) tends toward making the sharing coefficient of explicit performance and the expected explicit performance fall, but an increase of the cost of the agent’s guanxi actions raises the expected performance by stimulating the agent to elicit more efforts on the production of explicit performance even if it has no effect on the sharing coefficient of explicit performance; (III) comparing to the case of ignoring the implicit guanxi contract, whether the outcomes of an explicit incentive contracting with the concern of the implicit guanxi contract are better depends on the economic properties involved in producing explicit performance, the characteristics of the guanxi contract and the costs of guanxi actions.(5) By introducing the schedule variance and the cost variance as performance indicators into the framework of the principal-agent model in (4), we show under the optimal synthesized incentive contract in a guanxi setting that the expected project performance (I) increases as the agent’s competence increases, (II) decreases as the agent’s degree of risk aversion increases, (III) decreases as the uncertainty of the external environment of the project in question increases, (IV) increases as mutual benefits on the basis of the guanxi increase but is regardless of the characteristic of the guanxi.Finally, we summarize the results and point out some possible extensions on the current research.更多还原