【作者】 Kalyan Raj Sharma（高亮）；

【导师】 尹翔硕；

【作者基本信息】 复旦大学 ， 国际贸易， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 后冲突转型国家目前在世界上是一个独特的群体,虽然该类国家国内在不同程度上存在着一些不稳定因素,但是总体形势正在不断改善。这些国家都面临着“如何吸引FDI促进经济发展”的难题。目前看来,该领域的的理论研究和实证检验都是一个新的研究领域,现有的研究相对较少。因此,本文将对这一问题进行探索。本文认为,外商直接投资(FDI)可作为后冲突转型国家振兴经济的主要方式之一,因为它将有助于此类国家扩大资本存量,加速技术进步、增加就业机会、进一步吸引外来援助等各种有形和无形的收益。在经济全球化的背景下,外商直接投资无疑还将有利于后冲突转型国家实现长期的经济稳定,从而实现与国际市场接轨。最为重要的是,通过外商直接投资,后冲突转型国家能够逐步实现自行增长,走上独立自主的社会发展之路。随着国内政治形势的逐步好转和稳定,对于外商投资者而言,大部分后冲突转型国家均提供了具有吸引力的高收益机会,同时也包含着一些独有的投资风险,诸如国有化、政策的连续和稳定性、贪污腐败等政治及经济风险。为了消除外商投资者在这方面存在的种种顾虑,后冲突转型国家政府通常会制定相应的法律和政策,以便确保和激励外商投资者的投资。与此同时,外商投资企业或跨国公司出于对自身利益的考虑,也会选择不同的资本进入和盈利模式。以这些问题为背景,本文的一个特点就在于,构建了一个关于后冲突转型国家和跨国公司之间的博弈模型。把后冲突转型国家政府与跨国公司(外商投资企业)作为参与博弈的双方,该博弈模型为文章提供了一个基本的理论分析框架；其中,转型国家调整结构的意愿和效果与跨国公司FDI战略存在着某种相关性。具体地说,东道国在其政治目标的实现与招商引资之间存在着某种替代关系,而跨国公司的目的则是选择最恰当的资本进入方式进入东道国,如跨国并购或者新设投资(或称“绿地投资”)等。该博弈模型存在两个均衡：第一个均衡是(FT, AQ),即东道国致力于快速的经济结构调整,颁布和实施市场化政策,跨国公司则选择在现有政策下通过跨国并购进入市场,这个均衡总可在产业结构调整过程中形成。第二个均衡是(GD, NP)。即东道国选择渐进的改革方式,跨国公司则更多地通过设立新厂,直接转移技术和管理知识。博弈模型体现了东道国政府和跨国公司之间的相互适应过程。实证分析部分。本文运用1980-2009年的36个后冲突转型国家的宏观经济面板数据,对该类国家的政府政策与外商直接投资之间的相关性进行了实证分析。由此得到的结果表明,东道国国内生产总值的增长速度、基础设施、政治稳定、贸易开放政策等是外商直接投资的主要决定因素。尼泊尔是一个典型的后冲突转型国家。本文利用尼泊尔1980-2009年宏观经济面板数据及国内的相关政策变量,对尼泊尔利用外资数量进行了回归检验,结果显示出外商直接投资与尼泊尔国内宏观经济变量和开放政策之间存在高度的相关关系。总之,本文将理论研究与后冲突国家现实将结合,采用博弈模型与实证检验的分析方法,对后冲突转型国家吸引FDI理论和现实进行了初步的探索,得出了一些研究结论。限于文章相关模型的拓展难度和后冲突国家资料和数据有限,很多研究还欠深入,尚需要进一步探索。更多还原

【Abstract】 The post-conflicting and transitional countries are viewed as a kind of some special ones in today’s world. While there remains some degree of political instability, hopefully they are in the phase of the peace and development now. For those nations, how to attract more FDI represents a meaningful but challenging question. And, as we see, such a topic has received little attention for economists yet. Realizing the very importance of FDI, this dissertation will examine and explore that the role of FDI in the post conflict transactional economy.FDI is one of the main ways for post-conflict countries to increase economy, as it can help these countries to increase their stock of capital, accelerate technology advancement, generate employment, and bring about other visible or invisible benefits such as foreign assistance. FDI is also conducive for the long-term economic stability of post-conflict countries, creating conditions for their integration with world market, which is extremely important in the context of economic globalization. Most importantly, the ultimate goal of encouraging FDI is to help post-conflict countries realize independent economic growth and embark on a road of independent social development.With improving political situation, post-conflict countries will provide highly profitable investment opportunities, making them appealing in the eyes of most foreign investors. But there is a widespread concern over some political and economic risks specific to these countries, such as the uncertainties in nationalization, the inconsistency and instability of policies, serious bribery and corruption, just to name a few. In order to eliminate the concerns of foreign investors, post-conflict countries have made regulations and policies correspondingly to encourage investment. In the mean time, for the sake of their own interests, foreign investment enterprises (or multinational corporations) will also make a comparison among different model of entry of capital and different business modes to find the way that suits them best. Considering these facts, this paper develops a game model between post-conflict countries and multinational corporations.Taking post-conflict countries and multinational corporations as two game players, the proposed game model provides a basic theoretical framework for the paper, in which the will of the nations in transition to restructure and the effect of restructuring is somewhat correlated with the FDI strategy adopted by multinational corporations. Specifically speaking, on the part of host countries, there is a substitution relationship between the realization of their political goals and the encouragement of investment, while on the part of investors, their aim is to enter the target country with most appropriate entry mode of capital, such as the cross-border acquisitions, the newly created investment (also referred as "Greenfield Investment"), etc. The proposed game model can reach two equilibriums. The first equilibrium (FT, AQ) is a state where host countries actively issue and implement relevant market policies to realize rapid economic restructuring, while multinational corporations enter the host country through cross-border acquisition in compliance with current policies. This equilibrium is to be reached in the process of industry restructuring. The second equilibrium (GD, NP) means a state where host countries adopt progressive reforming mode, while multinational corporations prefer to directly transfer technology and management knowledge through establishing new plants. The game model represents the mutually adaptation process between post-conflict countries and multinational corporations.Drawing on the panel data of 36 post-conflict countries from 1980-2009, the paper carries out an empirical analysis of these macroeconomic data and the correlation between governmental policies and FDI. The analysis results show that the major factors affecting FDI are the growth rate of GDP, the infrastructure construction, the political stability, the opening degree of trade, etc. of host countries.Nepal, the motherland of the author, is one of the post-conflict country. The paper utilizes the macroeconomic panel data of Nepal from 1980 to 2009 and relevant policy variables to conduct a regression test of Nepal’s introduction of foreign investment. The test results suggest a high correlation between the amount of FDI with Nepal’s macroeconomic variables and the opening policies.Combining theoretical analysis with the reality of post-conflict countries, the paper constructs a game model and adopts empirical approaches to make preliminary exploration into the theory and practice of post-conflict countries’introduction of FDI. However, due to the difficulty in extending the proposed model and the limited access to the material and data concerning post-conflict countries, the explanation given in this paper is not sufficient enough, thus requiring further exploration.更多还原