【作者】 廖莉；

【导师】 吴耀华；

【作者基本信息】 山东大学 ， 控制理论与控制工程， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 在我国,“三农”问题已成为关系着国家稳定与社会和谐发展的全局性、根本性、战略性问题。解决“三农”问题的根本出路在于农业现代化,而制约我国农业现代化的瓶颈之一就是农产品供应链效率不高,严重影响了我国农业产业的竞争力,难以应对经济全球化浪潮的严峻挑战。因此,农产品供应链问题已成为目前我国最迫切需要解决的问题之一,研究如何优化农产品供应链,降低成本、提高效率和农产品质量,具有重要的理论和现实意义。本文针对导致我国农产品供应链效率不高的几个关键问题,运用供应链管理理论、博弈论、契约理论、行为经济学及最优化理论进行了相应的研究,主要研究内容和成果如下：1.农产品供应链分销网络设计优化建立了一个新的结合库存控制的农产品分销网络选址—分配问题数学模型,寻求合理的分销中心数量和位置、每个分销中心所服务的需求点,以及各分销中心和需求点的最优订货策略,使得整个分销系统总成本最低。该模型综合考虑了农产品分销网络中多品种、变质损耗、运费不均衡、库存成本、服务水平、固定折旧成本、总投资预算有限等方面因素,更具实用性。针对优化问题特点,提出了启发式的并行禁忌搜索算法求解。该算法首先根据投资预算限制进行问题可行解的空间划分,然后通过并行禁忌搜索克服单点出发的弱点,在各从进程禁忌搜索中,以运输距离最短给出可行的初始解。仿真结果表明该算法有效地缩小了搜索空间,提高了求解速度。2.农产品供应链分销网络库存—配送路径优化分别针对加盟连锁和直营连锁两种经营模式,建立了一对多、间隔周期补货的农产品供应链两级分销网络库存一配送路径优化问题数学模型。该模型综合考虑了顾客需求与库存相关、农产品变质损耗及处理成本、车辆启动成本等因素,且加盟连锁模式采用的是批发价合同。对加盟连锁模式,提出了基于启发式自适应遗传算法的模型求解方法；对直营连锁模式,提出了带零头修正的双层遗传算法进行模型求解。双层遗传算法的上层用于确定对零售商的送货周期和送货量,下层用于确定分销商的最优订货周期和订货量,以及分销商配送中心的最优配送线路,并进行零头修正操作、确定对零售商的送货修正量,同时将优化结果反馈回上层。通过仿真实验,表明了所提算法的有效性,探讨了固定订货成本和批发价格对加盟连锁模式供应链的影响,并将两种经营模式进行了对比。3.随机产出下农产品供应链的生产优化与协调分别考虑乘法型和加法型随机产出,建立了确定性需求下以采购加工商为主导的供应商—加工商两级农产品供应链的Stackelberg博弈模型。该模型基于批发价契约、批发价加缺货惩罚契约、批发价加剩余原材料收购惩罚、批发价加剩余原材料收购加缺货惩罚四种契约,寻求最优的生产策略与契约参数使供应链成员的利益最大。通过理论分析和算例比较,表明：(1)在乘法型随机产出下,产品市场需求量、加工商最优订货量、供应商最优投产量之间成正比关系,比例系数由契约参数确定；在加法型随机产出下,产品市场需求量、加工商最优订货量、供应商最优投产量之间的差值均为常值,该值由契约参数确定；(2)本文契约能使乘法型随机产出下的供应链完全协调,但不能使加法型随机产出下的供应链完全协调；(3)综合考虑到供应链总利润最大化、利润分割的灵活性和操作简便性,本文四个契约中,批发价加剩余原材料收购契约最有优势,接下来依次是批发价加原材料收购加缺货惩罚契约、批发价契约、批发价加缺货惩罚契约。4.基于公平心理偏好的农产品质量检验优化与供应商激励机制以提高农产品质量为目的,以一个核心企业加工商和两个初级农产品供应商组成的两级农产品供应链为研究对象,建立了综合考虑质量抽检和公平心理偏好的农产品供应链委托—代理模型,寻求最优的农产品抽检率和报酬契约及参数,使加工商以最小的激励成本达到让两个供应商都努力工作的效果。在风险中性条件下,通过理论分析和算例比较,表明：(1)最优抽检率与检验成本系数负相关,与生产随机性正相关；(2)极端相对业绩评价契约和中间联合契约可以取得激励效益正收益,且收益率与检验成本系数正相关,与生产的随机性负相关；(3)在最优契约的选取上,当生产随机性较大且检验成本系数较小时,应选择极端团队业绩评价契约,其余情况下更倾向于选择中间联合契约。更多还原

【Abstract】 In China, the "Agriculture, Rural and Peasant" problem has become an overall, fundamental and strategic problem which relations with the country’s stability and so-ciety’s harmonious development. The basic outlet that solves the problem lies in the agricultural modernization. One of the bottleneck factors that restrict the agricultural modernization is the inefficient agricultural products supply chains, which has seriously affected the industry competitiveness of our country agriculture, and make it very difficult to cope with the grim challenges brought about by global economic progress. Therefore, the problem about the agricultural products supply chain has become one of the most imminent and urgent problems to resolve. The study has great academic sense and real significance in optimizing the supply chain of agricultural products, reducing cost, improving efficiency and the products’quality.In view of the several above key problems, relevant research is done in this paper, which is based on supply chain management theory, game theory, contract theory, behavioral economics and optimization theory. The main creative work is as follows: 1. Optimization design of distribution network for agriculture products supply chainA new mathematical model of Location Allocation Problem for agriculture products distribution network is founded, which is based on inventory control. The objective is to determine the rational numbers and position of distribution centers, the demand points which served by each distribution center, and the optimal order strategy of every distribution center and demand point. In this model, comprehensively considered factors of multi-item, deteriorating, imbalance transportation cost, inventory cost, service level, depreciation of fixed assets, and limited investment budget etc.. Therefore it is more practical.According to the characteristics of optimal problem, A heuristic parallel tabu search algorithm is presented. This algorithm first made space partition of the feasible solution, which based on the limited investment budget, then overcome the shortcoming of single point departure by parallel tabu search. In the followed parallel tabu search process, the initial solutions are obtained based on lest transportation distance. The simulation results show that it can reduce the search space and improve solving speed effectively.2. Inventory-distribution routing optimization of agriculture products distribution networkIn view of the two management modes, coalition chain and regular chain, two mathematical models of inventory-distribution routing optimization for two-echelon agriculture products distribution network are established. These models are based on one-to-many, interval periodic order, demand depend on inventory, deteriorating treatment cost of agriculture products, start-up costs of vehicles etc.. In the coalition chain, the wholesale price contract is adopted.According to the model of coalition chain, an heuristic adaptive genetic algorithm is presented. And for the regular chain, a two-layer genetic algorithm based on oddment modification is proposed. In the two-layer genetic algorithm, the upper layer is to determine the distribution periodic and quantity, and the lower layer is to seek the optimal order cycle, quantity and distribution routes of the distributor. Furthermore, the lower layer determines the rational oddment modification number, and optimal results are sent back to the upper layer. Based on simulation experiment, the validity of the algorithms is demonstrated, the Influence of fixed order cost and wholesale price in the coalition chain is discussed, and the two management modes are compared.3. Production optimization and coordination of agriculture products supply chain based on random yieldAccording to additive and multiplicative random yield respectively, stackelberg game models of two-echelon agriculture products supply chain are founded, in which the manufacturer is the leader with deterministic demand, the supplier is the follower with random yield. These models are based on wholesale price contract and the contracts combined with wholesale price, penalty for insufficient yield and purchase for surplus yield, and the objective is to determine the optimal production strategy and contract parameter to maximize benefits of the supply chain members.By theory and simulation analysis, the following results are obtained:(1) In case of multiplicative random yield, there is direct ratio relations between market demand of agriculture products, optimal order quantity of manufacture and optimal input quantity of supplier, in which the proportional coefficients depend on the contract parameters. In case of additive random yield, the difference value between market demand of agriculture products, optimal order quantity of manufacture and optimal input quantity of supplier is constant values, which depend on the contract parameters.(2) The contracts in this paper can realize the perfect coordination of the supply chain under multiplicative random yield conditions, but can not under additive random yield conditions.(3) In view of maximization the total profit of supply chain, flexibility of profit distribution and simplify operation, in the four contracts, the wholesale price contract combined with purchase for surplus yield is the best, then the wholesale price contract combined with penalty for insufficient yield and purchase for surplus yield, the wholesale price contract, the wholesale price contract combined with penalty for insufficient yield in sequence.4. Quality inspection optimization of agriculture products based on fairness preferences and incentive mechanism of suppliersBy taking a two-echelon agriculture products supply chain as the research object, which consisted of one leader manufacturer and two follower suppliers, a principal-agent model based on quality sampling inspection and fairness preferences is established. The objective is to determine the optimal sampling inspection rate, the optimal compensation contract and its parameters, which can motivate the suppliers to work hard and improve quality with manufacture’s lowest incentive cost.By theory and simulation analysis under the risk-neutral assumption, the following conclusions are obtained:(1) The optimal sampling inspection rate is significant negatively correlated with inspection cost coefficient, and positively correlated with the product randomness. (2) Positive income of motivation benefit can obtained under the extreme relation achievement evaluation contract and the middle joint contract, and the return is positively correlated with inspection cost coefficient, and negatively correlated with the product randomness.(3) In terms of contact selection, when the inspection cost coefficient is little and the product randomness is strong, the extreme team achievement evaluation contract should be adopted, otherwise, it is inclined to the middle joint contract.更多还原