【作者】 孙文琪；

【导师】 曹玉昆；

【作者基本信息】 东北林业大学 ， 林业经济管理， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 随着社会主义市场经济的发展和国有林区林权改革的深入,国有林各经营主体的利益权益能否得到保障,是这场改革能否进一步进行与成败的关键所在,因此,寻求各利益主体之间利益的均衡点,是保证改革顺利进行的关键。现阶段国有林区利益主体责权利改革面临诸多制约因素,本文以博弈理论为基础,以制度政策为载体,探索国有林各利益主体在责、权、利方面的平衡点,为进化国有林区林权改革提供理论依据与可操作性政策建议,促进国有林区社会的可持续发展。本文所界定的国有林区林权改革的利益主体为国家、林业企业及国有林区职工群众三方。论文首先对国有林区历史进程中国家、国有森工企业、职工在经营利用国有森林资源的过程所形成的利益格局进行了梳理,发现利益主体责权利严重不统一,是阻碍国有林区可持续发展,阻碍目前国有林权改革无法顺利进行的深层次原因。因此,本文从博弈的参与人、博弈目标责权利之间的相互关系、博弈的假设条件、博弈对策所遵循的条件以及将制度设计作为林权改革责权利三个方面综合博弈载体等方面,构建了国有林权改革利益主体博弈模型理论框架。其次,从国有林权改革权利博弈均衡、利益博弈均衡、责任博弈均衡三个层面,构建了国家、企业、职工三方面博弈模型,求得各博弈模型的均衡解,即结果,并对结果进行了理论解析。(1)构建了国有林权改革权利博弈模型。分别构建了国有林木资源所有权在不同所有制条件下的博弈均衡模型、从经营创新博弈模型,处置权博弈模型和对收益权的博弈模型。研究结果表明,林木资源所有权在公有与非公有制并存的条件下,林木资源所有权采取公有制与非公有有制并存的形式为该博弈的纳什均衡解。完全的公有制会导致国有森林资源“公共地悲剧”问题,过度的私有会导致国有资产的大量流失。解决林木资源所有权在公有与非公有制并存的问题,目前比较合理的方式是进行林木流转。(2)构建了国有林权改革利益博弈均衡模型。根据政府与林业企业,政府与国有林区职工群众,林业企业与国有林区职工群众三种形式的博弈关系构建利益博弈模型,确定各利益主体之间利益的均衡点。完全信息静态博弈情况下,政府、林业企业和国有林区职工群众博弈中的混合策略纳什均衡取决于各个博弈过程中的收益,即收益的大小决定了政府、林业企业和国有林区职工群众对林业经济(政策)方面投入和不投入的概率。完全信息动态博弈情况下,无论是政府、林业企业还是国有林区职工群众只有在投入的期望值大于不投入的期望值下,才会首先采取对林业经济(政策)投入策略,相反采取不投入策略。当各方利益不能合理分配,那么参与人不会选择对林业经营活动投入这个劣策略。(3)构建了国有林权改革责任博弈均衡模型。研究结果表明：实行按责任获取合理利益是关键,决定了利益主体选择充分履行责任是该博弈的纳什均衡解。不充分履行责任也能获得相同利益使得利益主体选择不充分履行责任为最优解,但是这种情况最终将阻碍林区经济、资源、生态发展。根据责任博弈模型的纳什均衡解,明确了政府、林业企业和国有林区职工群众各自应履行的责任。最后,从国有林区林权改革责权利统一方面构建了博弈综合模型并进行改革制度的设计与对策分析。在权利、利益、责任三个层次,国家、企业、职工三方博弈分析研究的基础上,以制度政策为载体建立了国有林经营主体责、权、利三方统一的综合博弈模型。制度改革博弈主要包括强制性制度改革博弈和诱致性制度改革博弈模型。研究结果表明,强制性制度改革博弈研究下,当参与人为非既得利益者的情况下,参与人与政府都不选择改革的条件下,双方都会获得新制度带来的收益,这也是强制性制度改革博弈的最优均衡解。参与人为既得利益者的情况,在这种条件下强制性制度改革博弈无法达到纳什均衡。诱致性体制改革博弈研究下,通过设计伊春国有林权改革的诱致性制度博弈模型,得出以下结果：当政府与林业企业(国有林区职工群众)都不进行林权改革时,大家都得不到新制度带来的利益,当然也不会有损失,因此双方得益均为零；当政府与林业企业(国有林区职工群众)都选择进行改革时,大家都会获得新制度带来的收益；当政府或林业企业(国有林区职工群众)一方寻求变革而获得收益,不变者没有收益。这说明只有政府和参与者都选择进行改革才能双赢,即达到纳什均衡。综上,国有林区森林资源生态、经济的可持续发展有赖于构建科学的林权制度。其中,明晰、合理、市场化的权利制度是国有林权改革的核心；合理的利益分配是国有林权改革的驱动力；以责任为指导,并充分履行各方责任是国有林发展的保证。为确保国有林权改革顺利进行,提出了利益改革博弈对策、权利改革博弈对策以及责任改革的博弈对策,这些保障对策是推进国有林权改革深入发展的重要力量。更多还原

【Abstract】 With the development of market economy and deepen of state-owned forest tenure reform forests, the key for the success of the state-owned forest tenure reform is whether the rights and interests of the principal parts of interests of the state-owned forest can be ensured. Thus, the key factor for the state-owned forest rights reform is to abtain the equilibrium of interests of the principal parts of interests of the state-owned forest. At this stage, the reform of the responsibilities, rights and interests of the principal parts of interests of the state-owned forest face many constraints, of which the most critical factor is to build right system. Therefore, this study is based on the game theory, with a carrier of a scientific and reasonable right system, to abtain the equilibrium of responsibilities, rights and interests of the principal parts of the state-owned forest, which could provide effective guidance of development strategies for the state-owned forest right reform and to promote sustainable development of state-owned forests.In this paper, the principal parts of interests of the state-owned forest right reform are nation, forestry companies and forestry workers. First, this paper studied the interest situations of the principal parts of state-owned forest, during the history for the management of the state-owned forest. It was found that the reason for blocking the sustainable development and system reform of state-owned forest is the serious inconsistent of the responsibilities, rights and interests of the principal parts of the state-owned forest. The game models frame was built according to the game participants, game objects and its relationships, game hypothesis conditions, conditions corresponding to game strategy and system design.Second, game models were constructed for the three aspects of state, enterprise and workers based on right game equilibrium of right, interest and responsibility. And the results of the game equilibrium were analyzed. (1) Building the game model of state-own forest right reform. In this paper game models for the ownership of forests resources, management between government and enterprises (workers), right of disposal and interest. Method of double matrix game was used to study the game behaviors between the government and enterprises (workers) with regarding to the ownership of forests resources. The results show that the establishment of public and non-public co-existence mechanism is the optimal Nash equilibrium. Under the complete public ownership condition, the problem of "public terra tragedy" for the state-owned forest resources could occur. Excessive non-public ownership of the forests resources will result in the great loss of state-owned assets. To resolve the problem of the co-existence mechanism of public and non-public ownership, a relative reasonable form is to make the woods turnover. (2) Building the game model for interest of state-owned forest reform. Basded on the game releationship between government and forest enterprise, government and workers, and enterprise and workers, the game model of interest was built. According to the game model, the equilibrium for the interest was obtained. The mixed stratagy quilibrium of government, enterprise and workers depended on their income under the complete information and static game. Namely, the amounts of interests determine the probility for government, enterprise and workers to choice inputing or not. Under the complete information and dynamic game, when the expected income with inputing is higher than that without inputing, government, enterprise, workers will choice the statagies to input. On the contrary, the principal parts of state-owned forest could not choice the bad statagies to input. (3) Building the game model for responsibility of state-owned forest reform. The results indicated that it is very important to achieve reasonable income according to its responsibility, which is the optimal Nash equilibrium, determining to perform its responsibility sufficiently. If the principle parts can achieve the same income, when not performing its responsibility sufficiently, the principle parts will choice the optimal strategy of performing its responsibility insufficiently. In this condition, the economic development, resources development and zoology development will be blocked. We pointed out the responsibility of government, forest enterprise and workers based on the optimal Nash equilibrium.At last, the integrated game model was constructed according to the integer of right, interest and responsibility. According to the integrated game model, the system reform was designed and analyzed. The integrated game model was built with consideration of right, interest and responsibility of government, enterprise and workers, and with a carrier of system strategy. The game of system reform main includes two types of constraint system reform and induced system reform. The results indicated that the participant and government will achieve income due to the new system, when the participant is a non beneficiary and participant and government did not choice reforming under the condition of constraint system reform. This strategy is also the optimum equilibrium. Under the condition of constraint system reform, when the participant is beneficiary, the game can not get the Nash equilibrium. Under the condition of induced system reform, according to the induced system reform game model of YiChun forest right reform, some important results can be obtained:the incomes of government and forest enterprise/workers are zero, without loss, and they could get the interests from the new system, when they did not choice forest right reform; when both take reforming strategy, they will both get the interest from new system. When one participant of government or forest enterprise/workers takes reforming strategy, he will get the interest from new system. These results indicated that the Nash equilibrium is that the government and forest enterprise/workers both choice strategy for reform.In summary, the scientific and sustainable development of state-owned forest resources zoology and economy depends on the building of scientific forest system. The clear, reasonable, market-oriented right system is the core to promote the development of state-owned forests. The reasonable distribution of benefits is the key and is the driving force of forestry development. The responsibility is as a guide, at the same time, the fully implementing responsibilities are to protect the development of state-owned forests. To insure the success of the forest reform, we proposed the reform strategy of interest game, right game and responsibility game, which are the important forces to deep the reform of forest system.更多还原