【作者】 张润；

【导师】 杨烨；

【作者基本信息】 华东师范大学 ， 科学社会主义与国际共产主义运动， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 本论文旨在以邓小平外交思想为理论基础,以国家利益与意识形态的关系为理论视角,运用综合、案例、比较等技术方法,研究毛泽东的联美抗苏的外交战略。本研究的新意和独特之处在于,从与联美抗苏战略同时存在并与该战略有着直接或间接关系的诸多具体历史案例入手,基于丰富的史料,通过分析它们与毛泽东联美抗苏战略的关系,从多个历史侧面来揭示该战略的实质、影响、后果、特征、前提和所面临的制约,从而拓宽了这个传统学术领域的研究视野,深化了对毛泽东的这场外交革命的意义和历史地位的理解。论文所涉及的具体历史案例包括：中美关系中的台湾问题、1960—70年代的印度支那战争、毛泽东在1973年提出并开始实施的“一条线”和“一大片”外交策略、70年代的东西方缓和、中美苏大三角格局、毛泽东的世界革命外交、文革影响下的国内政治,以及毛泽东于1974年提出的三个世界战略理论。中美战略合作的根本原因是双方共同面临的、对各自来说都是头号的苏联威胁。但仅此不足以提供双方合作的充分条件。台湾问题事关中国的核心利益,毛泽东不可能为了联美抗苏而牺牲一个中国这个至高无上的原则。台湾问题事关美国在亚太的重要战略利益,与高度意识形态化的美国内政和对外政策有直接关系,美国同样不可能为了联华制苏而完全舍弃台湾。为了抗衡苏联这个共同和最高利益,双方在这个问题上的妥协势在必行。妥协的内容,对于美国,是对一个中国原则的公开承认,和公开或私下做出的在将来与台湾“断交、废约、撤军”的有约束力的承诺；对于中国,是在美国依然与台湾保持官方关系、继续在台湾驻军和维持美台防御条约以及拒绝放弃保卫台湾的义务的现状下,与美国进行战略合作。部分地由于尼克松和福特政府承认但迟迟不履行“断交、废约、撤军”的承诺,毛泽东被迫拒绝美方提出的部分军事交流计划。双方战略合作的效力因而受到一定影响。毛泽东兼顾中国的安全利益和统一利益的政策,表现了其对中国国家利益的深刻理解。70年代初仍在持续的印度支那战争,和中美在这场战争中的间接为敌状态,不可能不影响双方针对苏联的战略合作。在既已先后明晓美国卷入印支战争的防御性动机和退出印支的意图之后,特别是在面临着难以逆转的苏越接近的趋势、觉察到越南控制整个印度支那的地缘政治抱负之后,毛泽东依然大力支持越南抗美统一战争和印支三国革命,主要出于支援世界革命的意识形态考虑。这种使联美抗苏和援越抗美并行不悖的切割政策,在帮助越南完成民族统一的正义事业的同时,既维护了国家安全这个最大利益,客观上也便利了苏联从南边包围中国的意图的实现。这一后果与联美抗苏的政策意图是有冲突的。但毛泽东在美越谈判后期对中国立场的微妙调整,帮助美国部分实现了其体面退出印度支那的意图,为毛泽东强化其联美抗苏战略即提出“一条线”的外交策略提供了前提。“一条线”和“一大片”是中国特色的对苏遏制和孤立政策,是联美抗苏战略的手段,旨在建立国际反苏统一战线,最大限度地维护中国的安全利益和世界革命利益。这个策略提高了中国的国际地位,一定程度上实现了阻遏苏联的地缘扩张和孤立苏联的意图。但由于毛泽东对苏联威胁的估计不尽符合部分相关国家的利益,总的说来毛泽东未能实现其孤立苏联的策略初衷。从意识形态与国家利益的关系视角看,此策略的受挫部分地源于毛泽东所固守的以反苏划线的意识形态,这种意识形态认为,苏联是世界革命和世界和平的头号威胁,是比美国更有侵略性和冒险性的社会帝国主义国家。这个判断不完全符合事实。缓和是“一条线”未能建立起来的直接原因。70年代,美国、西欧和日本基于其不完全与中国一致的安全利益、对苏联威胁的更少意识形态色彩的认知和与苏联共有的避免核大战的愿望,在维持对苏冷战格局的前提下,对苏奉行长达十年的缓和政策。这种政策之得以推行和部分成功,还在于美国在中美苏大三角关系中所占据的比中国更主动的地位。而美国之所以能够获得这种主动地位,一个重要原因在于毛泽东奉行的、在意识形态领域(注意：并非国家间关系领域)对苏联的不妥协立场。这一立场使中国对两个超级大国的政策缺少足够的弹性,失去了本应拥有和一度拥有的三角关系中的最主动地位,进而制约了联美抗苏的战略效力的最大化。淡化世界革命的意识形态,是毛泽东能够与此前的头号意识形态对手实行战略合作的不可或缺的前提。但毛泽东始终没有完全放弃对世界革命的执著追求,包括支援部分非社会主义国家的反政府革命武装,支持国际上几乎一切反苏力量。在支持反苏力量这一点上,世界革命逻辑和国家安全逻辑达到了一定的统一。但世界革命外交客观上也疏远了“一大片”策略所欲联合或中立的部分国家,因而也制约了联美抗苏的战略效力的最大化。传统的、强调战争与革命的意识形态既使得毛泽东对具体的中美军事合作持消极态度,也为毛泽东的联美抗苏战略提供了革命统一战线这一有效的维护国家安全的手段。特殊历史条件下的文革路线所强调的反修防修既便利了联美抗苏战略,也妨碍了该战略的充分实施。部分基于对“一条线”策略和革命外交的反省而提出的三个世界战略理论,强调反霸甚于反帝,反映了毛泽东对国家利益和意识形态之关系的进一步思考,和对正在形成中的世界多极化和初露端倪的和平与发展的世界主题的某种领悟。其彻底放弃以社会制度划线的思维与联美抗苏的逻辑前提是一致的。其强调苏联威胁甚于强调美国威胁的明显政策意味,为联美抗苏提供了更少意识形态的和间接的战略辩护。综上,中美在台湾问题上的相互妥协为联美抗苏战略提供了前提。毛泽东在印支问题上的政策和其对革命外交和文革路线的坚持,同时构成了联美抗苏战略的前提和制约。它们都反映了传统意识形态对于联美抗苏战略的复杂影响。中国国家安全的改善、国际地位的提高和美国在三角关系中的主动地位,都是联美抗苏战略的影响和后果。从地缘政治上看,联美抗苏的实质是三角格局下与美国结成的准同盟；从毛泽东所笃信的意识形态看,其实质是革命统一战线。他在联美的时候始终没有放弃他所理解的革命。联美抗苏外交的两大特征,是默契和务虚。这种特征的根源部分地来自台湾问题僵局,就中方而言,也与传统意识形态的制约有关。总的说来,联美抗苏外交是毛泽东的既英明又不彻底的外交革命的产物,并受到这种不彻底性的妨碍。英明表现为,这个外交战略在实践上是非意识形态外交的典范。不彻底性表现为,他在对该战略的理论阐释上未能始终坚持国家利益高于意识形态利益的原则,及他所始终没有完全放弃的意识形态外交和文革路线妨碍了联美抗苏战略效力的最大化。这种不彻底性同时来自历史环境的客观限制和毛泽东个人的自觉选择。把台湾问题、对印支政策、革命外交和文革路线与联美抗苏战略相隔离的切割策略,即在实际操作中使前四者和联美战略并行不悖的做法,在当时历史条件下最大限度地减少了对这个战略的干扰。这一做法,同时反映了毛泽东的英明和局限所在。邓小平外交思想的三个精髓,即国家利益至高无上,不搞意识形态外交,和独立自主不结盟,很大程度上是建立在他对毛泽东联美抗苏战略和与其相关的、本研究所涉及的其他外交政策、战略和策略的成就和局限的反思基础上的。更多还原

【Abstract】 Using techniques such as synthesis, case study, comparison, and based on Deng-xiaoping’s diplomatic thought, this dissertation is aimed at a further research of Mao-zedong’s diplomatic strategy of uniting with America against the USSR, with relations between ideology and national interest as the basic theoretical perspective. The innovation and the uniqueness of this dissertation lie in its exploration of the essence, influences, unexpected outcomes, features, prerequisites, and constraints in Mao-zedong’s strategy of uniting with America against the USSR, based on lots of historical materials and through the study of the relations between Mao-zedong’s strategy on the one side, and some historical cases on the other, which had something to do with the strategy, direct or indirect. In other words, this is a survey out of different historic profiles. Such an attempt can broaden field of vision in this traditional research area, and deepen the understanding of meanings and historic place of this diplomatic revolution set out by Mao-zedong.Historical cases concerned in the dissertation are as follows:Taiwan issue in Sino-American relations, Indochina war in 1960s and 1970s, the diplomatic tactics of ’one line’ and ’one sweep’ put forward first by Mao-zedong in 1973 and carried out henceforth, the detent in 1970s, the great triangular configuration among China, America and the Soviet, Mao-zedong’s diplomacy for world revolution, politics at home during the ’cultural revolution’, and the strategic theory of the three worlds inaugurated by Mao-zedong in 1974.The fundamental cause for Sino-American strategic cooperation had been first-place Soviet threat to both nations. The threat itself, however, was insufficient for these two nations to go together. Taiwan issue refers to China’s core interest, and it was impossible for Mao-zedong to sacrifice the supreme principle of one China for the cause of uniting with America against the USSR. The issue was also America’s one of the most interests in the Asian-pacific area, and it had been directly related to the highly ideologicalized home politics and foreign policies in America. It was impossible, too, for America to give up Taiwan completely for cause of unification with China to balance the USSR. For the common and supreme interests of against or to balance the USSR, the mutual compromise was inevitable. To America, the compromise was the open recognition of one China principle, and the promises to break the diplomatic relation with, denounce the treaty on common defense signed with and the complete retreat of its army from Taiwan, which were offered openly or privately but bound. To China, the concessions were the maintenance of strategic cooperation with America, despite the facts of the on-going American-Taiwan official relation, keeping of US army in Taiwan, the continuation of the treaty on common defense with Taiwan in an indefinite future, and the American refusal to give up its obligations to defend Taiwan. Partly because the administration under Nixon and Ford refused to keep their promises mentioned above, which they still recognized, Mao-zedong had to reject some of the military interchange projects offered by America, hence weakening of effects of Sino-American strategic cooperation to some degrees. Mao-zedong’s policy to give consideration to both Chinese security and unification interests represented his deep understanding of the Chinese national interests.The on-going Indochina war in the early 1970’s meant Chinese and American actors as mutual enemy, though indirectly. The fact more or less blocked mutual strategic cooperation between two sides directed at the Soviet. Having understood the defensive motivation for American involvement in this war, and its sincere motive to go out of Indochina, and having faced nearly irrevocable trend of Soviet-Vietnamese alignment, and the Vietnamese ambition to control the whole Indochina especially, Mao-zedong still kept up supporting Vietnamese attempts to unify their country against America and revolutions in all three Indochina states heart and soul. The policy was mainly out of world revolution, a pure ideological consideration. This cutting policy of supporting Vietnamese cause of unification against America and uniting with America against USSR concurrently, while helped Vietnamese just cause of national unification, and defended the supreme interest of the Chinese national security, contributed objectively to the realization of Soviet attempt to encircle China from the southern side, partly neutralizing the strategic effects of uniting with America against the USSR in fact. However, Mao-zedong’s subtle policy adjustment toward American-Vietnamese peace talks at its final stage, helped partial realization of American motive to retreat from the war and save the face at the same time, making it possible for him to put forward the diplomatic tactics of ’one line’ and ’one sweep’ to deepen his strategy of uniting with America against the USSR.The tactics of ’one line’ and ’one sweep’ was a policy aimed at building up an international united front against the USSR, contributing to Chinese security interests and the world revolution as possible as it could. As a means for strategy of uniting with America against the USSR, it was a policy to contain and isolate the USSR with Chinese characteristics. The tactics heightened China’s international place and realized the intentions of isolating the USSR and of blocking its geopolitical expansion to some extent. However, because Mao’s estimation of the Soviet threat wasn’t in conformity with interests of many nations, Mao’s motive to isolate the USSR failed on the whole. With regard to the perspective of relations between ideology and national interest, the failure resulted from his ideology to divide frontline with the criterion of against USSR, which regarded USSR as top threats both to world revolution and world peace, and a socio-imperialist country more aggressive and risky than America. The judgment was not all true.The detent constituted direct obstacles to the failure of ’one line’ and ’one sweep’. During 1970s, out of their security interests which were not completely fit for Chinese one, their own knowledge of Soviet threats, which was less ideological and more realistic, and desire to avoid nuclear catastrophe shared with Soviets in common, America, western Europe and Japan all kept a detent policy toward the USSR for about ten years under the structure of the cold war. The maintenance and part success of this policy partly resulted from American more initiative place than China in the Sino-American-Soviet triangular configuration. The chief reason for America’s more initiative place came from Mao’s strongly uncompromising standing toward the USSR on ideological issues other than relations between nations. This standing lessened flexibility in China’s policies toward the two superpowers. Because of lack of enough flexibility, China lost the most initiative place it would have and actually had taken in the triangular configuration, hence weakening of maximum effects of strategy for uniting with America against the USSR. A partial desalination of ideology on world revolution had been an indispensable prerequisite for Mao-zedong to cooperate strategically with the former top ideological foe. Mao-zedong, however, never gave up his insistent pursuit of world revolution, keeping up aiding anti-governmental armed and revolutionary forces in some countries, supporting almost all anti-Soviet forces in the world. The support of anti-Soviet forces had unified logics of world revolution and national security to some extent. However, diplomacy for world revolution alienated China from some countries Mao’s tactics of’one sweep’wanted to unite or neutralize, thus blocked maximization of efficiency of his strategy. The traditional ideology stressing on war and revolution both had made Mao to refrain from concrete military cooperation with America to some extent, and had provided his strategy against the USSR with a revolutionary unified front, which had proved to be an effective way to defend national interest. The line of’cultural revolution’stressing on anti-revisionism, under the particular historical context, had both legitimized and weakened his strategy.Partly out of reflections on his tactics of’one line’and of his revolutionary diplomacy, Mao’s strategic theory of three worlds stressed anti-hegemonism more than anti-imperialism, representing his further thought of relations between ideology and national interests, and his primary knowledge of the on-going multi-polar trend and the dawning era theme of peace and development in the world. The thought of giving up dividing frontlines according to social system thoroughly was in conformity with the logic of uniting with America against the USSR. The obvious policy orientation of stress on Soviet threat much more than America threat provided his strategy of uniting with America against the USSR with a defense that was less ideological and indirect.In conclusion, the Sino-American mutual compromise on Taiwan issue offered a pre-condition for strategy of uniting with America against the USSR. Mao-zedong’s policies toward Indochina issue, and his insistence upon revolutionary diplomacy and’the cultural revolution’had provided the strategy of uniting with America against the USSR with both prerequisites and constraints, all representing the complexity of influence upon the strategy of uniting with America against the USSR by the traditional ideology. The improvement of Chinese national security, the rising of Chinese international status and the America’s most initiative place in the triangular relationship had been all impacts and outcomes of this strategy. Geo-politically, the essence of the strategy was a quasi-alignment with America under the triangular configuration. From the point of ideology Mao had faith in, the essence was a revolutionary unified front. He had never given up the revolution in his understanding. The two great features of the strategy were tacit agreement and only principles. The tacit and the principal both originated from stalemate in Taiwan issue. On Chinese side, the two features had something to do with the limits from traditional ideologies, too. On the whole, this diplomatic strategy was outcome of Mao’s wise and incomplete diplomatic revolution, weakened by this incompleteness, too. The wisdom lay in the fact that it was an example of non-ideological diplomacy in practice. The incompleteness lay in the fact that in theoretic explanation of this strategy he had failed to insist upon the superiority of national interests over ideological interests persistently, and that the ideological diplomacy and’the cultural revolution’he had never denounced had blocked the maximization of efficiencies of the strategy for uniting with America against the USSR. All of these incompleteness originated from both limits imposed upon him objectively by historical surroundings and his conscious choices. Under the particular historical context, Mao’s cutting tactics of separating the Taiwan issue, his Indo-china policies, revolutionary diplomacy and the line of’cultural revolution’from the strategy for uniting with America against the USSR had decreased the interferences with this strategy as possible as could be. The tactics represented both Mao-zedong’s wisdom and limitations. The three essences of Deng-xiaoping’s diplomatic thought, i.e., supremacy of national interests, refusal of ideological diplomacy, and independence with the initiative in one’s own hands and nonalignment, were, to a great extent, based on his reflections on achievements and limitations in Mao-zedong’s strategy of uniting with America against the USSR, and Mao’s other diplomatic policies, strategies and tactics having something to do with the strategy discussed in this dissertation.更多还原