【作者】 吴敏晓；

【导师】 蓝发钦；

【作者基本信息】 华东师范大学 ， 金融学， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 股权分置改革的完成使大股东的股份获得了流通权,其获利机制发生了巨大的变化,大股东通过二级市场获取资本利得将成为其获利的主要方式之一在对相关文献进行梳理评价的基础上,第三章对全流通条件下大股东利益机制进行了分析,发现了大股东可能的行为变化。接下来,从大股东收益最大化角度出发,以市净率股票估值理论为基础,在综合考虑大股东的“隧道行为”、“支撑行为”以及二级市场交易行为后建立了大股东收益函数,并在此基础上详细分析了全流通条件下大股东的行为变化,认为全流通后大股东将会谋求通过二级市场交易获取资本利得收益。大股东的持股比例、上市公司的盈利能力以及成长性、股票价格偏离其真实价值的大小、监管部门的监管程度以及大股东未来增持或减持股份的比例大小将对大股东的“隧道行为”、“支撑行为”以及市场交易行为产生影响。第四章在对大股东减持和增持的影响因素进行实证后发现,当大股东减持时,其减持数量多少与减持前的业绩并不存在直接的相关关系,其是否减持主要取决于对上司公司的前景预期。而大股东在增持时,其增持数量与增持前的业绩则存在着较强的相关关系,大股东一般只对业绩较好的上市公司进行增持。大股东在减持和增持时都充分利用了市场及个股估值的波动。不同类型的大股东在进行减持和增持时其行为差异较大。运用事件分析法对交易公告后的股价变动进行实证后发现,大股东的交易行为具有信号效应,减持会对股价产生下跌的压力,增持会对股价形成支撑。在不同的市场环境中大股东市场交易行为的信号效应对股价的影响相差很大。第五章在对“资本利得控制权私有收益”概念进行界定后,提出了控股股东资本利得控制权私有收益的计算方法,并利用该方法建立了回归模型对2005-2010年间大股东二级市场的套利收益率进行实证检验。实证结果表明有相当比例的控股股东在利用大盘的波动进行高抛低吸的同时还会借助手中所掌握的控制权优势操控上市公司的业绩或利用提前预知业绩的信息优势进行套利,从而达到获取超额的资本利得控制权收益的目的。第六章从二级市场交易的角度出发,分别考察了大股东减持和增持前的盈余管理、隧道行为或支撑行为,发现大股东会凭借信息优势,利用上市公司的非经常性业绩增长或下降的机会进行减持或增持；其还会借助控制权优势主动对上市公司采取支撑行为来提升上市公司的业绩进而使股价上升,实现高位减持的目的；或其对上市公司采取隧道行为来做低上市公司的业绩进而使股价下降,实现低位增持。与中央国有大股东相比,民营大股东及地方国有大股东在减持前对上市公司进行盈余管理的现象更为多见,动机也更强。民营大股东减持前对业绩操控的幅度更大。大股东在减持或增持前对股价进行的操控,会严重侵害与其作为交易对手的中小投资者的利益。第七章对我国上市公司大股东在二级市场买卖所控制上市公司股票的相关规定进行了总结和分析,发现对大股东通过二级市场进行交易的限制过于宽松,而且,大股东违规进行交易的成本很低。在以上分析的基础上,本文提出了全流通后加强对大股东二级市场交易行为监管的政策建议,包括要对大股东持股数量变化、买卖时间间隔及提前预告交易方面进行更严格的限定；要完善相关的信息披露制度,增加大股东信息披露的义务；要建立大股东、实际控制人及其一致行动人日常交易的监控系统,对大股东的日常交易进行实时监控；要改变监管方式,加强法律监管及执法力度,提高违规的成本；要建立投资者信息交流平台,通过广大投资者对大股东的监督作用,来增加大股东违规违法行为被发现的概率并进而提高其违规成本。第八章对全文进行了总结,并对本文研究尚存的不足以及未来可以继续研究的方向进行了探讨。更多还原

【Abstract】 With the non-tradable share reform, the large shareholders obtain the circulation rights, and their profit mechanism has changed greatly. To get capital gains by trading in the secondary stock market will be one of the main ways of earning their profits.After reviewing the relevant literatures, chapter three analyzed large shareholders’profit mechanism after full circulation and found their possible behavior changes. Then, from the perspective of revenue maximization, and based on stock evaluation model of PBV, large shareholder’s profit function is established through a comprehensive consideration of large shareholder’s tunneling behavior, propping behavior and trading behavior in the secondary stock market. And then a detailed analysis of the changes in large shareholder’s behavior under the condition of full circulation is made. It is considered that large shareholders will seek capital gains income through the trade in secondary stock market after full circulation. The large shareholders’tunneling behavior, propping behavior and trading behavior in the secondary stock market will be affected by its shareholding proportion, the profitability and growth of listed companies, the degree of deviation between the stock price and the real value of it, the degree of supervision and the share proportion which large shareholders will purchase or sell in the future.In chapter four, the empirical study of the factors which influence the large shareholders’trading behavior in the secondary stock market shows that there is no direct correlation between the quantity of reduction and the listed companies’ performance before selling. Whether large shareholders decide to sell the stock or not depends on the expected prospect of listed companies. But there is strong correlation between the purchase quantity and the listed companies’performance before buying. Most of the time, large shareholders will only purchase the stock of the listed companies which have good performance. When trading in the second stock market large shareholders will take advantage of the fluctuation of market and stock evaluation. Different types of large shareholders differ greatly in their trading behavior. The event analysis method is used to empirically study the stock price volatility due to trade announcement. The empirical result shows that large shareholders’trading behavior has signal effect. Large shareholders’selling behavior will bring about the fall of stock prices. And their buying behavior will lead to the support for stock prices. In different market environment, the signal effect of large shareholders’trading behavior varies greatly.In chapter five, based on the definition of "private benefit of control by capital gains", one method is proposed to calculate the controlling shareholder’s "private benefit of control by capital gains". And by this method the regression model is established to test the controlling shareholder’s arbitrage return in the secondary market between 2005 and 2010. The empirical results show that many controlling shareholders will sell stock at high price and buy at low price according to the fluctuation of stock market. Furthermore, in order to earn the excess return of "private benefit of control by capital gains", many controlling shareholders will make arbitrage through manipulating the listed companies’financial performance by virtue of controlling advantage or through knowing the listed companies’financial performance in advance.In chapter six, from the perspective of trading in secondary stock market, large shareholders’earning management, tunneling behavior and propping behavior before trading are investigated. The result shows that large shareholders will sell or buy the stock by means of information advantage which can help them foresee the irregular growth or decline of listed companies’performance; or in order to sell at high price, they will conduct propping behavior by means of controlling power to improve the listed companies’performance so as to increase stock prices; or in order to purchase at low price, they will conduct tunneling behavior to decrease the listed companies’ performance so as to lower stock prices. Compared with the central state-owned large shareholders, before the selling, the private and the local state-owned shareholders conduct earning management more frequently and positively. The performance is greatly manipulated by private large shareholders before their selling. The stock price manipulation conducted by large shareholders before trading will seriously invade the interests of minority investors who trade with large shareholders.Chapter seven firstly analyzes the related trading rules on large shareholders buying or selling the stock of listed companies controlled by themselves. This paper finds that the related restrictions are too lax and the cost of regulation violation is too low to constraint large shareholders’ trading behavior. Based on the above analysis, some policy suggestions are proposed to enhance the supervision of large shareholders’ trading behavior after full circulation, including:we should constraint effectively the behavior of large shareholders which is involved with fluctuation of stock amount, the interval of trading, and the advance notice of trading; we should improve the relevant information disclosure system, and increase large shareholders’ information disclosure obligations; we should establish the monitoring system to realize the real-time supervision to the daily transactions of large shareholders, actual controllers and their concert parties; we should change supervision method, strengthen legal supervision and law enforcement, and increase violation cost; we should establish information exchange platform for large investors to supervise large shareholders’trading behavior, so as to increase the probability of regulation violations being found and increase their violation costs.Chapter Eight gives a brief summary about the major arguments. At the same time, it probes into the insufficient aspects in the research and initiate direction for further researches in the future.更多还原