【作者】 林大庞；

【导师】 苏冬蔚；

【作者基本信息】 暨南大学 ， 公司金融与投资学， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 股权激励能促使高管与外部股东之间的利益趋同,有助于解决委托代理问题,是公司治理的重要激励机制,因此,研究股权激励的公司治理效应,对完善股权激励机制,对考察国有企业改革成效都具有重要意义。为此,本文以2005至2008年间1336至1573家非金融类上市公司为样本,从盈余管理和公司业绩两个角度研究股权激励的公司治理效应。首先,本文探讨CEO股权激励对盈余管理的影响,结果发现：尚未实施股权激励计划的上市公司,其CEO股权激励与盈余管理呈负相关关系；而实施股权激励计划的上市公司,其CEO股权激励与盈余管理的负相关关系显著变弱；另外,盈余管理提高了CEO行权概率,而且CEO行权后公司业绩显著下降。其次,本文使用盈余管理修正公司业绩,并通过Heckman两阶段模型研究股权激励与公司业绩的关系,以及股权激励与国有控股的交互作用,结果发现：未使用盈余管理调整公司业绩前,CEO股权激励与公司业绩呈显著的正相关关系,且股权激励与国有控股的交互作用不显著；而调整后,CEO股权激励对公司业绩的影响变弱,且股权激励与国有控股的交互作用显著为负。最后,本文比较CEO与CFO股权激励的公司治理效应,结果发现：尚未实施股权激励计划的上市公司,其CEO股权激励对盈余管理的抑制程度显著大于CFO；CEO股权激励对公司业绩的影响显著大于CFO。以上实证结果表明,正式股权激励可以诱发更多的盈余管理行为,而其它类型的高管持股则能抑制盈余管理行为；股权激励有助于提高公司业绩,且国有控股能显著削弱股权激励的积极治理作用；CEO股权激励的公司治理效应显著大于CFO；盈余管理和产权性质均能显著影响股权激励与公司业绩的关系。更多还原

【Abstract】 Managerial stock incentives, an important incentives mechanism, can align managers and outside stockholders, and help firms resolve the agency problem. Analyzing the corporate governance of managerial stock incentives, not only can impove the stock incentives’mechanism, but also can assess the state enterprise reform in China. This paper uses the sample of 1336-1573 firms in 2005-2008, and examine the corporate governance effect of managerial stock incentives from the perspective of earnings management and firm performance.First, this paper analyzes the influence of CEO stock incentives on earnings management. The paper finds that CEO stock incentives, as measured by the percentage of shares and options in total CEO compensations, are negatively related to earnings management for publicly listed firms which have not declare CEO stock incentive plans. This negative relationship becomes statistically insignificant for firms which have either formally announced or approved CEO stock incentives plans. In addition, there is strong evidence that earnings management is positively related to the probability of stock options exercises by the CEOs. Moreover, industry-adjusted ROA significantly declines after CEO exercises her stock options.Second, under accounting for earnings management, this paper uses Heckman two-step model to examine the relation between CEO stock incentives and firm performance, and the interaction between CEO stock incentives and state-owned holding. The paper finds that before accounting for earnings management, CEO stock incentives are positively related to corporate performance. After accounting for earnings management, the impact of incentive-based compensation on corporate performance drop. This paper examines also examines the cross-action between State-owned holding and CEO stock incentives. The paper finds that before accounting for earnings management, the cross-action is not statistically insignificant. However, after accounting for earnings management, the negative cross-action is statistically significant.Final, this paper compares the corporate governance effect of CFO stock incentives with that of CEO stock incentives. The paper finds that the positive affect of CEO stock incentives on earning management is bigger than that of CFO stock incentives in the firms with formal CEO stock incentives plans. In addition, after accounting for earnings management, the affect of CEO stock incentives on firm performance is stronger than that of CFO stock incentives.These findings in this paper indicate as follows. First, formal stock incentive plan are encourage earnings management, and the others restrain it. Second, stock incentives help to heighten firm performance, and state-owned holding can dramatically weaken the positive corporate governance effect of stock incentives. Third, the corporate governance effect of CEO stock incentives is stronger than that of CFO stock incentives. Finally, both earnings management and the nature of property right can prominently influence the relation between managerial stock incentives and firm performance.更多还原