【作者】 胡宜奎；

【导师】 吴建斌；

【作者基本信息】 南京大学 ， 经济法学， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 股东代表诉讼是一种特殊的制度设计,在诉权的性质、诉讼程序的设置、涉及利益主体的广泛性及复杂性等方面,都与普通的民事诉讼有很大的差异。该制度设置的初衷主要是为了保护中小股东的利益,强调公司的参加,看似是一种悖逆,实则不然。在诉讼所涉及的各利益主体之间,公司处于一种事实上的核心地位。既是股东代表诉讼制度能否有效发挥作用的关键,也是构建股东代表诉讼利益平衡机制的中心环节。公司在诉讼中的角色既尴尬又复杂,它可能是诉讼的最大受益者,也可能是最大的利益受损者。这就需要积极发挥公司在诉讼中的作用,使之能够对股东代表诉讼程序的启动与进程、对诉讼的结果施加必要的影响,在股东代表诉讼制度所要实现的各目标之间起到调节与平衡的作用。本文综合运用公司法学、民事诉讼法学、民法学以及法经济学等学科的相关理论及分析工具,并结合我国股东代表诉讼制度、股东权保护、民事诉讼相关制度以及公司治理机制发展的实际,对股东代表诉讼中的公司参加问题进行了系统、深入地探讨。本文除导言及结语之外,共分六章：第一章股东代表诉讼诉权的性质。本章首先分析了“股东权说”.存在的不足,并从法经济学的角度,认为股东享有代表诉讼诉权的权利基础在于相关过错行为人对公司契约义务的违反,揭示出公司法何以仅将该权利配置给股东以及为股东行使该权利设置前置程序背后的经济逻辑,即该种制度安排有利于节约交易成本,提高资源使用的效率。股东代表诉讼诉权承载着事前监督与事后救济两方面的功能。并论证了该权利的程序法基础是诉讼担当。第二章股东代表诉讼中公司的参加。本章分析了公司参加股东代表诉讼的正当性在于其符合正当程序原理及诉讼效率价值的要求,与股东代表诉讼诉权的性质相一致。公司可以选择是否参加诉讼,但不能辅助被告方,也不享有取代原告股东接收诉讼或重新起诉的权利,并应为公司参加诉讼设置相应的通知程序。第三章公司的诉讼地位。本章通过对国内相关争议的梳理、评述与反思,结合对域外公司地位立法的经验性考察,提出公司原则上应作为共同诉讼参加人,在例外情况下可以选择作为无独立请求权第三人。第四章公司在股东代表诉讼中的权利。首先,公司应有条件享有阻止诉讼权,并应改革我国现有的董事会和监事会制度,保证其相关判断的独立性,法院应对公司独立机构的相关决定予以尊重,为了保障该权利的实现,应合理引入经营判断规则。其次,公司应享有对诉讼和解程序及结果的异议权,但不能撇开原告直接与被告进行诉讼和解。再次,公司应对“提起诉讼的依据显属虚构”的败诉股东享有损害赔偿请求权,其要求赔偿的范围主要限于直接损失。最后,公司还享有再审申请、申请执行等权利。第五章公司在股东代表诉讼中的义务。首先,公司基于无因管理理论应对胜诉股东因诉讼所产生的合理费用予以补偿,败诉股东如果基于合理的理由而起诉,又没有明显的违背诚信的行为和过错的,也有权从公司处获得费用补偿,但我国不应确立原告股东直接受偿制度。其次,基于法定的诉讼担当,确定判决的既判力及于公司,而诉讼和解协议则不具有既判力。最后,公司还应负有不起诉理由说明、提供证据等义务。第六章股东代表诉讼中的利益平衡。首先,应强化公司的地位与作用,这符合公司法的价值追求和股东代表诉讼诉权性质的要求,有助于平衡保护各相关主体之间的利益,并改进股东权保护的其他机制。其次,构建股东提诉的激励与约束机制。再次,从法经济学的角度来看,经营判断规则能够合理减轻被告董事的责任,有助于节约交易成本,提高资源配置的效率。最后,要有效发挥股东代表诉讼利益平衡机制的作用,需要合理扩张法官的自由裁量权来加以调节。更多还原

【Abstract】 Abstract:As an special system design, shareholder’s derivative action has more difference from common civil action in such as the attribute of litigation right, design of lawsuit procedure, the universality and complexity of interest subjects involved, and so on. The main original intentions of it are to protect small shareholders’ interests, strengthen corporation’s litigation participate seems inconsistently, but that’s not true. Actually, corporation lies in the core of the associated interest subjects. Corporation’s litigation participate is the crucial factor not only for whether shareholder’s derivative action system works well or not, but also for the design of interest equilibrium mechanism. Corporation’s parts in shareholder’s derivative action are ambivalent and complicated, and corporation perhaps becomes of primary beneficiary as well as maximal victim in shareholder’s derivative action. It is necessary to strengthen corporation’s function and provide it the chances to impose on the procedure and result of shareholder’s derivative so that corporation could bring into play an adjustable and balanceable function. By using the related theories and methodology of corporation law, civil procedural law, civil law and economic analysis of law comprehensively, this paper has given a systemic and in-depth analysis on the problem of corporation’s litigation participation on basis of the developmental status quo of our shareholder’s derivative action system, the protection of shareholders’right, related systems of civil litigation and corporate governance mechanism.This paper is divided into six chapters besides introduction and epilogue. They are as follows: Chapter One:Quality of Litigation Right of Shareholder’s Derivative ActionShareholders’right doctrines have some constructional deficiencies. By using the methodology of economic analysis of law on basis of contract theory of corporation, it’s not difficult to find out that the entity law foundation of shareholder’s derivative of litigation right was based on the breach of director or other high-level corporation governor’s contract obligations. Furthermore, the economic principles about why only shareholder could hold the right and the corporation law set up preceding procedure for shareholder’s litigation was opened out. Namely, these system arrangements could reduce the transaction cost and promote the effective utilization of social resources. Shareholder’s derivative action system is charged with the functions of aforehand supervision and posterior remedy. Its procedural law foundation is litigation entrusting.Chapter Two:Corporation’s Participation in Shareholder’s Derivative ActionThis chapter explains that corporation’s participation accords with the requests of due procedure theory, litigant efficiency merit and quality of litigation right of shareholder’s derivative action. The corporation has the right to choose whether participate the lawsuit or not, but it shouldn’t select to assist the defendant and replace the plaintiff shareholder to institute new lawsuit. It’s necessary to provide an apprizing procedure for corporation’s participation.Chapter Two:Corporation’s Litigation StatusBy doctrinal analyzing the related viewpoints of domestic academe, this chapter explains that the corporation should be regard as joinder participant in principle, as third party without independent claims exceptionally on basis of the experiential reviews on overseas legislation experiences.Chapter Four:Corporation’s Rights in Shareholder’s Derivative ActionFirstly, this chapter explains that the corporation should have the right to prevent some shareholder’s derivative actions conditionally. It’s necessary to reform our existing directorate and supervisory board systems and ensure the independence of correlative judgments. The court should respect the independent decisions. We need introduce into business judgment rule in order to guarantee the right’s realization. Secondly, the corporation should have demurrer right for the procedure and result of litigation reconciliation, but it’s not appropriate to permit it to reconcile with the defendant solely. Thirdly, the corporation has the right to claim the plaintiff shareholder who loses a lawsuit clearly without institute basis to compensate for his direct damages because of the false lawsuit. Lastly, the corporation should also be endowed the claim right to re-try, execute, and etc.Chapter Five:Corporation’s Obligations in Shareholder’s Derivative ActionFirstly, this chapter analyses that the corporation should compensate the recover plaintiff shareholder for his reasonable expenses because of the action based on the theory of negotiorum gestio, and the unsuccessful plaintiff shareholder also could gain reasonably compensation conditionally. But it’s not proper to establish the system of shareholders’direct compensation. Secondly, res judicata of the lawsuit is expanded to the corporation based on statutory litigation entrusting, but the litigation reconciliation hasn’t res judicata. Lastly, the corporation should also be charged with the obligations of evidence providing, reasons explaining for not’instituting action, and so on.Chapter Six:Interest Equilibrium in Shareholder’s Derivative ActionFirstly, it’s important to strengthen the corporation’s status and functions because it accorded with the merits seeking of corporation law and the quality of litigation right of shareholder’s derivative action. That would be propitious to protect the interrelated subjects’interests evenly and improve on the other protection mechanism of shareholders’rights. Secondly, the inspiriting and inhibiting mechanisms of shareholders’claim need to be established. Thirdly, viewing from economic analysis of law, business judgment rule could abate the defendant director’s obligations reasonably, that is propitious to reduce the transaction costs and promote the effective utilization of social resources. Lastly, it’s indispensable to expand the judge’s power of discretion in order to make the interest equilibrium mechanisms of shareholder’s derivative action function effectively.更多还原