【作者】 戚文举；

【导师】 贾生华；

【作者基本信息】 浙江大学 ， 企业管理， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 上市公司已经成为中国资本市场投资价值的源泉和中国经济运行中最具发展优势的群体,对中国资本市场和国民经济的持续发展做出了卓越的贡献。然而,大多数中国上市公司都存在较为严重的终极控制人控制现象。据估计,90%左右的中国上市公司是由终极控制人控制的,并且其中绝大部分终极控制人通过金字塔结构掌握股东大会超额控制权,通过选派董事掌握董事会超额控制权。终极控制人滥用超额控制权,通过资金占用、内幕交易等方式,侵害中小股东和企业利益的事件频频发生,给上市公司的持续成长带来了巨大挑战。与此同时,为了避免被摘牌、取得新股发行资格等,终极控制人也时常会利用其超额控制权向上市公司注入优质资产、提供资金支持等,进而使中小股东和企业受益。在此背景下,中国不断完善投资者法律保护制度,加大执法力度,进而提高投资者法律保护水平,制约终极控制人的行为,保障投资者和企业的长远利益。然而,中国投资者法律保护水平总体较低,并且具有明显的地区差异。因此,理解超额控制权对企业绩效的影响以及投资者法律保护在其中的作用,进而推动上市公司持续成长,已经成为中国资本市场和国民经济发展过程中亟待解决的一项重要课题。2007年爆发的全球金融危机则进一步提高了解决这项重要课题的紧迫性。通过对国内外终极控制人控制效应研究脉络的梳理和前沿动态的追踪,笔者认为,终极控制人控制的本质特征是超额控制权；研究超额控制权对企业绩效的影响以及投资者法律保护在其中的调节作用,需要综合考虑隧道效应和支持效应。可是,在综合考虑隧道效应和支持效应的基础上,超额控制权对企业绩效的影响尚未明确,投资者法律保护各维度在超额控制权对企业绩效的影响中的调节作用更是没有得到深入研究。这些问题已经成为终极控制人控制效应研究纵深发展过程中遇到的瓶颈性问题。为此,本文采用规范研究与实证研究相结合的方法,试图对上述问题进行比较系统的分析。论文的主要研究工作和内容集中在四个方面。其一,基于已有研究成果,科学界定了超额控制权和投资者法律保护的概念及维度。鉴于没有经理层超额控制权的测度和私人执法水平的纵向数据,本文仅考虑了股东大会超额控制权和董事会超额控制权,以及国家立法水平、国家执法水平和地区执法水平。其二,以委托代理理论和投资者保护理论为理论基础,在综合考虑隧道效应和支持效应的基础上,系统地阐释了超额控制权对企业绩效的影响,以及投资者法律保护在其中的调节作用,并提出了10个研究假设。其三,以2005-2009年中国制造业上市公司为研究对象,笔者利用公司年报、国泰安CSMAR数据库等多种途径,收集了1800个样本,积累了较为翔实的实证资料。最后,建立计量经济学模型,使用Stata 11.0分析软件,选择固定效应模型,对研究假设进行了实证检验。由此,本文得到以下三方面的主要结论：第一,股东大会超额控制权和董事会超额控制权对企业绩效具有倒U型影响。随着股东大会超额控制权的提高,企业绩效先以递减的速度提高,在股东大会超额控制权提高至一定点之后企业绩效开始以递增的速度降低。随着董事会超额控制权的提高,企业绩效先以递减的速度提高,在董事会超额控制权提高至一定点之后企业绩效开始以递增的速度降低。这表明,科学评价终极控制人控制效应,需要综合考虑隧道效应和支持效应,宜选择超额控制权视角。第二,股东大会超额控制权和董事会超额控制权对资金占用净额具有U型影响。随着股东大会超额控制权的提高,资金占用净额先以递减的速度下降,在股东大会超额控制权提高至一定点之后资金占用净额开始以递增的速度提高。随着董事会超额控制权的提高,资金占用净额先以递减的速度下降,在董事会超额控制权提高至一定点之后资金占用净额开始以递增的速度提高。这表明,股东大会超额控制权和董事会超额控制权对企业绩效的影响也体现在行为层面上。第三,国家立法水平和国家执法水平显著负向调节股东大会超额控制权、董事会超额控制权对企业绩效的倒U型影响,地区执法水平对上述影响具有部分调节作用。国家立法水平越高,股东大会超额控制权和董事会超额控制权对企业绩效的倒U型影响越弱。国家执法水平越高,股东大会超额控制权和董事会超额控制权对企业绩效的倒U型影响越弱。随着地区执法水平的提高,股东大会超额控制权对企业绩效的倒U型影响显著地减弱,而董事会超额控制权对企业绩效的倒U型影响并未显著减弱。这既可能是因为本研究采用的地区执法水平测度指标不全面,也可能是因为在中国地区执法难以发挥保护投资者的作用。总体而言,这表明,投资者法律保护是一个多维概念,能够弱化超额控制权对企业绩效的影响。论文的创新点主要集中在以下三个方面：第一,在综合考虑隧道效应和支持效应的基础上,系统研究了股东大会超额控制权和董事会超额控制权对企业绩效的影响,推动终极控制人控制效应研究从“孤立”走向“整合”。终极控制人控制既产生隧道效应也产生支持效应,终极控制人控制的本质特征是超额控制权,因此对终极控制人控制效应的评价也应该综合考虑隧道效应和支持效应,并选择超额控制权作为终极控制人控制的代理变量。可是,现有研究基本上都仅从隧道效应或支持效应单一视角展开,选择现金流权、控制权或控制权增强机制作为终极控制人控制的代理变量。正因为如此,不同研究之间的理论逻辑关系模糊,可比性和继承性不高。本文通过理论分析和实证检验,在综合考虑隧道效应和支持效应的基础上,系统研究了股东大会超额控制权和董事会超额控制权对企业绩效的影响,有助于提高研究者们对终极控制人控制效应的全面认知,突破该领域研究纵深发展的瓶颈性障碍,进而推动该领域研究从“孤立”走向“整合”。第二,在综合考虑隧道效应和支持效应的基础上,进一步系统研究了股东大会超额控制权和董事会超额控制权对资金占用净额的影响,促进终极控制人控制效应研究从“结果”走向“行为”。根据公司治理理论,终极所有权结构通过影响终极控制人行为,影响企业绩效。可是,终极控制人控制效应的现有研究集中关注结果层面,对行为层面的研究明显不足。本研究在综合考虑隧道效应和支持效应的基础上,进一步系统研究了股东大会超额控制权和董事会超额控制权对资金占用净额的影响,为超额控制权对企业绩效的影响提供了进一步的经验证据,并促进该领域研究从“结果”走向“行为”。第三,从国家立法水平、国家执法水平和地区执法水平三个维度,深入研究了投资者法律保护在股东大会超额控制权和董事会超额控制权对企业绩效的倒u型影响中的负向调节作用,推进投资者法律保护研究从“直接作用”走向“调节作用”。投资者法律保护既直接影响终极控制人行为及其效应,即发挥直接作用,也通过弱化终极所有权结构对终极控制人行为及其效应的影响发挥间接作用,即发挥调节作用。然而,现有研究大多聚焦于投资者法律保护的直接作用,并且基于发达经济体的样本数据从投资者法律保护的单一维度展开。目前,关于投资者法律保护在股东大会超额控制权和董事会超额控制权对企业绩效的影响中的调节作用研究几乎还是一个“盲点”。本研究基于中国投资者法律保护制度的实际,明确了投资者法律保护的维度,理论分析并实证检验了国家立法水平、国家执法水平和地区执法水平在股东大会超额控制权和董事会超额控制权对企业绩效的倒U型影响中的负向调节作用,提供了来自新兴经济体的经验证据,丰富了投资者保护法律论,并促使该领域研究从“直接作用”走向“调节作用”。终极控制人控制效应研究领域还比较年轻,本文也仅仅是对其中几个相对比较重要的问题做了初步的探索,未来研究还需要从多方面去提升终极控制人控制效应的理论研究水平。其中,超额控制权影响企业绩效的过程机理、私人执法在超额控制权对企业绩效的影响中的调节作用等,都是值得进一步深入探讨的重要研究议题。更多还原

【Abstract】 Becoming a source of investment value in Chinese capital market and the most advantage group in China’s economic system, listed companies have made outstanding contributions to the sustainable development of Chinese capital market and the national economy. However, there is more serious phenomenon of the ultimate controlling shareholders’control in most of Chinese listed companies. It is estimated that about 90% of Chinese listed companies are controlled by the ultimate controlling shareholders, most of whom possess excess control right over stockholders’meeting through the pyramid structure and over board of directors through selecting directors. Events like this happened frequently:the ultimate controlling shareholders abuse the excess control right, and infringe the interest of enterprise and the minority shareholders through fund embezzlement, insider trading and so on. These events bring great chanllenge to the sustainable growth of Chinese listed companies. In the meantime, in order to avoid being delisted, achieve IPO qualification and so on, the ultimate controlling shareholders also use their excess control right to inject high quality assets in the company and provide financial support for the companies which will benefit minority shareholders and enterprise. In this context, in order to protect the interest of minority investors and enterprises, Chinese government is improving the system of investor legal protection and strengthening law enforcement. However, in China, the level of investor legal protection is low as a whole and exists regional differences. Therefore, the understanding of the impact of excess control right on enterprise performance and the role of investor legal protection has become an important issue that must be solved during the development process of China’s capital market and national economic. The global financial crisis since 2007 has increased the urgency to resolve this important issue.Through a review of the study on the effect of the ultimate controlling shareholder’s control, this dissertation holds that excess control right is the essence of ultimate controlling shareholder’s control, and in order to study the impact of excess control right on corporate performance and the moderating effect of investor legal protection, tunneling effect and propping effect should be considered synthetically. However, the impact of excess control right on corporate performance remains unclear when tunneling effect and propping effect are considered synthetically. Furthermore the moderating effect of the investor legal protection has not been well studied. These issues have become bottlenecks which limit the further development of the study on the effect of ultimate controlling shareholder’s control.Integrating normative and empirical research approach, this dissertation attempts to study these issues systematically. The following four parts are the main work of this dissertation. Firstly, based on existed research achievements, the concept and dimension of both the excess control right and the investor legal protection were defined. In the absence of the proper measurement of excess control right over management and longitudinal data of private law enforcement, this dissertation only considered excess control right over stockholders’meeting and excess control right over board of directors, the level of national legislation, the level of national law enforcement and the level of local law enforcement. Secondly, considering tunneling effect and propping effect synthetically, the impact of excess control right on enterprise performance and the moderating effect of investor legal protection were explained systematically, and then 10 research hypotheses were proposed. Thirdly, the listed companies in manufacturing industry in China during the period of 2005-2009 were chosen as the research object.1800 samples were collected through a number of mean such as annual report and the CSMAR database of Shenzhen Guo Tai’an information technology Co., Ltd,, and more detailed and accurate data were accumulated. Finally, the research hypotheses were tested based on fixed effect model using Stata 11.0 software.Above research work, the following conclusions are drawn:Firstly, excess controls right over stockholders’meeting and over board of directors have inverted U-shaped impacts on enterprise performance. On one hand, along with the increase of excess control right over stockholders’meeting, enterprise performance improves with decreasing speed first, and then declines with increasing speed after the excess control right over stockholders’meeting reaching a certain point. On the other hand, along with the increase of excess control right over board of directors, enterprise performance improves with decreasing speed first, and then declines with increasing speed after the excess control right over board of directors reaching a certain point. These results suggest that in order to evaluate the effect of ultimate controlling shareholder’s control scientifically, tunneling effect and propping effect should be considered synthetically, and excess control right should be chosen as the proxy variable of ultimate controlling shareholder’s control.Secondly, excess controls right over stockholders’meeting and over board of directors have U-shaped impacts on net amount of fund embezzlement. On one hand, along with the increase of excess control right over stockholders’meeting, net amount of fund embezzlement declines with decreasing speed first, and then raises with increasing speed after the excess control right over stockholders’meeting reaching a certain point. On the other hand, along with the increase of excess control right over board of directors, net amount of fund embezzlement declines with decreasing speed first, and then raises with increasing speed after the excess control right over board of directors reaching a certain point. These results suggest that the impacts of excess control right over stockholders’meeting and over board of directors on enterprise performance are also reflected in the behavior lelvel.Thirdly, the level of national legislation and national law enforcement negatively moderate the inverted U-shaped impacts of excess control right over stockholders’ meeting and over board of directors on enterprise performance significantly; the level of local law enforcement negatively moderates the above impacts to some extent. The higher the level of national legislation, the lower the inverted U-shaped impacts of excess control right over stockholders’meeting and over board of directors on enterprise performance. The higher the level of national law enforcement, the lower the inverted U-shaped impacts of excess control right over stockholders’meeting and over board of directors on enterprise performance. Along with the increase of the level of local law enforcement, the inverted U-shaped impact of excess control right over stockholders’meeting on enterprise performance is weakened significantly; the inverted U-shaped impact of excess control right over board of directors on enterprise performance is weakened insignificantly. It may be due to the measurement indicators of local law enforcement are incomplete. Another explanation may be that local law enforcement can not play a good role in the protection of investors in China. Overall, these results suggest that investor legal protection is a multidimensional concept, and can weaken the impact of excess control right on enterprise performance.Compared with previous studies, this dissertation contributes to the existing studies in the following ways:Firstly, based on considering tunneling effect and propping effect synthetically, the impacts of excess control right over stockholders’meeting and excess control right over board of directors on enterprise performance have been studied systematically, which promotes the study on the effect of the ultimate controlling shareholder’s control from "isolated" to "integration". The control of ultimate controlling shareholder produces tunneling effect and propping effect both. Excess control right is the essence of ultimate controlling shareholder’s control. Therefore, the evaluation of the effect of ultimate controlling shareholder’s control, should consider tunneling effect and propping effect synthetically, and excess control right should be chosen as the proxy variable of ultimate controlling shareholder’s control. However, almost all existing researches carry on studies from only one single perspective——tunneling effect or propping effect. Most of them select cash flow right, control right or enhancement mechanism of control right as the proxy variable of ultimate controlling shareholder’s control. As a result, the logical relation among these researches is fuzzy. Considering tunneling effect and propping effect synthetically, this dissertation has studied the impacts of excess control right over stockholders’meeting and excess control right over board of directors on enterprise performance systematically. It helps researchers to perceive the effect of excess control right over stockholders’meeting and over board of directors on enterprise performance completely and also promotes the study on the effect of the ultimate controlling shareholder’s control from "isolated" to "integration" in certain extent.Secondly, based on considering tunneling effect and propping effect synthetically, the effect of excess control right over stockholders’ meeting and over board of directors on net amount of fund embezzlement have been further studied systematically, which promotes the ultimate controlling shareholder’s control study from "result" to "behavior". According to corporate governance theory, the ultimate ownership structure affects enterprise performance through affecting the behavior of the ultimate controlling shareholder. However, most existing researches focus on the result level and give a little attention to the behavior level. Considering tunneling effect and propping effect synthetically, this dissertation has studied the impacts of excess control right over stockholders’meeting and over board of directors on net amount of fund embezzlement systematically. It provides empirical evidence for the impact of excess control right on enterprise performance and promotes the ultimate controlling shareholder’s control study from "result" to "behavior".Thirdly, from three dimensions of investor legal protection (the level of national legislation, the level of national law enforcement and the level of local law enforcement), the negative moderating effect of investor legal protection on the inverted U-shaped impacts of excess control right over stockholders’meeting and over board of directors on enterprise performance has been studied, which promotes the investor legal protection research from "direct effect" to "moderating effect". Investor legal protection not only affects the behavior of ultimate controlling shareholder and its effects directly, but also plays a moderating role by weakening the impact of the ultimate ownership structure on the behavior of ultimate controlling shareholder and its effects. However, most existing researches focus on the direct effects, and are use data from developed countries and single dimension of investor legal protection. Currently, the moderating effect of investor legal protection on the impacts of excess control right over stockholders’meeting and excess control right over board of directors on enterprise performance is almost a "blind spot". Based on China’s system of investor legal protection, this dissertation has clarified dimensions of investor legal protection, and then studied the negative moderating effect of investor legal protection on the inverted U-shaped impacts of excess control right over stockholders’meeting and over board of directors on enterprise performance. It provides empirical evidence from emerging economies for this field, and promotes the investor legal protection research from "direct effect" to "moderating effect".The research field of the effect of the ultimate controlling shareholder’s control is still very young, and only a few relatively important issues were studied in the dissertation. Further research still calls for improvements from a number of different aspects. In future, the impact mechanism of excess control right on enterprise performance, the moderating effect of private law enforcement and so on, are all interesting topics that require in-depth study.更多还原