【作者】 吴泽斌；

【导师】 刘卫东；

【作者基本信息】 浙江大学 ， 土地资源管理， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 “十分珍惜、合理利用土地和切实保护耕地”是我国的基本国策。目前我国耕地保护制度安排主要有土地利用规划制度、耕地总量动态平衡制度、土地用途管制制度、农地转用审批制度、土地开发复垦整理制度、占用耕地补偿制度、农用地的管理和鼓励农民种粮的有关政策等。这些制度的建立是从我国人多地少、耕地后备资源不足的国情出发的,具有积极的作用,但不可忽视的事实是我国耕地保护效果却并不乐观。从1985-2008年中,全国耕地面积共减少了346.4×104公顷,年均减少15.1×104公顷。我国耕地保护政策没能达到预期的目标,其深层次原因是耕地保护中所涉及的多样化利益关系没能得到科学的管理,耕地保护主体的利益在土地开发利用过程中并未能得到公平的保障和有效的协调。通过对已有研究的梳理发现,基于冲突管理视角研究耕地保护的文献还十分有限,研究力量有待加强。为了科学和合理地制定耕地保护政策,并保证其在土地利用过程中能够有效实施,需要认真调查、发现、研究和解决耕地保护利益冲突,把它们转换为耕地保护的积极力量。本研究从我国耕地保护现行政策的运行效果评价出发,揭示耕地保护现状及其存在的问题；通过对耕地保护利益冲突的具体表现形式的分析,阐明了耕地保护利益冲突形成和发展的机理；提出了解决耕地保护利益冲突的管理策略和保障措施。研究的内容主要包括：(1)从执行力角度出发,基于PSR框架下构建耕地保护政策执行力的指标体系,运用灰色关联分析法和协调度函数组合模型,测度和评析我国现行耕地保护政策的执行效果。(2)借鉴西方管理理论中利益相关者的有关思想,从紧密性和社会性两个维度出发,对耕地保护利益相关者进行了分类,并探讨了耕地保护利益冲突的具体形态类型。(3)耕地保护利益冲突机理分析的目的在于让耕地保护的各利益相关者理性地了解冲突产生的原因及其发生过程,为创造和建立耕地保护利益相关者之间的合作与互动提供条件。从耕地保护外部环境的区域非均衡性、耕地保护成本收益核算的非对称和现行土地管理制度的不完善三方面分析了耕地保护利益冲突产生的原因。(4)共同但有区别责任原则是耕地保护利益冲突管理的基本原则。围绕这一原则,本研究提出了耕地保护利益冲突管理的“两大支柱”。支柱之一是明确责任,协调发展,研究内容包括耕地保护区域的划分及其建设管理、以耕地保护为契机建立区域协作与联动机制；支柱之二是提高收益,有利可图。提高耕地保护主体的收益主要通过两种途径解决,途径一是重构耕地多功能价值,把耕地作为一种价值工程来开发,显化耕地的隐形价值；途径二是测算耕地保护的区域经济补偿标准,以矫正耕地保护的外部经济性。(5)为保障耕地保护利益冲突管理策略在实践中的运用,提出了相应的配套措施作为支撑。主要探讨了耕地保护责任的外部审计监督机制,同时,归纳总结了相应的政策建议。本研究主要取得了以下成果：(1)测度和评价了我国现行耕地保护政策的执行效果。引入执行力概念,扩展了耕地保护政策执行力的内涵,耕地保护政策的执行力是由多种“分力”共同作用所形成的“合力”。通过测度表明,耕地保护政策执行力可用耕地保护PSR系统协调度来表征；耕地保护P-S-R系统协调度最高为黑龙江1.7799,最低为海南1.5518。(2)提出了耕地保护利益冲突管理的共同但有区别责任原则。耕地保护是全民共同的责任,但由于耕地保护外部环境的区域非均衡性和耕地保护机会成本损失的区域差异决定了耕地保护的责任又必须是有区别的。耕地保护共同责任的价值在于倡导和促进不同地区和社会成员的广泛参与,区别责任的主张使得耕地保护的政策措施在实践中更易接受和推行,更具有生命力和效率,同时耕地保护的共同但有区别责任也是有机联系的统一整体。在耕地保护中,应该从注重“共同责任”转变到“共同但有区别责任”的路径中来。为了使共同但有区别责任原则在耕地保护中得到更好的运用,本研究相应地探究了实施耕地保护共同但有区别责任原则的前提条件—耕地保护区域的合理划分及其建设管理；实施耕地保护共同但有区别责任原则的保障条件—以耕地保护为契机,建立区域协作与联动机制。(3)重构了全国各省市耕地资源的多功能价值,为各省市之间耕地保护成本收益的比较和省际之间土地的统筹利用提供理论和技术支撑。通过对全国各个省份耕地资源的多功能价值的测算,表明耕地生态价值和社会价值被忽视,耕地的经济价值所占比重较低,全国平均为9.30%,把耕地保护作为一种价值工程开发,拥有无限的商机。大部分省市的耕地社会价值占其总价值的比重位于70-80%区间内,说明在我国现阶段,耕地仍然是大多数农民赖以生存的重要资源,耕地的社会保障功能显得尤其重要和必要。耕地生态服务价值占总价值的比重全国平均为15.26%,生态环境较为脆弱的西部地区所占比重较高,贵州、云南、西藏、陕西、甘肃、青海、宁夏和新疆的耕地生态服务价值比重均高于全国平均水平。(4)测算了全国各省市之间耕地保护的区域补偿或支付标准,从而让耕地保护所产生的外部效益在经济活动中实现内部化,让营利型耕地保护替代任务分配型的耕地保护运作模式成为可能。依据耕地保护的机会成本损失和基于区域粮食安全所折算的耕地盈余或赤字量,测算出耕地保护区域间的经济补偿标准。在不同情景模式下的测算结果表明,粮食主产区为主要的补偿对象,黑龙江省所应得到的补偿金额最高,可获得543.24亿元／年,而东部地区大多为耕地保护外部效益补偿金的主要支付者,上海市需要支付的补偿金最多,最低也应支付421.79亿元/年。(5)探讨了耕地保护责任的审计监督机制。地方政府保护耕地实质上是履行其受托责任,地方政府耕地保护责任的审计是对其履行受托责任的一种审计。受托责任包括耕地保护的报告责任、财务责任和管理责任。审计将在这三种受托责任中发挥监督作用。从审计学角度探讨耕地保护责任的外部监督机制,丰富和完善了耕地保护的监督制度,增强了耕地保护利益冲突管理的制度保障力量。更多还原

【Abstract】 To cherish and give a rational use to the land as well as to give a true protection to the cultivated land are seen as a basic principle of land use in the country.The current policy of cultivated land protection mainly include the followings:land use planning, dynamic balance of total amount of cultivated land, land use control system,the surpervison and approval for agricultural land conversion, land development、reclamation and consolidation, cultivated land requisition-compensation balance,farmland management and incentive policies for farmers to grow food, et al. All these policies are extremely positive because China’s densely populated and retains limited reserve resources of cultivated land. China has the world’s most stringent cultivated land protection system, but cultivated land amount is still decreasing from 1.25×108 ha in 1985 to 1.21×108 ha in 2008, average annual reduction of 15.1×104 ha. Why is it so difficult to protect cultivated land in China? One of the main causes is that the interest conflicts of cultivated land protection isn’t scientifically managed. Through the existing research with regarding to interest conflicts of cultivated land protection, the author found that it is rare which need to further study. Therefore, discovering, acquainting and resolving conflicts of cultivated land protection is greatly meaningful.This study firstly evaluated the performance of cultivated land protection in order to get to know the situation and to find problems, then analyzed the forms of interest conflicts in cultivated land protection and explored how it caused, and finally some management strategies are proposed. The contents of this paper mainly include as follows:(1) The index evaluation system, the Delphi, the grey system theory and the coordinative degree calculation model are employed to evaluate executive ability of cultivated land protection polices in china from 1996 to 2006 based on PSR model.(2) Refereed to stakeholder’s ideas, from the two dimensions of tightness and social attributes, the stakeholders of cultivated land protection are divided into primary social stakeholders, minor social stakeholders, primary non-social stakeholders and minor non-social stakeholders. The stakeholders of cultivated land protection enjoy different interests and needs together with different responsibilities, which will result in various interest conflicts.(3) The purpose of analyzing the mechanism of cultivated land protection conflicts is to understand how the conflicts generate. Such factors are involved in explanation of the cultivated land protection conflicts:non-equilibrium external environment of cultivated land protection, asymmetric cost-benefit accounting of cultivated land protection and imperfections of current land administration system.(4) Common and differential liability is the basic principle for managing the interest conflicts of cultivated land protection. In order to better manage the interest conflicts, several measures may be necessary as follows:1) rational division together with managements of cultivated land protection zones; 2) taking cultivated land protection as an opportunity to establish regional collaboration and interaction;3) constructing compensation mechanism for external economic loss of cultivated land protection; 4)reevaluate the cultivated land’s multifunction value.(5) Auditing in local government’s accountability and some measures are discussed to smoothly apply in cultivated land protection.This study mainly acquired the following achievements:(1) Established an index system for evaluated the governments’executive ability of cultivated land protection on the basis of its defined connotation and the Pressure-State-Response (PSR) model by referring to combined model of the gray system theroy and Coordination function. The study shows that executive ability of cultivated land protection could be measured by the harmonious degree of the PSR system, which reflects the cause-effect-response logical relations in protecting cultivated land, and that executive ability of cultivated land protection varies from region to region. The harmonious degree among the samples, Heilongjiang Province is highest, which is 1.7799, Hainan Province last, being 1.5518.(2) Put forward the principle of common and differential liability in conflicts management of cultivated land protection, cultivated land protection is the common liability to all people but the liability is also differential because of the uneven external environment and loss of opportunity cost in cultivated land protection. At the same time common liability and differential liability of cultivated land protection is organically unified. Common liability is the bedrock and differential liability is the key to implement the principle. The way must be shifted from the "common liability" to the "common and differential liability" in the management of cultivated land protection.(3) Reevaluated cultivated land taking thirty-one samples at provincial level in order to weigh the cost and benefit of cultivated land protection. The results show that the proportion of the economic value is very lower, only 9.30%. The cultivated land’s ecological value and social value are ignored in the public decision-making. Provincial differences of cultivated land value are obvious. The proportion of cultivated land’s social value account with 70-80% range, which indicate that the cultivated land is the main survival resources for farmers; the average is 15.26% of ecosystem service value of cultivated land, but most of western province is higher than the national average level.(4) Calculated the amount of economic compensation on the premise of regional grain security and through quantifying the opportunity cost of cultivated land protection so as to balance the external economical loss of cultivated land protection, namely, regions where bearing less task in cultivated land protection should provide how much payment to those regions bearing more in cultivated land protection, so that the economic loss caused by outnumbered cultivated land protection could be remedied. The study results show:l) The highest opportunity cost of cultivated land protection is 37.05×104 Yuan/hm2 in Shanghai, the lowest is 0.01×104 Yuan/hm2in Gansu province and the average level in the whole country is 6.22×104 Yuan/hm2 2)Under the scenarios of food self-sufficiency rate 90% and grain consumption 300kg per capita, cultivated land is deficit in Guangdong, Beijing, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Tianjin, Fujian, Qinghai, Shanxi, Shaanxi, Guizhou, Hainan province. Under the scenarios of food self-sufficiency rate of 95% and grain consumption 400kg per capita, in the Jilin, Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia, Henan, Xinjiang, Shandong, Ningxia, Anhui, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Hubei and Hunan provinces, cultivated land are surplus;3) The highest compensation is paid for Heilongjiang Province in the studying samples, for one year the amount of which is 543.24x108 Yuan. Most places in the east of China are the payers of financial compensation, with Shanghai being the one that pays most, at least 421.79×108 Yuan per annum. The cost is extremely high in order to achieve food self-sufficiency rate to be 90% or 95% and to rely on their own cultivated land to maintain the regional food security.(5) Explored the feasibility of auditing in the accountability of cultivated land protection for local government,which will enrich supervision institution system of cultivated land protection from a new angle of view. Essentially local government to protect cultivated land is a type of public accountability, so the content of accountability auditing in cultivated land protection for local government is to audit its public accountability.Auditing contents regarding local government’s accountability are established based on public accountability. Auditing can play a important role in reducing agent cost and increasing agent’s breach risk of government to protect cultivated land.更多还原