【作者】 肖浩；

【导师】 夏新平；

【作者基本信息】 华中科技大学 ， 工商管理， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 政治关联是世界各国经济发展过程中的一种普遍现象,它在很多国家都广泛存在,是近年来公司财务研究的热点和前沿课题。政治关联起因于政府对宏观和微观经济的干预行为,同样也具有支持和掠夺两种相反的经济效应。在我国,由于特殊的政治经济环境,政府干预经济的行为十分严重,上市公司通过各种方式形成了与政府复杂的多样性政治关联,这种关联关系从贷款税收优惠、公司治理、掏空掠夺等各种渠道影响企业经营运作的各个方面,并最终影响公司的价值。本文在对国内外政府干预、政治关联研究现状及最新发展进行梳理的基础上,立足于中国特有的制度环境,分别从融资约束、资本成本和公司绩效三个方面探索政府干预和政治关联的作用,检验中国的政府干预、政治关联对不同终极控制人控制下的公司价值的影响。本文以2004-2006年A股上市公司为研究样本,采用多元判别分析方法和现金--现金流敏感度模型,对我国上市公司融资约束的现状进行统计分析,并深入研究了政治关联对国有和民营上市公司融资约束和融资能力的影响。研究结果发现,民营企业遭受比国有企业更严重的融资约束,并且直接IPO的民企融资约束程度要显著低于非IPO上市的民企；政治关联显著地减轻了民营企业面临的融资困境,但并未能降低国有企业面临的融资约束,这是由于大股东的政府背景已经为国有企业提供了银行借贷的软约束,高管的政治背景对提升融资能力的作用也就不显著；另外,考虑不同地区政府干预程度的差异后,民营企业的政治关联在政府干预比较厉害的地区能够降低其融资约束,对国有企业则没有这种效应；进一步,与融资约束较低的企业相比,融资约束较高的企业的政治关联能够更大程度地降低企业面临的融资约束。本文以1999-2001年沪深两市334个配股上市公司样本为研究对象,实证研究了政府干预、政治关联与权益资本成本的关系。研究发现,政府干预对国有企业的权益资本成本产生了显著的负面影响；政治关联整体上并没有影响国有企业的权益资本成本,但考虑不同的政府干预程度后,政治关联在政府干预比较严重的公司能提高权益资本成本。另外,非国有企业的政治关联同样增加了企业的权益资本成本。实证结果证明,政治关联对多数公司的权益资本成本具有负面的影响。这是因为政府干预、政治关联对企业风险同时存在“可预期效应”和“保护效应”,两种影响相互抵消后,净效应是提高投资者对企业风险的评价,从而提高企业权益资本成本。本文基于柯布-道格拉斯生产函数建立随机前沿模型,以2002-2005年沪深两市1000多家民营上市公司为研究样本,按照上市方式的不同将民营公司分为直接上市和间接上市两种类型,区分两类民营企业形成政治关联的不同途径,实证研究了民营上市公司的政治关联与公司价值之间的关系。研究结果发现,直接上市民营公司更有动机去与政府形成政治关联,其公司价值也显著地高于间接上市民营公司；直接上市民营公司的政治关联对公司价值没有显著影响,而间接上市民营公司的政治关联减少了公司价值,因此,政治关联的掠夺之手在间接上市民营公司中更明显。而在不同类型的民营上市公司中,政治关联对公司价值影响的差异主要在于政治关联形成的途径和动机存在差异。本文的研究拓广了国内外学者关于政府干预的理论研究,并为我国当前关于政治关联与公司价值关系的争论提供了实证依据和参考。总体上,政府干预与企业政治关联都给企业带来了价值上的损害,制度环境的完善则能够减轻这种负面效应。研究对于认识政府干预和政治关联的影响路径及经济后果也有着重要的理论和实践意义,其政策启示在于：国家应通过加强政治和法律制度的建设,从根本上减少政府干预企业的动机和企业寻租空间,以实现社会公平和经济的健康发展。更多还原

【Abstract】 In the process of world economic development, political connections become universal phenomena all over the world and widely exist in most countries. Especially in recent years, political connections have become a hot research field and a frontier topic of corporate finance. Political connections originate from government’s intervention in macro and micro economy, and similar to government’s intervention, they also have two opposite economic effects:the grabbing hand and the helping hand. In China, because of its special political and economic environment, governmental intervention in business activities is very serious. Meanwhile, many listed firms have developed complex and diversified associations with government through various ways, and enjoyed easier access to debt financing, lower taxation, and stronger market power. By means of bank loan, tax, corporate government, tunneling and etc., political connections can impose significant impact on almost all aspects of enterprise operation and management, and consequently affect firm valuation. Based on the overview of research on government intervention and political connections at home and abroad, and rooted in China’s unique institutional background, this paper explores the role of government intervention and political connections from the perspectives of financing constraints, capital cost and corporate performance, and focuses on examining the influence of government intervention and political connections on firm valuation under different ultimate ownerships conditions.Using a sample of Chinese A-share listed firms during 2004-2006, this paper adopts the method of multiple discriminant analysis, to analyze the listed firms’present situation of financing constraints. Further, this paper sets up an empirical model of cash and cash flow sensitivity, presented initially by Almeida et al., to study in depth the effects of political connections on financing constraint and financing ability of private firms and state-owned enterprises. The results show private firms suffer higher financing constraints than state-owned enterprises. Moreover, indirect-listed private firms are more likely to be financially constrained than direct-listed private firms. Political connections can significantly reduce financing constraints of private firms. But it is helpless to promote the growth of financing abilities of state-owned enterprises, which is most attributed to the governmental background of large shareholders. Government ownership enables state-owned enterprises to take advantage of soft constraints in bank loans, thus the role of political connections is weakened and insignificant. After considering the strength of government intervention in different provinces, empirical results show that in provinces with higher governmental intervention on the economics sectors, political connections have more obvious effects on financing constraint of private firms. However, this effect is not reflected by state-owned firms.This paper examines the effects of government intervention and political connections on cost of equity capital in China, by using a sample of 334 A-share listed firms launching share placement during the period of 1999-2001. The research finds that there is significant negative influence of government intervention on the cost of equity of state-owned enterprises. For the state-owned sample, there is no significant relationship between political connections and cost of equity. However, for the sub-sample with higher governmental intervention, political connections significantly increase the cost of equity. Moreover, for the non-state sample, political connections also have negative impact on the cost of equity. These results suggest political connections bring even higher risks to the majority of firms. The reason is that government intervention and political connections both have two opposite effects on enterprise risks. One is to increase the predictability of operation behaviors and business environment and consequently decrease cost of equity. The other is cost of equity will be increased without government protection. These two effects are offset by each other, eventually the net effect is investors increase the evaluation of enterprise risks, and therefore increase the cost of equity. Based on Cob-Douglas production function, this paper establishes a stochastic frontier model to test the data set of more than 1000 private listed firms. This paper divides private firms into direct listed firms and indirect listed firms, differentiates their ways to establish connections with government, then analyzes the relation between political connections and market valuation of private listed firms. The empirical results show that direct listed private firms have stronger motivation to construct political connections, and then have higher market valuation than indirect listed private firms. Political connections have no significant effect on the valuation of direct listed firms, but it has significantly negative impact on the valuation of indirect listed firms. A reasonable explanation is that grabbing hand following political connections is more pronounced in the sub group of indirect listed firms. The differences lie in that two types of firms have different motivations and ways to establish their owners’political connections.This paper not only deeply extends the theoretical study on government invention, but also provides valuable empirical evidences for the debate on whether political connections will increase or decrease firms valuation. The results confirm that both government invention and political connections indeed do harm to the interests of shareholders as a whole, but the improvement of institutional environment can reduce such negative effects. This research deepens our knowledge and understanding about the mechanisms and economic effects of government invention and political connections, therefore has important theoretical and practical significance. The research aims at throwing light on China’s policies, and discloses that China should further promote political and legal institution building, reduce motivation of government intervention and squeeze the space of enterprises rent-seeking, and finally realize social fairness and healthy development of economy.更多还原