【作者】 聂大海；

【导师】 王天成；

【作者基本信息】 吉林大学 ， 科学技术哲学， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 论文主要讨论了克里普克关于专名与通名指称确定的同一性与必然性的语言哲学思想,并通过对同一性的辩证分析尝试性地提出一个说得通的解决方案。克普里克在同一命题中确定指称的学说是以可能世界语义学为前提对传统摹状词理论的反驳开始的,以严格指示词在历史因果链条的回溯和对形而上学必然性的追寻中完成的。第一章探讨了摹状词理论,这是克普里克理论批判的前提。弗雷格发现了密尔所指即意义这一理论的困难从而区分了涵义与所指。一个语词有指称,也有涵义,指称是语词所代表的对象,涵义是通达这一对象的途径。罗素则指出有些表达式是没有指称的,进而认为如果一个句子没有表达一个命题,这个句子是无意义的。罗素的解决方法是把包含特殊摹状词的句子改写成谓词逻辑中的一个命题,以揭示其真实的逻辑结构。弗雷格和罗素的摹状词理论的一个困难是:一个专名等于一个摹状词还是一些?塞尔和维特根斯坦的簇理论有助于解决这一疑难。描述理论的核心是指称的确定与涵义相关。然而摹状或描述的偶然性为克普里克所反对。第二章和第三章是论文的主体。在讨论专名时详细考察了克里普克反驳摹状词理论的三个证明。1.模态证明。摹状词理论认为专名N的意义是由与之联系的—簇属性给出的,但克普里克认为这不符合模态事实,许多属性与专名无必然联系。2.知识论证明。根据摹状词理论,与专名相联系的一簇属性是专名所独一无二具有的。但克里普克指出,我们常常使用一些专名而没有联系到他们的独特属性。3.语义证明。根据摹状词理论,如果在Q中的大部分属性被X所有;那么X就是专名N的指称。克里普克举哥德尔的例子反驳这一假定。基于以上批判,克里普克提出了历史—因果理论,认为专名是现实与可能世界中的严格指示词,专名的指称同一性是由历史因果链条保证的,并可追溯到个体的起源,具有形而上学必然性。如果克里普克是正确的,那么专名的指称的同一性与必然性就不是由与专名相联系的特定摹状词决定的。克里普克认为通名像专名一样都是严格指示词,并且将通名指称的同一性诉诸于物质的基本结构,因而与个体起源一起被贴上了本质主义的标签,因此,同一命题的先验偶然与后验必然之分也成题中之意了。关于信念命题中的同一替换疑难在克里普克严格指示词的规定中并不存在,如果克里普克信念之谜是信念本身的问题,这将引导我们对信念的本质做细致的分析。最后一章我们将克里普克指称的同一性本质-形而上学必然性追溯到了亚里士多德的本质主义,笔者认为克里普克的指称理论是对亚里士多德实体理论的语言重建。笔者还在同一性的辩证分析中尝试性地提出了确定指称的新框架,并试图在这一新框架中达到指称同一性的同与异的辩证统一,以期结束由于同与异分离的理解给语言指称的确定所带来的哲学困扰。更多还原

【Abstract】 This dissertation mainly discusses the referential identity and necessity. It also analyzes the real meaning of what is the identity. The author tries to put forward a make-sense answer to the question of how to fix the object by words.The first chapter is about Kripke’s object to the theory of descriptions. A word or phrase means what it stands for or refers to, This was mill’s view for naming expressions. Frege saw a difficulty for the theory of meaning for naming expressions if the meaning of such an expression is simply the object named and introduce a distinction between the sense and the reference. The referent of a naming expression is that item that is uniquely characterized by the sense of the expression. Russell realized that naming expressions could sometimes fail to name anything. Russell thought that if a sentence did not express a proposition then that Sentence had to be nonsense. His answer was a theory of descriptions based on the idea of logical analysis. Russell’s analysis can Solve Frege’s problem without the introduction of sense. But one problem with the description theory by Frege and Russell is that according to that view each use of name has a single description associated with it. Wittgenstein and Searle use the cluster of descriptions to solve the problem. Kripke is against contingence of the theory of description.The second and the third chapter are the main body of the dissertation. The first part is about Kripke’s rejections to descriptivism, arguing that it is based on a number of faulty presuppositions. We can roughly group the objections into three categries:1. modal arguments—according to kripke, the description theory of names gets the modal facts wrong. The theory holds that the meaning of the name N is given by the properties in the associated cluster Q. He points out that many of properties that we commonly associate with people are properties that are not essential to the person. Kripke introduced the notion of rigid designator/non- rigid designator to help clarify the different ways that we may use expressions. 2.epistemic arguments-According to the description theory, one of the properties or some collection of the properties in Q is believed by the speaker to designate someone uniquely. Kripke points out that we often use names to refer to certain persons without believing that we have unique descriptions of those persons. 3. semantic arguments. Kripke’s basic idea is simple. A given use u of a proper name N refers to a given entity X Provided two conditions obtain: (a) at some time X was baptized N, and (b) there is a chain of reference-dependent uses of N leading from u to the baptism. And then the general name is the same as proper name. And the essence of the proper name and general name depend on the individual and the deep structure. Therefore his distinction between necessity a posteriori and contingent a posteriori dose make sense. Kripke’s puzzle can not be solved by descriptivism. It will be solved by analyzing the essence of belief.Finally we hold that Aristotle’s essentialism is the base of Kripke’s theory. And after dialectically analyzing the identity we try to advance a new frame of reference, in order to end up the dilemma of the same and the difference of identity.更多还原