【作者】 李志刚；

【导师】 麻彦春；

【作者基本信息】 吉林大学 ， 制度经济学， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 从1980年恢复保险以来,中国保险业获得了高速增长,几乎每年的增速都远远超过同期的GDP的增速。但是这种持续了30年的高速增长是否有利于我国保险业的长远发展,也就是说这种增长是否是健康和可持续的?本文从诺思提出的“适应性效率”的视角,对中国保险制度变迁的长期动态效率以及制度变迁的原因和动力进行研究,探索中国保险制度未来变革的方向。一般来说,我们将1980年恢复保险后我国的保险制度划分为两个阶段:一是计划经济体制下的财政型保险制度,它是以国有保险产权占绝对主导地位和财政实行重税政策为特征,以寡头垄断为标志,保险与财政之间形成了巨灾损失由财政兜底的分配关系;二是社会主义市场经济体制下的金融型保险制度,它是以保险产权主体多元化和保险企业独立纳税为特征,以垄断竞争为标志,承保业务与投资业务并重,保险与财政之间形成正常的税收分配关系。在从财政型保险制度过渡到金融型保险制度的过程中,保险产权制度、监管制度、市场制度相继发生变化。本文将这些制度设为虚拟变量,并以其为投入变量,将保险深度和保险密度两个反映保险业发展水平的指标作为输出变量,使用数据包络分析(DEA)的CCR模型分析了中国保险制度变迁的整体效果。实证分析的结果表明中国保险制度的改革大体上是成功的,投入产出的效率不断提高,基本上实现了配置效率。在此基础上,本文从适应性效率角度出发,从理论与实证两个方面对中国保险制度变迁的适应性效率进行了评价。虽然诺思提出了适应性效率理论,但主要是建立在经验总结和主观判断的基础之上。因此直至目前为止,适应性效率并没有一个得到广泛认可的客观评价标准,无论是诺思的交易费用标准还是王玉海的即期合作剩余标准,都难以完整准确地对适应性效率进行评价。对此,本文从诺思关于适应性效率的文献中归纳出具有适应性效率的制度应具备的四个基本特征:(一)没有行业进入壁垒,实现充分竞争;(二)有完善的组织治理结构,以利于决策的分散化;(三)组织具有充分的灵活性,以增强其创新能力;(四)产权界定明晰,国家对产权保护提供可信承诺。并从理论上对中国保险制度进行适应性效率评价,分析的结果表明中国保险制度目前仍不具备适应性效率的这四个最基本的特征。在实证分析方面,本文沿用适应性效率最宽泛的定义——制度的适应性指的是制度安排与经济条件之间的相互适应关系——建立保险行业与经济社会发展之间适应性评价的因子——弹性分析模型。实证分析的结论表明中国保险行业的发展严重滞后于经济社会的发展,在保险业发展过程中存在着严重的制度瓶颈,保险制度变迁并不具备适应性效率。既然中国保险制度的变迁不具备适应性效率,那么为什么中国保险业会出现近三十年的持续高速增长?本文运用博弈论的基本理论和方法,对中国保险产权制度、监管制度和市场制度的变迁进行了分析,认为在中国二重经济结构下强而有力的上层结构根据自身效用的变化单方面主导保险制度的变革,从而引起保险制度的变迁。这种由上层结构单方面主导的制度变迁通常被认为是无效的,因为它仅代表了一方利益集团的意志,而中国政府主导的保险制度变迁却带来了保险行业的快速增长。对此,本文采用保险业增长结构的“三分法”计量了中国保险制度变迁过程中的合作剩余。实证分析的结果表明在制度变革的过程中保险行业获得了即期合作剩余,即保险业各利益集团都从政府单方面主导的变革中获得了利益,这是中国保险制度变迁的主要动力。对于产生这种结果的原因,本文将其归因于中国的政府具有泛利性和实践的务实主义的特征。也就是说,在过去三十多年里中国政府的利益和各利益集团的利益基本上是重合的,并且能够根据经济社会环境的变化不断调整自己的意识形态,采取自上而下的变革,以促进经济和社会发展。但是今后的三十年或更长的时间里,随着各种利益集团的形成和不断分化,这种完全政府主导推进的强制性制度变迁是难以持续的。从中国保险制度变迁的适应性效率和变迁原因的分析中可知,中国经济二重结构下政府单方面主导保险制度变革是导致适应性效率缺失的最主要原因。在借鉴西方发达国家保险制度及其变迁的成功经验的基础上,本文提出了实行经济民主、加强保险行业协会作用、发展中小保险企业和推进渐进改革等对策建议。实行经济民主的目的在于通过分权、民主和法治限制上层结构过于集中的权力,避免其单方主导制度变革;加强保险行业协会作用的目的在于建立富有协调力的中间结构,协调上下层结构之间的利益和冲突;发展中小保险企业的目的在于充实下层结构,使之具有更多的谈判能力,从而能够影响中国保险制度的变迁;渐进式改革的目的在于避免政府主导型制度变迁的路径依赖,通过创新、试点和试验等方式进行小幅度、多阶段的渐进式改革,以减少路径依赖。更多还原

【Abstract】 Since the insurance recovery in 1980, China’s insurance industry has been rapidly developing,almost every year’s growth rate is far more than the growth rate of GDP in the same period. Is this rapid growth lasted for 30 years conducive to long-term development of China’s insurance industry, in other words, is this growth healthy and sustainable? This article studies the long-term and dynamic efficiency, reasons and motivations of the changes of insurance institution and explores the future direction of China’s insurance institution from the North’s "adaptive efficiency" perspective.In general, we divide Chinese insurance institution changes after 1980’s recovery into two stages: First, the financial-based insurance institution under the planned economy system, which is featured as the state-owned insurance property rights have the overwhelmingly dominant status and the financial implementation of heavy tax policy, taking oligopoly as its symbol and the distribution relationship between the insurance and finance is formed that the catastrophe losses will be covered by the finance; Second, monetary-based insurance institution under the socialist market economic system, which is characterized as the pluralism of insurance property rights and the independent taxing of insurance companies, taking the monopolistic competition as its symbol, regarding the underwriting business and investment business as of same importance and the normal revenue distribution relationship between insurance and finance has been formed. During the transition from the financial-based insurance institution to the monetary-based insurance institution, the insurance property rights institution, regulatory institution and the market institution have been changed one by one.This article set these institutions as the dummy variables and the input variables, the insurance penetration and insurance density, which reflects the level of development of the insurance industry, as output variables and uses the CCR model of data envelopment analysis (DEA) to analyze the overall effect of the changes in China’s insurance institution. The results show that the reform of China’s insurance institution is largely successful with the efficiency of input and output increasing continuously. The efficiency value changes over the years also reveal that the Chinese insurance institution has the characteristics of portability, the feature of phased portability of the insurance institution has brought the volatility of the increasing process of efficiency value.On this basis, the article attempts to evaluate the adaptive efficiency of China’s insurance institution changes from the point of view of adaptive efficiency, from both the theoretical and empirical aspects. Although North proposed adaptive efficiency theory, but it’s mainly based on the experience and the subjective judgments. So far, the adaptive efficiency has not got an widely accepted objective criteria. Neither North’s standard of transaction costs nor Yu-Hai Wang’s spot cooperation surplus standards can evaluate fully the adaptive efficiency. So the article summarized four basic characteristics of the institutions with adaptive efficiency should have from the North’s articles on the adaptive efficiency: (a) There is no industry barriers of entry to fulfill the full competition; (b) There are sound governance structures in order to facilitate the decentralization of decision-making; (c) The organization has sufficient flexibility to enhance their innovative capacity; (d) There is clear definition of property rights and the State could provide credible commitments to protect property rights. The article evaluates the adaptive efficiency of China’s insurance institution from the theoretical aspect and the analysis results show that the current China’s insurance institution still has not these four basic characteristics of the adaptive efficiency In the empirical analysis respect, this article follows the broadest definition of adaptive efficiency - the adaptability of the institution refers to the mutual relationships between institutional arrangements and economic conditions - to establish the factor - elastic analysis model to evaluate the adaptability between the insurance industry and the social developments.The results of the empirical analysis show that the development of China’s insurance industry lagged far behind economic and social developments and there are serious institutional bottlenecks during the development process in the insurance industry and the insurance institutional change does not have an adaptive efficiency.Since the Chinese insurance institutional change does not have the adaptive efficiency, why dose the Chinese insurance industry sustain a high growth for nearly three decades? The article analyze the changes of Chinese insurance property rights institutions, regulatory institutions and the market institutions by using the basic theory and methods of Game Theory and draws a conclusion that the strong upper structure under the dual economic structure in China led unilaterally the insurance institution reforms according to its changes of effectiveness and leads to the institutional changes. The institutional changes dominated by the upper structure unilaterally is generally considered invalid, as it only represents the will of single interest group, but the Chinese government-led insurance institutional change has brought rapid growth of the insurance industry. This article measures the cooperation surplus during the process of Chinese insurance institutional changes using the method of“Rule of Thirds”. The result of the empirical analysis shows that the insurance industry obtained a spot co-operation surplus during the process of institutional changes, which means that all the interest groups of the insurance industry have gained the benefits from the changes led by the government unilaterally and this is the main motivation of the Chinese insurance institutional changes. The reason for this result, the article attributed to that the Chinese government has encompassing and practical characteristics of pragmatism. In other words, in the past three decades the Chinese government’s interests and the interests of various interest groups basically coincide, and the government constantly adjusts its ideology according to the economic and social environment changes, fulfilling top-down reforms to promote the developments of economy and society.But during the next three decades or longer time, with the forming and continuous dividing of the various interest groups, this fully government-led and mandatory institutional changes is unsustainable.From the analysis of the changing reasons and the adaptive efficiency of Chinese insurance institutional changes, we can see that the insurance institutional reform led by the government unilaterally under the dual structure of the Chinese economy is the most important reason for the missing of the adaptive efficiency. On the base of taking examples of the successful experience of the western developed countries’insurance institutions and their changes, the paper made some recommendations: strengthening the role of the insurance industry association, implementing economic democracy, nurturing small and medium insurance companies and promoting the progressive reforms, etc. To strengthen the role of the insurance industry association aims of establishing a coordinating force in the middle structure, coordinating the conflicts and the interests between the upper and lower structures. The purpose of the implementation of economic democracy is to limit the too concentrated power of the upper structure through decentralization, democracy and the rule of law avoiding the unilateral reforms. Nurturing small and medium insurance companies to enrich the lower structure, so that it has more bargaining power, which can affect the changes of Chinese insurance system. Small-amplitude and multiple stages of gradual reforming is designed to avoid the path dependence of the government-led institutional changes through innovation, pilot testing, etc.更多还原