【作者】 倪子靖；

【导师】 史晋川；

【作者基本信息】 浙江大学 ， 政治经济学， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 本文的研究主题是转型国家的“分层俘获”。通过对我国钢铁行业的案例分析和数理模型的构建,本文指出由于经济市场上大型钢铁企业和地方企业的经济利益竞争,导致大型钢铁企业和地方政府在政治市场上的晋升利益竞争。但是由于中央政府对两类企业的产出有自己独立的偏好,所以会在不同情况下采取不同的政策态度。本文用实证的方式说明了我国钢铁行业里规制存在的相关问题。最后,本文对转型国家的行业规制提出了相应的政策建议。本文用第二章和第三章作为全文的行业基础和理论基础。在第二章中,本文详细描述了我国近六十年来的钢铁产业政策和政策特点,并介绍了美、日、韩、俄、印等国的钢铁政策发展,提出我国钢铁政策的发展特点,为下文的理论部分做铺垫。第三章为本文的规制俘获文献综述部分。规制俘获文献综述依照规制俘获理论所解决的问题展开,从理论的产生背景,规制俘获理论的发展,新规制经济学的规制俘获理论发展进行分析。同时,本文根据第二章提出的进入壁垒问题,以利益集团造成的行政性进入壁垒为角度,进行相关文献梳理,归纳了相关的理论观点。在第四章和第五章中,本文开展详细的理论分析。第四章提出了全文的理论观点——转型国家的“分层俘获”理论。全章的阐述主要分为理论的概念说明,特点概括和产生原因这三大方面。第四章首先提出全文的主题概念,并从各个层面阐释了“分层俘获”的概念和其特点。然后,本文从经济和政治两方面综合分析了“分层俘获”的产生原因,并指出由于行业的特性,中央政府会因为自己的政治经济目标,对不同类型的企业在不同阶段采取不同的政策措施。第四章主要为下章的模型建立起理论框架。第五章根据第四章作出的理论分析,建立起基本的数理模型,以期望用博弈模型说明我国钢铁行业中“分层俘获”的形成机制。首先,本章先梳理出钢铁行业中的分层俘获现象和表现。然后,本章提出了模型相关的基本思路,并且讨论了各个博弈主体的目标和约束条件。之后,本文根据上文内容分析了模型的时序过程,建立博弈树,并针对各种不同的情况,用逆向归纳法求解博弈结果,得出不同情况下的最优和次优条件。最后,本文总结分析分层俘获的存在原因和内在机制。第六章为本文的计量检验部分。本文根据第五章得出的结论,首先提出相关假设。然后,本文利用我国49家钢铁企业的相关数据指标,测度这49家钢铁企业的规模效率和Malmquist竞争力指数,通过tobit随机效应方法进行再步检验。计量结果指出我国现在的钢铁行业由于没有呈现出规模经济,不存在有效的规模经济壁垒,钢铁行业政策对钢铁行业总体规模效率的提升没有帮助,只袒护了国有企业。然而一些中小钢铁企业也是在地方政府的庇护下以低效率存在于市场。第七章为全文的总结。这章概括阐明了观点和主要研究结论,并对转型国家的经济政治体系改革提出可行的政策建议。最后,基于本文的不足指出可再深入研究的方向和问题。更多还原

【Abstract】 This dissertation focuses on the analysis of hierarchical capture in the countries of transition. With analyzing the case of Chinese steel industry and building mathematical models, this dissertation points out that due to the competition between SOEs and local firms in economic market, the leaders of SOEs and local governments compete against each other for their own promotion in political market. However, the central government has its independent preference to the two kinds of output so that it will change its policies on the root if its preference changes.Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 are the bases of the dissertation. Chapter 2 is the summary of the steel industry and Chapter 3 is the introduction of the theory. The second chapter describes the history and characters of Chinese steel industry policies in recent 60 years. Firstly, it summarizes the general condition and the tendency of Chinese steel industry developing. Secondly, it states the change of policies in Chinese steel industry and sorted these. At last, besides introducing the developing of other countries’policies, such as U.S. A, Japan, Korea, Russian and India, it points out the characters and the problems of Chinese policies for foreshadowing following parties. Chapter 3 is the reviews of literatures. The chapter follows the process of developing of the theory of regulatory capture, from the happening, traditional points, new regulatory theory to the research for the transitional countries. Finally, it gives the suggestion of Chinese economic and political institution reforming.Besides; the review of entry-barry theory is based on the theory of interest groups and focuses on the industry aspect.There is elaborate theoretical analysis in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. Chapter 4 begins to propose the theoretical idea of this dissertation, the theory of "hierarchical capture". This chapter is divided into three main sections such as the conceptual description, summary of characters and causes. Chapter 5 illustrates the mechanism of hierarchical capture with mathematical models. At first, this chapter proves firms which enter into marker through capture are efficient. Secondly, with "leader model" this chapter analyzes the cost relation if one of SOEs and local firms want to win in the economic market. Then, with the incentive theory, this chapter designs the restrictions of individual ration and incentive comparison to work out the choice sets of SOEs and local firms. At the end of this chapter, the analysis of the variable preference of central government proves the central government could not keep its commitment.Chapter 6 is the econometrical part of this dissertation. This chapter uses the relative data from 49 Chinese steel firms to measure their scale efficiency and Malmquist index. The results show that there is not any scale efficiency in Chinese steel industry and there is not the phenomena that "bigger is better" mentioned by policies. With the way of tobit model, the results indicate that the steel industry policies are useless for helping Chinese steel industry improve general efficiency, however, they just protect the SOEs partially. These results prove SOEs captured the central governmental policy institutes to carry out the policies which just benefit themselves.Chapter 7 is the summary of this dissertation. The first section of this chapter summarizes the points and important conclusions of the whole dissertation, furthermore, figures out the practicable deeper research directions and topics based on the weakness of this dissertation. The second section gives the practical suggestion of the political and economic reforming in the transitional countries.Keywords:Hierarchical Capture. Transition Country. Regulation. Steel Industry更多还原