【作者】 徐冯璐；

【导师】 胡祖光；

【作者基本信息】 浙江工商大学 ， 企业管理， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 全球范围,随着信息技术革命、金融管制放松、金融一体化、国际金融竞争白热化,各国商业银行把内部治理的变革和创新视为应对环境、降低代理成本和风险、提高效率、培育竞争力的法宝；国内,随着金融市场的全面开放,金融市场全球化的压力和外资银行进入的强有力竞争已经将国有商业银行内部治理的彻底改革推向了前台,并将对我国未来经济和金融发展产生全局性影响。普遍认为,国有商业银行治理缺陷在于产权主体虚置和产权约束不力,只有理顺国有商业银行产权关系,引入多元化产权制度,才能克服国有银行科层委托代理链条中的本质缺陷,最大限度地提高经营效率和监管效果。但是我们更要看到,在当前国有银行股份制改造过程中,政府依然是最大的股东,具有绝对控制权。而且,由于国有商业银行在国家政治经济中的特殊地位,在相当长的时间内,国有资本在银行产权结构中占据主导地位是必然的也是必须的。在中国现有的经济社会文化背景中,国有商业银行庞大复杂的科层组织能否顺利、彻底地贯彻总行的战略决策?科层经理人的控制权会否在一定程度上影响正常的银行法人治理,导致科层利益或局部小团体利益的最大化?科层治理机制变革能否在既有的产权模式下提高国有商业银行的绩效?这都将作为新的问题来研究。国际经验表明,银行科层治理不善极易导致银行经营风险,引发金融危机。在中国目前经济金融大幅转轨的动荡时期,在国有商业银行产权结构没有发生实质性变化的前提下,通过重组科层结构、优化科层权限配置、加强科层激励约束来改进国有商业银行内部治理应该成为提升银行绩效的中心环节之一,这也正是本文的意义所在。委托代理理论专门研究委托人和代理人之间相互依赖、相互影响的决策行为及其结果,在信息不对称、目标不相同、责任不对等、契约不完全的条件下研究委托人和代理人的理性行为及其相互关系,将问题的根源理解为信息不对称下各级代理人按自身效用最大化而非委托人效用最大化来行动,在委托人无法觉察的情况下牺牲委托人的利益；把问题的解决锁定在设计一套合适的机制减少代理成本：要么增加信息透明度,提高委托人的监控能力,要么引入利益诱导,将代理人的利益与委托人的利益相协调。其严密的逻辑结构和分析方法为现代管理学的理论研究提供了一个有效的分析工具。本文在对既有的关于科层制理论、委托代理理论以及商业银行公司治理研究的相关文献进行回顾和综述的基础上,把国有商业银行科层治理放到中国转轨经济特定的制度结构中,以委托代理理论作为整体的分析框架,对科层治理中经理人道德风险行为、组织架构设置、权限配置、激励约束机制等问题进行系统阐述和模型解析,并在实证的基础上提出可行的银行科层治理机制改革思路和建议。全文分为七章,主要结构如下：第一章为导论。主要提出论文研究的背景和选题意义,界定本文的研究对象,概述论文的研究思路和论文框架,并解释本文力求做出的创新以及未来值得进一步研究的方向。第二章为理论综述。介绍科层制理论、委托代理理论和商业银行公司治理研究的相关文献,作为随后部分研究的理论基础。第三章为国有商业银行科层经理人道德风险问题研究。首先,从委托代理角度阐述了科层经理人道德风险的生成机理并用案例进行实证分析；其次,以委托代理模型来分析科层经理人的道德风险行为的动机,研究影响其道德风险行为动机的因素以及这些因素间相互作用；最后,对地方政府干预下科层经理人道德风险行为进行分析。第四章为国有商业银行科层机构设置研究。首先,基于委托代理理论对银行科层机构设置进行分析,探讨了科层规模、层级与代理成本、委托效率以及组织绩效的关系；其次,从影响委托代理关系的几个因素(信息不对称、总行监控能力、集权程度、分支机构积极性、分支机构间的制衡、总分行目标偏差、代理成本等)比较国际上几种常见的银行科层机构设置模式；再次,阐述我国国有商业银行科层机构设置演进和现实存在的弊端,并用DEA实证检验国有商业银行科层机构设置与银行效率的关系；最后,运用进化博弈的复制动态模型,分析国有商业银行科层机构设置变革中的各级代理人动力机制。第五章为国有商业银行科层权限配置研究。首先,阐述企业权限配置的组织有效性,政治经济文化、组织规模、员工技术条件等因素对不同的权限配置方式的组织有效性产生影响。其次,通过委托代理有限契约模型分析不确定条件下集权和授权的优劣,同时分析了授权的优先次序对代理人激励效应的影响。再次,在回顾国有商业银行科层权限配置演变历程和阐述现状的基础上对目前国有商业银行普遍上收权限的做法进行评析,提出国有商业银行应正确处理总行控制力、分支行应变力与权限配置的关系。最后,以花旗银行和德意志银行科层权限配置案例为我国国有商业银行提供借鉴。第六章为国有商业银行科层激励机制研究。首先,对现代银行科层激励体系进行概述,包括物质激励、精神激励和竞争激励；其次阐述国有商业银行科层经理人激励现状;再次,国有商业银行科层经理人激励模型分析,包括激励契约的时效、激励契约基数确定以及内外部经理人市场的竞争效应对棘轮效应的改善等；最后,以美国、日本的商业银行和国内其他股份制商业银行科层激励方案为案例,把它们与国有商业银行进行比较,找出国有商业银行科层激励的改进方向。第七章为国有商业银行优化科层治理的制度安排。在前面各部分分析的基础上,就科层机构设置、科层权限配置、科层内控机制和科层激励机制等方面提出优化国有商业银行科层治理的对策建议。本文的创新在于,国内外用委托代理理论来分析银行内部治理的研究主要集中在讨论银行产权改革的必要性方面,而本文深入到银行内部科层,从道德风险、组织结构、权限配置、激励约束机制等几方面来探讨国有商业银行科层治理,使其宏观表现具备更有说服力的微观解释；论文结合当前国际委托代理理论研究前沿,从实际情况出发建立了若干商业银行科层治理机制委托代理模型,主体部分各章的分析都是在相应模型基础上展开的,逻辑较为清晰,论证较为严密；本文将国有商业银行科层治理问题置于中国转型经济的大背景下,充分结合我国特殊的国情和国有商业银行的特性来考虑银行科层委托代理关系的特点；本文综合运用DEA计量分析、案例分析、对比分析、历史分析等方法对银行科层委托代理问题进行实证,使研究更加贴近现实,辨证客观,动态发展,更具有信服力；提出对策建议时,充分结合现有条件,重视改革中会面临的问题和挑战,强调改革的渐进性和阶段性,而不是一味照搬先进银行的模式更多还原

【Abstract】 In global scale, accompanied with revolution in information technology, financial deregulation, financial integration, and intense international competition, more and more big banks consider internal governance reform as a magic weapon to deal with environment, reduce agency cost and risk, increase efficiency and foster competitiveness; in domestic scale, complete opening of financial market and overwhelming force of foreign bank entry compel state-owned commercial banks(SOCBs) to adopt thorough internal governance reform which will have far-reaching influence on future economy and finance of our country. It is commonly held that SOCB’s governance drawbacks lie in property right absence and soft property right restrains, and that property right reform is the key to solve principal-agent problems in SOCB hierarchical governance. However, the truth is that the government, which remains the biggest shareholder of SOCB, possesses absolute control. Moreover, in light of SOCB special status in our country politics and economy, it is necessary that government capital dominates SOCB’s property for quite some time in the future. Under China’s present economic, social and cultural background, can SOCBs’large and complicated hierarchical system smoothly and thoroughly carry out headquarter’strategic policies? Can hierarchical managers’authority hinder bank corporate legal person governance system implementation, leading to hierarchical benefit maximization? Can SOCB hierarchical governance reform enhance bank performance with bank current property right unchanged? All of these questions are well worth researching. International evidences show that improper bank hierarchical governance tends to cause business risk and financial crisis. In China present turbulent transitional stage, provided that SOCB’s property power remains not substantially changed, it serves one of central tasks to enhance bank performance by improving SOCB hierarchical governance, which also gives the significance of the paper.Principal-agent theory is a special method to study the participators’ interactive decision-making behaviors on the condition of information asymmetry, value target difference, responsibility unequivalence, and contract incompleteness. It provides the modern economics with effective analysis implement. Based on review of the principal-agent theory, hierarchical governance theory and SOCB institutional reform literature, this paper, combining with transitional economy characteristics of our country, expatiates SOCB hierarchical governance issues such as branch managers’moral hazard, organizational structure, authority allocation and incentive-control mechanism in principal-agent framework. Finally, based on empirical studies, some applicable SOCB’s hierarchical governance mechanism reform pattern suggestions are proposed. This paper includes seven parts:The first chapter is forward, which brings forward the study significance, defines study object, overviews the main content and logics, and states the study innovation and future research area.The second chapter includes theories summary and research status, which expounds principal-agent theory, bureaucratic theory and research status of bank internal governance as rationale.The third chapter discusses SOCB hierarchical managers’moral hazard. This part analyzes managers’moral hazard formation mechanism; then explains managers’motive for moral hazard actions with principal-agent model; and lastly studies hierarchical managers’moral hazard actions with local government administrative intervention.The forth chapter discusses SOCB hierarchical organizational structure. This part analyzes the relation between structural factor (scale, layer) and agency cost, principal efficiency and organizational performance, compares common hierarchical structure modes, then recounts SOCB hierarchical structure evolution and current drawbacks and empirically tests DEA efficiency of SOCB hierarchical structure, lastly discusses hierarchical managers’incentive mechanism in structure reform with a replicator-dynamics model.The fifth chapter discusses SOCB hierarchical authority allocation. This part firstly analyses impacts of some elements such as external environment, organizational scale, employee talent, and technical condition on organizational effectiveness of different hierarchical authority allocation modes, then compares centralization and delegation of power with limited contract model and considers incentive effect of delegation precedence. After reviewing SOCB hierarchical authority allocation evolution and analyzing current situation, this part explains why SOCB headquarter commonly limits branches authority and proposes SOCB duly handle the relationship between headquarter control and branch flexibility. Finally, case studies of Citi bank and Deutsche bank are given as reference.The sixth chapter discusses SOCB hierarchical incentive mechanism. This part outlines hierarchical incentive system of modern bank which includes material incentive, spiritual incentive and competitive incentive, analyses current situation of SOCB hierarchical incentive, then uses corresponding models to explain timeliness and base decision of incentive contract and the influence of internal and external manager markets on bank branch’s ratcheting effect, lastly give examples of HSBC and SMBC to provide some useful experiences to SOCB’s reform.The seventh chapter discusses institution arrangements for hierarchical governance optimization, which proposes some applicable suggestions in terms of organizational structure, authority allocation, internal control and incentive mechanism.Innovation of the paper lies in instead of traditionally discussing bank property right reform, deeply analyzing bank internal hierarchical system in terms of managers’moral hazard, organizational structure, authority allocation and incentive-control mechanism; constructing several principal-agent theory models to explain corresponding issues, with combination of pioneer theory and domestic practical situation; placing SOCB hierarchical governance on the background of China’s transitional economy and fully considering uniqueness of our bank hierarchical principal-agent relation; applying comprehensive methods such as DEA quantitative analysis, case analysis, comparative analysis, and historical analysis to empirically study principal-agent matters in bank hierarchical governance; instead of simply copying advanced bank practice, aimed at current situations and challenges, proposing progressive optimization suggestions for SOCB hierarchical governance.更多还原