【作者】 徐萌娜；

【导师】 周生春；

【作者基本信息】 浙江大学 ， 政治经济学， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 作为经济发展的重要组成部分,民营企业近年来表现出了蓬勃的生命力,在中国证券市场的影响力亦日益增强。但是民营上市公司本身依然存在着不少问题,其不断出现的各种违法违规行为,尤其是大股东对于中小股东利益的掠夺和侵占,已经对股市的正常秩序和健康发展造成了妨害。国内研究纷纷指出这一现象主要源于民营上市公司中的委托代理问题,并且在很大程度上是大股东控制权问题的反映。在当前这一从股权分置到全流通变迁的重要时期,民营上市公司大股东控制权产生何种变化、控制权私有收益是否得到有效抑制等,都是非常值得关注的课题。本文在回顾国内外相关文献的基础上,收集2004-2008年在沪深两市公开交易的民营上市公司数据,通过统计分析、理论分析、计量分析、数理分析、案例分析等多种分析方法,就股权分置改革对大股东控制权的影响进行了系统研究。本文首先考察控制性大股东在减持过程中是否关注控制权私有收益,然后探讨关注控制权私有收益的大股东对股改有何应对,最后就大股东的应对给控制权私有收益水平带来的实际的影响进行了探讨。主要结论可以概括如下：(])控制权私有收益没有对大股东的减持决定产生显著影响,大股东看似已经从追求控制权私有收益转变为关心控制权共享收益,但实际上仍然很关注控制权私有收益。本文从减持改变控股股东持股比例的角度出发,发现大股东是否对解禁股进行减持总体上是减持收益与控制权共享收益之间进行比较权衡的结果,但不能就此简单地认为大股东放弃追求控制权私有收益。之所以控制权私有收益对于大股东是否减持的影响不显著,一个重要原因是大股东为应对股改对其控制权进行了加强,减持解禁股不能对大股东控制权产生重要影响。(2)控制性大股东会对股权分置改革采取应对措施以维护其控制权。本文以家族控制为例,考察大股东是否为应对股改而对其控制权进行了加强,结果发现股改后家族管理权控制不仅没有被削弱反而进一步得到了强化。非流通股向流通股的转变使家族控制权的垄断性在股改后下降,最终控制者寻求从其他方面对家族控制进行巩固,增加家族成员参与管理人数成为控制性家族采取的最为便捷、有效的手段。此外,股权分置改革后,通过虚假披露操纵二级市场成为大股东攫取控制权私有收益的新途径,控制性家族在股改后增强管理权控制,有利于与管理层进行合谋获取控制权私有收益。(3)股权分置改革的绩效在长期内存在动态变化,为纠正大股东侵占中小股东利益的现象须就控制权强化机制进行全面的治理。民营上市公司控制权私有收益的关键在于大股东与中小股东之间的委托代理,控制权垄断性、金字塔控制层级以及家族管理权控制构成的控制权强化机制能够对其产生重要影响,股权分置改革启动后,民营上市公司控制权私有收益的水平存在随时间推移先降后升的“U”型趋势,控制权强化机制的影响在短期有所减弱后又开始增强,主要是由于大股东会对股改采取应对措施以维护其控制权。本文基于股改后依然存在的大股东侵占中小股东利益的现象,就股权分置改革对民营上市公司大股东控制权的影响进行了深入分析,得到了一些新的发现,并以动态的视角研究了股权分置改革的长期绩效。同时,本文还就大股东控制权及控制权私有收益的形成提出了不同于以往研究的解释,认为人力资本和社会资本能够对家族控制的程度产生重要影响,指出民营上市公司中的控制权私有收益主要反映大股东与中小股东之间的委托代理问题,并且均得到了实证支持。本文的研究结论有助于加深对民营上市公司大股东控制权相关问题的理解,对于股权分置改革的影响和绩效的研究亦是有益的补充和完善,并且能够为全流通时期我国证券市场的健康发展提供参考。更多还原

【Abstract】 As an important part of the economic development, private enterprises in recent years show thriving vitality. Its influence in China’s securities market is growing. But private listed company itself still has many problems. Its all kinds of illegal activities, especially the expropriation by big shareholders, have already been harmful to the normal order and healthy development of equities. Domestic studies have pointed out that this phenomenon mainly comes from the principal-agent problem of private listed companies, and largely reflects the control problems of big shareholder. In the current important period from equity division to full circulation, how does big shareholders’ control right change in private listed companies, whether private benefits of control can be effectively restrained, are extremely notable topics.Based on the reviewing of related literature at home and abroad, this reseach collects data of private listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges in 2004-2008, and systematically studied the influence of split-share structure reform on big shareholders’ control right through various methods like the statistical analysis and theoretical analysis, quantitive analysis and mathematical analysis, and case studies. This paper first examines whether big shareholders care about private benefits of control in selling their shares, then discusses the response of big shareholders who care about private benefits of control to the split-share structure reform. Finally, the factual impacts on the level of private benefits of control brought by big shareholders’ response are discussed. The main conclusions can be summarized as follows:(1) Private benefits of control do not have significant effects on big shareholders’ decision of selling their shares; however, big shareholders who appear to be indifferent to the pursuing of private benefits of control in fact care about the private benefits of control. Based on the view that selling stock shares changes share ratio of the controlling shareholders, this research discovers that whether big shareholders sell their shares or not is mainly a result of comparing the benefits of selling stock shares and public benefits of control. But we cannot simply make a conclusion that big shareholders do not care about private benefits of control. The reason why private benefits of control do not have significant effects on whether big shareholders sell their shares is that big shareholders strengthen their control in response to the split-share structure reform, and thus the reducing of one’s share holdings cannot have important impacts on big shareholders’ control.(2) Controlling shareholders take measure against the split-share structure reform in order to maintain their control. Take family control as an example, this research investigates whether big shareholders strengthen their control to cope with the reform, and finds that family management control is actually further enhanced instead of weakened. Split-share structure reform weakened the monopoly of family control rights, which urges big shareholders to consolidate their control from other aspects. Increasing family members participating in management becomes the most convenient and effective means for the controlling family. In addition, after the split-share structure reform, manipulating the secondary markets through false reveal becomes a new way for big shareholders to grab private benefits of control. The enhancement of family management control after the reform is helpful for grabbing private benefits of control by cahoot with managers.(3) The performance of split-share structure reform has dynamic changes in the long term. As a result, the comprehensive governance of strengthening mechanism of control must carry on in order to correct the expropriation of benefits of small shareholders by big shareholders. The key point of private benefits of control lies in the principal-agent relationship between big shareholders and small shareholders. Strengthening mechanism constituted by monopoly of control, pyramid control level and family management control can have an important impact on private benefits of control. After the launch of split-share structure reform, the level of private benefits of control in private listed companies shows a U-type trend over time. The influence of strengthening mechanism of control is weakened in a short term but then increases again. It is mainly because big shareholders strengthen their control to cope with the split-share structure reform.Based on the phenomenon that the expropriation of benefits of small and medium shareholders by big shareholders still exists after split-share structure reform, this research analyses the effects of split-share structure reform on big shareholders’ control in private listed companies and gets some new discoveries. Long-term performance of split-share structure reform is also investigated from a dynamic perspective. Meanwhile, this research puts forward explanations on the formation of big shareholders’c ontrol and private benefits of control that is different from existing literatures. Human capital and social capital are regarded as having important impacts on the degree of family control, and it is pointed out that the private benefits of control in private listed companies mainly reflect the principal-agent problem between the big shareholders and the medium and small shareholders. These viewpoints are all supported by empirical results. The conclusions of this research help to deepen the understanding of problems related to big shareholders’ control in private listed companies. It is a beneficial supplement and also improvement for researches on the influence and performance of split-share structure reform, and can provide a reference for the healthy development of China’s securities markets during the time of full circulation.更多还原