【作者】 孟丁；

【导师】 王林昌；

【作者基本信息】 武汉大学 ， 企业管理， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 民营上市公司在我国资本市场迅速发展,已经成为上市公司的重要组成部分。民营上市公司能否健康发展,既关系到民营企业能否通过资本市场完成二次创业,也关系到我国资本市场的健康发展。传统的公司治理研究是以股权分散为假设前提的,因此股东与管理层之间的冲突成为其关注的重点。但对我国民营上市公司来说,在众多的利益相关方之间无疑存在着更为严重的代理成本。在我国转型经济的制度背景下,由于缺乏制度支持、治理环境不完善等原因,借鉴英美经济发达国家为解决终极控股股东与其他股东的利益分歧所建立的信息披露、证券交易等治理机制,运行效果并不理想。①在此背景下,以我国民营上市公司为样本,从终极股东与其他股东的利益分歧角度,来研究终极股东的多元化经营战略对公司价值的影响,具有重要的理论与现实意义。民营上市公司终极控制人的自利性多元化不仅直接影响了中小投资者和债权人的利益,投资和破产政策的扭曲同时也损害了企业价值。本文从民营终极控股股东所受融资约束的角度并结合多元化经营来解释民营上市金字塔形成的原因以及债务融资代理成本的产生缘由,进而综合分析多元化经营,金字塔持股方式、资产负债率对公司价值的负面影响。以金字塔持股方式和实行多元化经营为标准来挑选样本,研究金字塔持股结构下的多元化侵占方式。本文首先综述了企业多元化价值等文献,回顾了多元化动因、金字塔持股结构形成的动因和价值、债务的代理成本以及相机治理效应、并购动因等相关理论,然后总结了我国民营企业发行上市的特定制度背景。接着结合具体的数据资料系统地对两类民营上市公司的股权结构、财务价值、市场价值进行了比较,分析了终极控股股东的行为。在对中国民营上市公司股权结构和企业价值等进行系统考察的基础上,进一步分析了两类民营上市公司主要利益相关者——终极控股股东、债权人、经理人可能的代理行为,并就因此导致的代理成本提出了假说。最后在此基础上通过2006年—2009年民营上市公司的样本对中国民营上市公司金字塔持股结构的代理问题、债务代理问题以及以多元化投资中所体现的大股东与中小股东之间的代理问题进行了实证检验,基本验证了本文的理论分析和假设判断,即金字塔控制方式使得民营上市公司终极控制人能够采取有利于自身利益而牺牲中小投资者的利益的“隧道挖掘”行为,他们通过多元化经营隐秘地对中小投资者利益实施剥夺,同时也对企业价值造成了实际侵害。本文分别使用了核心财务指标和市场价值指标为公司价值的代理变量,并分组进行了民营上市公司股权结构、债务比率、多元化经营与公司价值的实证研究,结果具有较强的一致性。本文按照“终极控制人受到融资约束——构建金字塔持股结构——多元化经营——企业价值”的逻辑思路,分析民营终极控股股东受到的融资约束如何影响其构建两权分离的金字塔控制结构,以及这种控制结构如何通过多元化侵占方式增加了大小股东之间的代理成本,实现其控制权私人利益最大化,损害中小投资者以及债权人利益。更多还原

【Abstract】 Private-controlled listed companies have experienced a rapid growth in recent years, and as a result, they have become an important ingredient of Chinese listed companies. Whether the private-controlled listed companies could develop healthily is concerned not only with restart of private enterprises, but also with the healthy development of the domestic capita market. The decentralized equity is the premise of the traditional corporate governance, so the conflicts between shareholders and the management become the focus of concern. But To China’s private listed companies, the shareholders of a company are not entirely absence owner. The benefit conflicts not only lie between shareholders and manager but also lie between the ultimate controlling shareholders and small shareholders including creditors.In our country’s system under the background of economic transition, due to lack of support system, imperfect on management environment, reference for solving differences between ultimate shareholder and other shareholders from the Anglo-American developed economies, running effect of governance mechanism such as information disclosure and securities trading is not ideal. In this context, with China’s private listed companies as a sample, from the view of interest divergence between ultimate shareholders and other shareholder, the study about ultimate shareholders diversification strategy for performance of the company has the important theoretical and practical significance.The irrational diversified investment of the ultimate control in private listed companies has effect not only on minority shareholders and creditors’benefit, but also on the loss of enterprise value as a result of the investment and bankruptcy policy. From the view of financing constraints and diversification faced by ultimate controlling shareholders we start to explain the reasons for the formation of private listed pyramid and agency cost of debt financing, then to analysis negative impact on corporate performance from diversification, pyramid shareholding, asset-liability ratio. The standard for sample selected from pyramid holdings and diversification help us start the research field of diversified encroach.This dissertation reviews the contemporary motivation and performance of diversification, motivation and performance of the pyramid control, agency cost of debt, enterprise merger classical theory and the recent literature, then summarizes the specific issue listed background about listed private enterprise, compare private the equity structure, financial performance, the market value about two kinds of private listed companies, at last analyze behavior of the ultimate controlling shareholders. On the basis of investigation about equity structure of private listed companies in China, we analyze the possible agent behavior of main stakeholders—the ultimate controlling shareholders and creditors and managers in two kinds of private listed companies, and the leading agency cost, then we put forward hypothesis. Finally with 2006-2009 sample of private listed companies we test empirically the agency problem of pyramid shareholding structure, agency problem of debt, the agency cost between large shareholders and small shareholders in diversified investments, and effectively verified theoretical analysis and assumptions. With pyramid shareholding structure the ultimate controllers of private listed companies take actions possibly beneficial to the expense of small investors’benefits. With diversification the ultimate controllers of private listed companies secretly deprive small investors’benefits, in the meantime violate the company’s value.This dissertation respectively uses the core financial index and market value index for the corporate value of the proxy variable, also group to carry on the substantial evidence examination of private listed company of ownership of a share structure, diversification behavior and company value. As a result have the stronger consistency. This text according to clue of financial constraints of the ultimate controlling shareholder—making up the pyramid structure—diversified investment-enterprise performance", the research make breakthrough on the field that how the ultimate controlling shareholders constrained by finance will influence the pyramid structure that separate control rights from cash flow rights, and how this kinds of control structure increase agency cost between the large shareholders and small shareholders by diversification, and maximize private benefits, leading to the loss to benefits of small investor and creditor.更多还原