【作者】 洪峰；

【导师】 张先治；

【作者基本信息】 东北财经大学 ， 财务管理， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 提供恰当形式的薪酬是激励和约束公司管理层作出符合股东利益决策的重要手段。在薪酬契约设计中,薪酬业绩敏感度的设定是核心。相应的,薪酬业绩敏感度影响因素构成薪酬契约研究的核心。基于对现有理论和文献的梳理发现,薪酬业绩敏感度影响因素的研究分为两类,本文将其分别定义为非权衡视角与权衡视角。非权衡视角下的研究基于实证研究中发现的事实,那就是高强度的薪酬业绩敏感度契约并不是上市公司实践中的普遍现象。由于非权衡视角下的研究认为只要提高薪酬业绩敏感度,公司治理效率就能得到改善。相应的,该类研究着眼于寻找高强度薪酬业绩敏感度契约缺失的原因。权衡视角下的研究关注到管理层基于规避薪酬风险而实施的机会主义行为,因此,提高薪酬业绩敏感度并非直接带来治理效率的改善,薪酬业绩敏感度的设定是一个利益权衡的过程。相应的,该类研究从权衡的视角识别影响薪酬业绩敏感度设定的因素。管理层可以通过实施四类机会主义行为规避薪酬风险,其分别为决策视野冲突、过度投资、薪酬动机盈余管理与管理层权力寻租。因此,薪酬契约设计需要分别置于以上四类机会主义行为情境中以识别薪酬业绩敏感度的影响因素。根据实施基础,本文将机会主义行为划分为信息冲突型与权力冲突型。信息冲突型机会主义行为的实施基于股东与管理层之间的信息不对称。由于管理层拥有信息优势,因此股东利用薪酬契约作为激励手段时,需要考虑相应的激励成本。这类激励成本属于信息成本,其构成管理层的超额收益。相应的,股东必须在信息成本和剩余损失之间进行权衡,薪酬业绩敏感度的设定成为代理成本权衡的过程。信息冲突型机会主义行为情境下影响因素的识别以经典委托代理理论中的激励模型为工具。基于扩展信息结构下的激励模型的构建与求解,本文识别以信息成本为中介影响代理成本权衡取向的因素。相应的,其为影响薪酬业绩敏感度设定的因素。权力冲突型机会主义行为的实施基于公司决策层级结构与激励结构失配。失配致使管理层影响薪酬契约的签订与执行,薪酬契约中包含无激励价值的权力租金。管理层会对权力收益与寻租成本进行权衡,相应的,薪酬业绩敏感度的设定成为管理层权力寻租权衡的结果。权力冲突型机会主义行为情境下影响因素的识别以多元回归模型为工具。基于构建的多元回归模型,本文识别我国上市公司中,以寻租成本为中介影响权力寻租权衡取向的治理结构。相应的,其为影响薪酬业绩敏感度设定的因素。本文的主要研究内容和结论如下：第一,公司价值由一系列具有现时与长期效应的经营活动共同创造,相对而言,具有长期效应的经营活动风险更大。为了规避业绩波动造成的薪酬风险,管理层可能采取有损公司长期利益的增长策略,决策视野冲突由此产生。相应的,薪酬契约设计需要置于决策视野冲突的代理冲突情境下。相对于道德风险,决策视野冲突的信息结构扩展于管理层掌握努力分配的私人信息。此时,信息成本表现为保险成本,即股东向风险厌恶的管理层业绩被错误判断的可能性提供的超额补偿。相应的,薪酬业绩敏感度的设定需要权衡保险成本与剩余损失。本文构建了包含股价与会计利润两个业绩指标的激励模型。由于股价汇总反映了所有经营活动的预期收益,将会计利润纳入信号集中起着调节决策视野和控制信号集整体风险的作用。出于业绩信号的多元化,薪酬业绩敏感度设定包含两个维度：单个业绩指标被赋予的绝对权重以及业绩指标之间的相对权重。绝对权重决定激励总强度,相对权重决定决策视野。对于单个业绩指标被赋予的绝对权重,其受该业绩指标的风险影响。业绩风险以保险成本为中介影响代理成本权衡取向。具体表现为：业绩风险越大,该业绩指标被赋予的绝对权重越小。对于业绩指标之间的相对权重,与单个业绩指标被赋予的绝对权重类似,其同样受业绩风险影响。然而由于相对权重与决策视野的调节相关,因此,业绩风险对相对权重的影响不再是单调性的。具体表现为：在产出价值没有变化的前提下,随着会计利润指标风险的下降,会计利润与股价被赋予的相对权重经历先上升后下降的过程；而随着股价指标风险的上升,会计利润与股价被赋予的相对权重经历加速上升的过程。因此,在决策视野冲突的代理冲突情境下,本文识别业绩风险为影响薪酬业绩敏感度设定的因素。第二,上市公司规模是影响管理层薪酬的重要因素。规模越大,管理层的薪酬水平也越高。由于基于公司规模的薪酬相对于基于业绩的薪酬是低风险的,因此,出于规避薪酬风险,管理层可能在违背净现值法则的前提下进行项目投资,由此导致公司规模扩张出最优水平,股东财富受损。因此,需要将薪酬契约设计置于过度投资的代理冲突情境下。相对于道德风险,过度投资的信息结构扩展于管理层掌握项目质量的私人信息。本文将项目质量划分为未来现金流与风险两个层面。通过扩展信息结构下的激励模型求解发现,在过度投资的代理冲突情境下,信息成本表现为信息租金溢出效应。信息租金为股东激励管理层提供真实的项目质量信息所支付的超额报酬。其具有外部性特征,表现为如果给予那些较低未来现金流或较低风险的的项目较高的信息租金,激励成本将变得昂贵而使股东难以承受,因为那些拥有更高质量项目的管理者会索要更大的信息租金。因此,薪酬业绩敏感度的设定需要权衡信息租金溢出效应与剩余损失。由于公司增长机会越大,管理者拥有高质量项目的可能性越高,因此,信息租金溢出效应随公司增长机会的增大而边际递减。相应的,公司增长机会以信息租金溢出效应为中介影响代理成本权衡取向。具体表现为：公司增长机会越大,薪酬业绩敏感度越高；随着增长机会的上升,业绩风险与薪酬业绩敏感度之间的负相关关系递减。即对于增长机会很小或没有增长机会的公司而言,业绩风险与薪酬业绩敏感度之间存在负相关关系;而对于增长机会大的公司而言,业绩风险与薪酬业绩敏感度之间存在正相关关系。因此,在过度投资的代理冲突情境下,本文识别增长机会为影响薪酬业绩敏感度设定的因素。第三,薪酬契约以业绩信号集作为契约基础,会计盈余是常被使用的业绩信号。由于会计盈余的契约作用以及会计政策的可选择性,掌握公司会计系统的管理层会出于规避薪酬风险而进行损害股东财富的盈余管理。相应的,薪酬契约的设计需要置于薪酬动机盈余管理的代理冲突情境下。相对于道德风险,薪酬动机盈余管理的信息结构扩展于管理层掌握会计政策选择的私人信息。通过扩展信息结构下的激励模型求解发现,在薪酬动机盈余管理的代理冲突情境下,信息成本具有保险成本的特征。为了区别基于自然状态随机性的保险成本,本文将其定义为基于会计系统的保险成本。基于会计系统的保险成本源于会计政策的可选择性,而会计政策影响会计盈余,这导致作为业绩信号的会计盈余不仅包含产出信息,也包含人为噪音,股东无法直接或低成本的分辨。相应的,薪酬业绩敏感度的设定需要权衡基于会计系统的保险成本和剩余损失。会计盈余质量以基于会计系统的保险成本为中介影响代理成本权衡取向。表现为会计盈余质量越差,薪酬业绩敏感度越低。本文从盈余持续性和操纵性应计两个层面分析盈余质量对薪酬业绩敏感度的影响,结论表明薪酬业绩敏感度与盈余持续性正相关,而与操纵性应计额负相关。因此,在薪酬动机盈余管理的代理冲突情境下,本文识别盈余质量为影响薪酬业绩敏感度设定的因素。第四,管理层承担薪酬风险意味着其参与公司剩余分享,公司的所有权结构被改变,管理层拥有抗衡股东大会与董事会的的权力。表现在薪酬契约上,管理层可能影响薪酬契约的签订与执行,从而产生自定薪酬现象。因此,薪酬契约设计需要置于权力寻租的代理冲突情境下。管理层通过权力寻租规避薪酬风险,这不仅表现为使得有利于自身的薪酬安排得以通过,还表现为在薪酬契约执行过程中通过盈余管理操纵表现业绩,并通过再谈判为自身谋取超额租金。相应的,薪酬与真实业绩敏感度降低,而薪酬与账面盈利和账面亏损业绩敏感度的非对称性增大。通过构建多元回归模型,本文从整体上识别我国上市公司中,对于权力寻租权衡具有显著影响力的治理结构。实证结果表明独立董事比例越低、政府机构控股、信息披露透明度越差,管理层薪酬与公司真实业绩敏感度显著越弱；未设置薪酬委员会、政府机构控股、信息披露透明度越差,管理层薪酬与账面盈利业绩敏感度显著越强。由此,可以判定薪酬委员会设置状态、董事会独立性、控股股东经济属性、信息披露透明度是我国目前上市公司中,影响管理层薪酬契约签订与执行,从而影响薪酬业绩敏感度设定的因素。更多还原

【Abstract】 The fundamental issue the corporate governance deals with is to induce managers to make decisions consistent with shareholders’interests by providing appropriate compensation contracts. In the design of compensation contracts, pay performance sensitivity setting is the core. Accordingly, the study on the influencing factors of pay performance sensitivity constitutes the core of compensation contracts study. Based on existing theories and literatures, the study on the influencing factors of pay performance sensitivity can be divided into two categories which are defined as non-trade-off perspective and trade-off perspective in this thesis. The non-trade-off perspective is based on the empirical studies which discover the fact that high intensity compensation contract is not common in the practice. These studies believe that the agency problem can be eased as long as the pay performance sensitivity increases. Accordingly, such literatures focus on finding the reasons of low pay performance sensitivity. On the other hand, the studies based on the trade-off perspective pay attention to the opportunistic behaviors of managers aimed to avoiding compensation risk. Thus, the increase of pay performance sensitivity does not mean the improvement of governance efficiency. The setting of pay performance sensitivity is a process of trade-off.Managers can avoid compensation risk by the implementation of following opportunistic behaviors:the conflict of decision-making horizon, overinvestment, earnings management and rent seeking of managerial power. Accordingly, the design of compensation contract should place in context of above opportunistic behaviors in order to identify the influencing factors of pay performance sensitivity. According to the foundation of opportunistic behaviors, this thesis divides them into information-based conflict and power-based conflict. Information-based conflict results from the information asymmetry between shareholders and managers. The managers have information superiority. Thus, shareholders should consider the incentive costs while providing compensation contracts. Incentive costs are information costs which are excess benefits of managers. Accordingly, shareholders should trade off information costs and surplus loss. The setting of pay performance sensitivity becomes a process of trade-off of agency costs. The identification of influencing factors of pay performance in the context of information-based conflict takes the incentive models of the classic principal-agent theory as the tool. Based on the incentive models, we identify the particular factors influencing the trade-off orientation. Correspondingly, the identified factors are factors influencing the setting of pay performance sensitivity. Power-based conflict results from the mismatch of decision-making hierarchy and incentive structure. Such mismatch causes managers to influence the signing and implementation of compensation contracts. Therefore, the compensation contains power rents. The managers will trade off the benefits and the rent-seeking costs. The setting of pay performance sensitivity becomes a process of managerial rent seeking trade-off. The identification of influencing factors of pay performance sensitivity in the context of power-based conflict takes the multiple regression models as the tool. Based on the multiple regression models, we identify the particular governance structures influencing trade-off orientation in listed companies. Correspondingly, the identified factors are governance structures influencing the setting of pay performance sensitivity.The main contents and results are as follow:Firstly, corporate value is created by a series of business activities with short-term or long-term effects. Long-term business activities contain greater risks relatively. In order to avoid the risk of pay fluctuations, the managers may adopt growth strategy which is detrimental to the long-term growth. The conflict of decision-making horizon arises. Accordingly, the design of compensation contracts need to place in the context of such opportunistic behavior.Contrast to moral hazard, the information structure of the conflict of decision-making horizon expands in the aspect of distribution of efforts. In the context of such opportunistic behavior, the information costs are insurance costs which are the remuneration the shareholders offer for the possibility of wrong performance evaluation. Accordingly, the pay performance sensitivity settings need to trade off the insurance costs and the surplus loss. We construct an incentive model containing two performance indicators which are stock price and accounting profit. As the stock price reflects the summary of the expected return of all business activities, the accounting profit plays the role of adjusting decision horizon and controlling the overall risks. Because of the diversification of signals, the setting of pay performance sensitivity consists of two dimensions:the absolute weight and relative weight. The absolute weight determines the intensity of incentive while the relative weight determines the decision-making horizon. The risk of performance indicators affects the absolute weight which is demonstrated as the greater the performance risks are, the smaller the absolute weight is. Similar to the absolute weight, the relative weight is subject to risk. However, due to the role the relative weight plays in the decision-making horizon, the relationship between performance risk and relative weight is no longer linear. On the condition of unchanging output value, as the decrease in the risk of accounting profit, the relative weight of accounting profit and stock price increases and then decreases. As the increase in the risk of stock price, the relative weight of accounting profit and stock price goes through an accelerated process. Thus, we identify performance risk as the influencing factor of the setting of pay performance sensitivity.Secondly, the scale of listed company is an important factor affecting managerial compensation. The larger the scale is, the higher the pay levels of managers are. The pay based on scale is less risky than the pay based on performance. Therefore, the managers may violate the rule of net present value to avoid compensation risk, which leads to the uneconomic expansion of company size and the damage of shareholders’wealth. Accordingly, the design of compensation contracts need to place in the context of such opportunistic behavior.Contrast to moral hazard, the information structure of overinvestment expands in the aspect of project quality. We categorize project quality into future cash flows and risk level. Based on the extended incentive model, we find the information costs display as the information rent spillover effects. Information rent is the excessive return the shareholders offer to incentive the managers to provide real project quality information. It has the characteristic of externality, which means shareholders must offer higher information rent to the managers with higher quality project than the amount they provide for the lower quality project. Therefore, the shareholder should trade off the information rent spillover effects and the surplus loss when they set the pay performance sensitivity. The greater the growth opportunity the company has, the greater the likelihood the managers possess high quality project. Therefore, the marginal spillover effects decline as the growth opportunity increases. Correspondingly, the growth opportunity affects the trade-off orientation via spillover effects. The greater the growth opportunity the company has, the higher the pay performance sensitivity should be set. As the increase of growth opportunity, the negative relation between risk and pay performance sensitivity declines. To the companies with a little or no growth opportunity, the risk and pay performance sensitivity is negatively related. However, to the companies with big growth opportunity, the risk and pay performance sensitivity is positively related. Thus, we identify growth opportunity as the influencing factor of the setting of pay performance sensitivity.Thirdly, compensation contracts are based on a set of signals in which accounting earnings is a regular choice. As the contractual role accounting earnings plays, managers who control the accounting system may conduct earnings management in order to avoid compensation risk. Accordingly, the design of compensation contracts need to place in the context of such opportunistic behavior.Contrast to moral hazard, the information structure of earnings management expands in the aspect of accounting policies. Based on the extended incentive model, we find the existence of information costs. In order to distinguish the insurance costs relevant with randomness of natural state, we define the information costs here as the insurance costs relevant with accounting system. The insurance costs relevant with accounting system originate from the optional accounting policies which decide the value of earnings. Accounting earnings not only contains output information, but also noises. Signal users cannot distinguish them directly. Therefore, the shareholder should trade off the insurance costs relevant with accounting system and the surplus loss when they set the pay performance sensitivity. The earnings quality affects the trade-off orientation via the insurance costs relevant with accounting system which demonstrated as the worse the earnings quality are, the lower the pay performance sensitivity should be set. We categorize earnings quality into earnings persistency and discretionary accruals. The conclusions are the pay performance sensitivity is positively and negatively related to earnings persistency and discretionary accruals respectively. Thus, we identify earnings quality as the influencing factor of the setting of pay performance sensitivity.Fourthly, the exposure of compensation risks means that managers participate in residue sharing, which changes the company’s ownership structure. The managers are able to contend with the board of directors. In the aspect of compensation, managers may affect the signing and implementation of compensation contracts, which results in the phenomenon of self-determining compensation. Accordingly, the design of compensation contracts need to place in the context of such opportunistic behavior.Managers seek rents to avoid the compensation risk. They not only make the contracts favorable to themselves to be approved, but also extract rents through renegotiation after earnings management. Accordingly, the sensitivity between compensation and real performance declines while the asymmetry between compensation book profit sensitivity and compensation book loss sensitivity increases. Based on the multiple regression models, we identify the particular governance structures affecting the trade-off orientation. The empirical result shows that the lower the proportion of independent directors and the transparency of the information disclosure are, the weaker the compensation and the real performance are related. The sensitivity between the compensation and. the real performance is lower in the companies controlled by government. The lower the transparency of the information disclosure is, the stronger the compensation and the book performance are related. The sensitivity between the compensation and the book performance is higher in the companies which do not set remuneration committee or controlled by government. Thus, we identify the remuneration committee, the independency of the board of directors, the controlling shareholders and the transparency of information disclosure as the influencing factor of the setting of pay performance sensitivity.更多还原