【作者】 孙晓琳；

【导师】 刘淑莲；

【作者基本信息】 东北财经大学 ， 财务管理， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 随着公司治理理论与实践的发展,公司治理研究的逻辑起点从Berle和Means (1932)分散的股权结构、Shleifer等(1997)集中的控股结构,发展到La Porta等(1999)更为复杂的终极股权结构。终极控股股东通过金字塔结构、交叉持股以及双重股权等方式对公司行使不对称的控制权与所有权,这种控制权的加强与两权分离使得终极股东更加具有能力和动机攫取控制权私有收益、侵占中小股东利益。由于货币资本和实物资本投资所形成的、对公司成长和发展起决定性影响的控制性资源,是产生控制权收益的基本来源,终极控股股东更加倾向于通过资本投资来扩大其可控制性的资源,从而形成不为中小股东所共同享有的控制权私有收益。在我国转型经济的制度背景下,上市公司处于大股东超强控制状态,金字塔股权结构普遍存在,终极控股股东作为上市公司实际控制人,深刻地影响着有关控制权收益的财务决策行为。并且我国上市公司投资行为呈现出一些耐人寻味的现象,如频繁变更募集资金的投向、盲目多元化、投资效率和效益低下等。因此,基于股权控制链的微观结构,研究终极控股股东对上市公司投资行为影响的内在机理与特征,对约束终极控股股东利益攫取、促进投资效率改进具有重要的理论价值与现实意义。本文主要通过追溯上市公司股权控制链,研究终极控股股东对上市公司投资行为的影响。文章采用规范研究与实证研究的方法,从“问题提出→理论分析→现实背景→实证研究”四个层面逐步展开研究。第1章“绪论”提出问题,界定了本文的研究范围、主题内涵。第2章“文献回顾与述评”和第3章“终极股东控制对公司投资行为影响的理论分析”共同构成本文的理论分析部分,梳理了国内外相关理论与文献,勾稽出终极股东控制与公司投资行为之间的相关关系,构建了基于终极股东控制权私有收益的公司投资理论模型,形成系统的理论分析框架,为后续的研究提供理论依据；第4章“我国上市公司终极股权结构与投资行为现状分析”描述了我国终极股权结构与投资的实际情况,为本文的实证研究提供现实的制度与环境背景,使本文的研究能够从我国的实际情况出发,更加具有现实意义。第5章“终极股东控制、内部现金流与上市公司投资行为研究”和第6章“终极股东控制、负债融资与上市公司投资行为研究”为本文的实证研究部分。基于我国沪深A股非金融类上市公司2005-2009年间590家上市公司样本数据,一方面以终极股权结构为切入点实证检验上市公司投资对现金流敏感性的来源,投资不足抑或过度投资；另一方面从负债规模、期限结构以及来源三个层面分别研究负债融资对上市公司投资行为的影响,检验负债代理成本与相机治理作用的存在,并进一步分析终极股东控制对负债作用机制的内在影响。文章最后是第7章“结论与政策建议”,主要总结本文的研究结论,并针对研究结论提出治理我国上市公司非效率投资行为的政策建议,同时对本文研究中存在的局限和未来的研究方向进行了总结和展望。通过上述研究主要得出以下结论：(1)理论模型研究表明,终极控股股东对上市公司利益侵占越严重,上市公司的过度投资行为越严重；终极控股股东拥有的现金流权比例越高,其利益与上市公司整体利益愈加一致,有利于减缓公司的过度投资行为；两权分离越大,控制杠杆越高,上市公司的过度投资行为越严重；而外部监督水平越高,越有助于降低上市公司的过度投资行为。(2)我国上市公司终极控股股东往往通过金字塔结构控制着上市公司,但大多数终极股东的现金流权与控制权并未发生分离,尤其中央政府和地方政府作为终极控股股东时,这一现象尤为显著,并且中央政府和地方政府在金字塔结构下更加倾向于通过更长的控制链控制上市公司,形成“金字塔结构”之谜。相对于国有终极控制的上市公司,非国有控股股东采用金字塔结构的比例相对较低,但其采用多条控制链的比例最高,并且金字塔结构下终极控股股东更加倾向于以较少现金流权的投入获取更大的控制权,控制杠杆较大。(3)我国上市公司投资现金流敏感性普遍存在。从整体上看,这种敏感性随着终极控股股东现金流权的增加而降低,随着控制权与现金流权分离度的增加而增加,支持了自由现金流过度投资假说,也体现了终极控股股东利益趋同效应与侵占效应对投资支出的影响,并且终极控股股东利益侵占效应发生不仅需要能力和动机,还需要公司具有充足现金流这一“机会”,较少的现金流能够有效地抑制终极控股股东的过度投资行为。(4)从负债融资看,整体上负债规模与公司投资支出之间显著负相关,说明我国上市公司负债具有抑制投资的作用,并且这种抑制作用随着终极控股股东现金流权水平的提高而逐步下降；控制杠杆越强,两权分离度越大,这种抑制作用就越强。然而基于成长性的研究发现,负债抑制了高成长公司的正常投资,导致投资不足,但却没有约束低成长公司的过度投资,负债的相机治理作用较弱。(5)从负债期限结构看,短期负债的流动性约束比长期负债能更有效地抑制投资支出,同样,短期负债一方面加剧了高成长机会公司的投资不足,另一方面却并没有对低成长公司的过度投资行为起到抑制作用。并且,随着终极现金流权的增加,短期负债对投资支出的抑制作用呈现出先下降后上升的U型变化趋势,而两权分离度不会对投资支出与短期负债之间的关系产生显著影响。(6)银行借款和商业信用两种不同来源的负债与上市公司投资规模之间的相关程度存在显著差异,且商业信用对投资规模的影响更大。商业信用不仅能够抑制低成长公司的过度投资,也使高成长公司的投资不足问题更为严重。但商业信用对投资支出的影响受终极股权结构的影响并不显著。(7)不同终极产权类型的上市公司投资行为及其受负债的影响存在很大差异。中央政府终极控制的上市公司投资对现金流不具备敏感性,表明整体上非效率投资不显著；地方政府终极控制的上市公司则存在明显的过度投资行为；而在自然人或家族终极控制的上市公司中,可能因终极股东的“支持”行为,使得这种正的投资现金流敏感性的来源表现得更加复杂。相对于自然人或家族终极控制的上市公司,国有终极控制的上市公司与国有商业银行产权同质性以及预算软约束,加大了该类上市公司的投资风险,弱化了负债融资对公司投资支出的抑制作用,并且,银行借款对上市公司投资支出的影响并不显著。而在自然人或家族终极控制的上市公司中,银行借款对投资支出却具有明显的抑制作用,并且商业信用、短期负债的抑制作用也更强一些。本文的创新之处主要体现在以下三方面：(1)借鉴Motta (2003)、Aggarwal和Samwick (2003)以及La Porta等(2002)的相关模型与基本思想,将终极控股股东控制权与现金流权的分离度(终极控制权与现金流权的比值,即控制杠杆)引入到投资模型中,构建了基于终极股东控制权私有收益的公司投资理论模型。结果证实终极股东对上市公司的控制杠杆越高,两权分离越大,上市公司的过度投资行为越严重,表明与终极控股股东两权分离相联系的利益侵占效应的存在。(2)以终极股权结构为切入点,将终极控股股东的现金流权以及控制权与现金流权的分离程度作为终极控股股东与少数中小股东之间利益一致程度的代理变量,对投资现金流敏感性的来源进行实证检验。同时使用终极控股股东的现金流权与两权分离度进行检验,较好地区分了终极股东的利益趋同效应与利益侵占效应,比以往单独使用大股东的持股比例(现金流权)能够更有效地区分投资现金流敏感性两种竞争性的解释。并且发现,终极控股股东对中小股东利益侵占不仅需要能力与动机,还需要有充足现金流这一“机会”的存在。(3)检验了终极股东控制下负债对上市公司投资行为的影响。不仅揭示了负债的异质性(负债期限结构及来源)对上市公司投资行为影响的差异,而且将终极控股股东的现金流权以及两权分离和控制杠杆引入到投资检验模型中,分析终极控股股东对负债与投资之间关系影响的内在机理。由于个人能力和客观条件的限制,本文尚存在一定的局限：(1)本文假定控股股东与管理层的利益相一致,没有考虑二者之间的代理问题及管理层目标、自信、激励等因素对公司投资行为的影响。(2)尚未深入研究金字塔层级与控制链个数对上市公司投资行为的具体影响。(3)尚未对公司治理内在机制进行研究。实际上,终极控股股东作为公司的实际控制人,必将影响公司治理的运行机制与有效性,进而影响到公司的投资决策与行为。公司治理是否和如何在终极股东控制与上市公司投资之间发挥着中介作用,也是一个值得深入研究的问题。上述研究存在的局限与不足正是作者以后要继续研究的方向与内容。更多还原

【Abstract】 With the development of the corporate governance theory and practice, the logical starting point of the corporate governance experience an evolution from the widely held ownership structure (Berle and Means, 1932) and the concentrated ownership structure (Shleifer et al.,1997) to the ultimate ownership structure with more complex characterization (La Porta et al. 1999). The ultimate controlling shareholders exercise control and ownership asymmetrically with the aid of the pyramidal ownership structure, cross-ownership as well as dual-class equity issue etc. Such a strengthen of control and separation between the control and the ownership lead the ultimate controlling shareholders holding more power and motivation to grab the private benefits of control and to occupy the interests of minority shareholders. In addition, controlling resources from the investment of monetary capital and physical capital is the basic source of the control benefits, which exerts a decisive influence on the growth and development the company. For this reason, ultimate controlling shareholders tend to expand the resources in their control by investment to produce private benefits not being shared by minority shareholders. Under the background of transitional economy in China, the listed companies are in the status of the super-control of large-shareholders as well as the universal pyramidal ultimate ownership structure. The ultimate controlling shareholders, as the actual controllers of listed companies, have a profound impact on the financial decision-making behavior related with the benefit of control. Furthermore, much food for thought was shown in the behavior of Chinese listed company, such as frequent change of committed investment project from the raised funds, blind diversification and low investment efficiency etc. Therefore, basing on the microstructure of ownership controlling train, the investigation on the mechanism and characterization in the investment behavior of the ultimate controlling shareholders upon the listed companies have great theoretical value and practical significance on the constraints of the profits grabbed by the ultimate controlling shareholders as well as the improvement of investment efficiency.By tracing the ownership controlling chain of listed companies, the effects of ultimate controlling shareholders on the investment of the listed companies are investigated in this thesis. With the aids of methods of normative research and empirical study, problem posing, theoretical analysis, realistic background analysis and empirical study are carried out step by step. The problem ware posed in the first section’Introduction’, in which the research scope and content are also clearly shown. The theoretical analysis part of the posed problem is in the second section’Literature Review and Commentary’ and the third section’Theoretical Analysis on the Impact of the Ultimate Control on the Companies’Investment Behavior’. In this part, the relationship between the ultimate shareholder control and investment of the company as well as the theoretical model with respect to the influence of the ultimate controlling shareholders on the investment of the listed companies are set up to creative the theory framework for systematic analysis and provide a theoretical basis for follow-up studies. The forth section is’Ultimate Ownership Structure and Investment Behavior Analysis for Chinese Listed Companies’, which illustrates the realities of the ultimate ownership structure and investment in China. So, the real system and background were well considered in this empirical study, which lead the research in the light of the specific conditions in our country. The part of empirical study is composed of the fifth section’Studies on Relationship among the Ultimate Shareholder Control, Internal Cash Flow and Investment Behavior of Listed Companies’and the sixth section’Studies on Relationship among the Ultimate Shareholder Control, Debt Financing and Investment Behavior of Listed Companies’ The empirical studies are based on 590 China’s A-share listed company’s research samples over the period 2005-2009. On the one hand, the impacts of investment of listed companies on the sensitivity source of the cash flow, underinvestment and overinvestment are investigated from the cut-in point of ultimate ownership structure. On the other hand, the effects of the debt financing on the investment behavior of listed companies are studied in three basic ways:the debt size, debt term structure and the sources of debt. The existence of the debt agency costs and the effect of the debt governance are also checked in the empirical study. The effect of ultimate ownership control on the debt mechanism is then further investigated. The ending of the thesis is the seventh section’Conclusions and Policy Recommendations’. In this ending section, the conclusions are drawn and the recommendations to the politics with respect to the governance of the non-efficient investments from Chinese listed companies are put forward. At the same time, the limitation and prospect of the research are also discussed in this part. According to the above, the following conclusions can be drawn as following.(1) Theoretical models show that the more interests from listed companies the ultimate controlling shareholders occupy, the more serious over-investment behavior of listed companies is. The higher proportion of cash flow rights is helpful to slow down the company’s over-investment for the consistent interest between the ultimate controlling shareholders and the listed companies. The the bigger the divergence between the control right and cash flow right is, higher the control leverage became, which leads the overinvestment of the listed companies more seriously. Moreover, the increasing level of the exterior supervision is helpful to reduce the overinvestment of the listed companies.(2) In China, the listed companies are controlled by ultimate controlling shareholders in the way of pyramidal ultimate ownership. However, the cash flow rights and control of the ultimate controlling shareholders are not separated, especially as the central or local governments being the ultimate controller. The central or local governments tend to control the listed companies by a long control chain, which leads a mystery named’pyramid structures’. Compared with state-owned ultimate controlling companies, the non-state-owned ultimate controlling companies show a lower percent to employ the ’pyramid structures’. However, the proportion of these non-state-owned ultimate controlling companies who employ multi-control chains is highest. The ultimate controlling shareholders under the’pyramid structures’ tend to obtain more ownership with lower input cash flow right. At this time, the control leverage is higher.(3) The cash flow sensitivity of the listed companies is widespread in China’s listed companies. In general, the sensitivity decreases when ultimate controlling shareholders’cash-flow rights increase and it increases as the separation degree between the controlling shareholders’cash-flow right and their control rights increase, which confirms the overinvestment hypothesis and reflects the effect of ultimate controlling shareholders’ convergence and entrenchment on investment. Moreover, ultimate controlling shareholders entrenchment not only needs ability and motivation, but also needs "opportunity" with sufficient cash flow. The overinvestment behavior of the ultimate controlling shareholders can be curbed effectively by less cash flow.(4) From the view point of debt financing, a significant negative correlation is shown between the corporate debt scale and its corporate investment spending, which indicates the debt inhibits the investment of the listed companies. In addition, the power of the inhibition also decreased with the increasing cash flow right of the ultimate controlling shareholders. The separation degree between the cash-flow right and the control rights increase with the increased control leverage, which leads increased inhibition of the investment consequently. Moreover, from the research with time sequence, the debt inhibits the investment of the high-growth companies, which lead the results of underinvestment. However, the debt exerts little binding effects on the investment of those low-growth companies. Under this condition, the debt management is weak for the investment.(5) From the view point of debt maturity structure, the liquidity constraints of the short-term liabilities can inhibit investment more effectively compared with those of the long-term one. The short-term liabilities, on the one hand, can lead the underinvestment of the high-growth companies more seriously. On the other hand, it exerts little effect on the little binding effects on the investment of those low-growth companies. With the increasing ultimate cash flow right, the inhibition of the short-term debt on the investment decreases firstly and then increases (a’U’ shape variation). However, the separation degree between the cash-flow right and the control rights exert little influence on the relationship between the short-term liabilities and investment.(6) Bank loans and commercial credit are the indebtedness with different sources. Great difference exists in the relationship between the investment scale with bank loans and that between the investment scale and commercial credit. In general, the commercial credit has a more strong impact on the investment scale. The commercial credit can inhibit the overinvestment of the low-growth companies, however, it lead the underinvestment of the high-growth companies more seriously. Additionally, the effect of ultimate ownership structure on the relationship between the commercial credit and the investment is not significant.(7) There are great differences on the investment behavior and the effect suffered from the debt for the listed companies with different types of ultimate ownership. The investment of state-owned ultimate controlling companies shows less sensitivity to the cash flow, which indicate the inefficient investment is not significant basically. The overinvestment of the local-owned ultimate controlling companies is obvious. However, as for the companies ultimately controlled by the natural person or family, the support from the ultimate controlling shareholders make the sources of the positive investment cash flow sensitivity more complex. The state-owned ultimate-controlled listed companies have homogeneity property with the state-owned commercial banks. The homogeneity and the soft budget constraints increased the risk of the investment and reduce the inhibition of debt financing on the investment Furthermore, bank loans exert little influence on the investment of the listed companies. However, as far as the companies ultimately controlled by the natural person or family are concerned, the inhibition of the bank loans on the investment is obviously. In the meantime, commercial credit and short-term liabilities also exhibit strong inhibition on the investment.The innovation of the study can be presented in three aspects.(1) Taking the basic ideas and relative models of Motta (2003), Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) as well as La Porta (2002) as reference, a theoretical investment model is set up basing on the private benefits of ultimate shareholder’s control, in which the control lever of the ultimate controlling shareholders (the ratio of ultimate control to the cash flow right) is employed. Simulation results confirmed that the increasing control leverage of the listed companies lead the separation degree between the cash-flow right and the control rights increase and the overinvestment more serious, which indicates the existence of interests occupation arise from the separation of the ultimate controlling shareholder’s ownerships.(2) The empirical studies are performed on the sensitivity sources of the investment cash flow from the view point of ultimate ownership structure, in which the ultimate controlling shareholder’s cash flow rights and control rights as well as their separation degree are taken as the proxy variables to reflect the degree of consistency between the ultimate controlling shareholders and the minority shareholders. In the meanwhile, with the aids of ultimate controlling shareholder’s cash flow rights and the separation degree between the cash flow rights and control rights, the entrenchment effect and the alignment effect arising from the ultimate controlling shareholders are well distinguished. Comparing with the evaluation employing the percentage of the shareholder’s ownership alone, the new method can also distinguish two competing explanations of the investment cash flow sensitivity effectively. Furthermore, it is found that the ultimate controlling shareholders entrenchment not only needs ability and motivation, but also needs "opportunity" with sufficient cash flow.(3) The effects of the debt under the ultimate control on the investment of the listed companies are also investigated. It is indicated the investment difference of the listed companies come from heterogeneous property of the liabilities, which is the debt maturity structure and its source. The internal mechanisms with respect to the relationship between debt and investment are analyzed with the aid of the new model that taking the ultimate controlling shareholder’s cash flow rights and control rights as well as their separation degree in consideration.In the end, I had to say there is some limitation in this thesis. (1) The study is under the assumption of the solidified interests between the controlling shareholders and management directors. The effects of management goals, self-confidence, motivation and the agency problem between the controlling shareholders and management directors on the company investment are not taken in to consideration. (2) The effect of the pyramid Level and control chains on the investment of the listed companies are not investigated further. (3) Internal mechanisms of corporate governance are not investigated. In fact, the ultimate controlling shareholders, as the company’s actual controller, will affect the mechanism and the effectiveness of the corporate governance inevitably. Consequently, it will exert strong influence on the investment decisions and investment behavior. Therefore, the role of the corporate governance between the ultimate control and the company’s investment is also a good topic for further research. The above limitations and the topic about corporate governance are the directions for my later research.更多还原