【作者】 龙建辉；

【导师】 贾生华；

【作者基本信息】 浙江大学 ， 企业管理， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 房地产行业是一个银行信贷依赖特征比较显著的行业,从土地储备、房地产开发、建设、投资和消费终端都离不开银行信贷的支持,银行在房地产公司经营活动中处于举足轻重的地位。因此,信贷政策是调控房地产市场失灵的重要手段,2003年6月5日,中国人民银行发布的《关于进一步加强房地产信贷业务管理的通知》(121号文件),加大了对房地产开发企业的监督力度,如禁止流动性资金贷款、禁止施工企业贷款垫资开发、严格控制土地储备贷款的发放等。此后,政府为了保持房地产市场的健康与科学发展,各种金融政策陆续出台,金融政策的频繁出台一方面凸显了银行在房地产行业中的关键地位,另一方面也暴露了银行面临的信贷风险。国有企业的所有者缺位,民营企业的大股东控制,都使得中国房地产上市公司普遍存在内部人控制(控股股东与经理人)现象,内部人的机会主义行为将给上市公司带来一定的负面影响,如高在职消费、高薪酬、“企业帝国”扩张欲望以及控股股东资金占用和关联交易等,这些机会主义行为正在威胁着银行等债权人的切身利益。虽然银行贷款“三查”制度中的“贷前调查”和“贷时审查”能够在一定程度上了解贷款企业的经营和财务状况,然而当贷款行为发生后,银行作为“外部人”始终难以完全掌握企业的行为方式,即使“贷后检查”制度也很难监督内部人的机会主义行为。因此,银行信贷的风险不仅表现为财务风险,更表现为公司治理风险；银行信贷风险不仅来自于事前选择,更来自于事后道德风险；银行信贷风险不仅来自于企业内部,更来自于制度因素。很多学者都认为债权人的监督工作能够提高公司治理效率(如Grossman & Hart,1982；Diamond, 1984；Fama,1985；Jensen,1986；等等)。本研究认为商业信用和企业债券等方式对公司治理效率的影响力可能会因为债权人的分散特征而被削弱,而且分散的债权人对企业进行监督的成本也很高,银行可以凭借其“专家式”的投资角色和信息优势作为众多债权人的“受托者”对贷款企业进行监督,因此,把银行信贷从其他负债中独立出来,研究其监督作用对公司治理效率的影响更有意义。转型期间的中国,政府控制、政府干预、信息问题、误导性规制和无效司法系统等现象普遍存在(Khanna & Palepu,1997；Peng & Heath,1996；Peng,2003)。房地产企业的两大战略性资源(银行借款和土地储备)都控制在政府手中,此外,债权人监督还应该有完善的法律制度才能发挥其治理效果(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997)。因此,本研究把银行监督、公司治理、政府控制和法律环境整合在一个逻辑框架之中,深入研究房地产企业、银行、政府和(法律)制度之间的关系。基本思路以银行监督与公司治理效率的关系为主线,将银行、企业与制度有机地结合在一起,从“银行监督与经理人代理成本”、“银行监督与控股股东代理成本’以及“银行监督与企业绩效”三条主线展开研究。此外,从商业银行的制度变迁、政府控制、银行与房地产企业的关系以及法律环境等阐述了银行与房地产企业赖以生存制度环境。同时把制度环境与以上三条主线进行了整合,利用文献研究、比较分析、调节与交互效应检验以及计量建模等方法,以2003-2008年41家房地产上市公司为样本,得出了一些既有理论意义,又有应用价值的结论。研究表明：(1)银行监督对公司治理效率的影响存在显著差异。具体而言,银行监督与经理人代理成本正相关,即银行监督不是降低了经理人代理成本,而是提高了经理人代理成本；银行监督与控股股东代理成本负相关,银行监督有利于降低控股股东代理成本；银行监督与企业绩效负相关,银行监督的治理效率处于扭曲状态。(2)政府控制(实际控制人性质)对公司治理效率的影响显著是一致的,即政府控制与经理人代理成本、控股股东代理成本和企业绩效(ROA和ROE)都表现出正相关关系,这说明在国有企业中,经理人代理成本和控股股东代理成本显著高于非国有企业,但是在房地产上市公司中,政府控制却有利于提高企业绩效。(3)相对于非国有房地产上市公司,在国有房地产上市公司中,银行监督与经理人代理成本正相关关系更强,与控股股东代理成本和企业绩效的负相关关系更强。当因变量是经理人代理成本或企业绩效时,政府控制导致了银行监督的预算软约束,从而导致银行监督的治理效率被扭曲,但是银行监督能够显著降低控股股东代理成本,甚至在国有企业这种关系表现得更为显著。(4)对于经理人代理成本、控股股东代理成本和企业绩效的影响上,银行监督作为一种外部治理机制与大部分内部治理机制之间表现出交互效应,具体表现为替代或互补关系。(5)改善为债权人提供保护的法律环境能够显著降低两类代理成本,提高企业绩效。这说明法律环境在公司治理中处于非常重要的位置。(6)除了经理人代理成本之外,对于控股股东代理成本和企业绩效的影响上,银行监督与法律环境之间表现出显著的交互效应。一方面,法律制度本身也是一种治理机制,能够发挥一定的公司治理作用,另一方面,银行与企业之间是一种契约关系,契约关系也需要健全的法律制度作为保障。从以上结论可以得出本研究主要有以下几个方面的创新：第一,本文结合了中国制度背景(政府控制、法律环境)研究银行监督与公司治理效率之间的关系,是对资本结构理论、Berle-Means范式以及LLSV范式的重要拓展；第二,本文研究了银行监督作为一种外部治理机制与传统的公司内部治理机制(如第一大股东、股权制衡度、董事会规模、高管报酬、经理人持股等)的交互作用,同时还研究了银行监督与法律环境之间的交互作用,发现银行监督与内部治理机制、银行监督与法律环境之间存在一定的替代或互补关系；第三,以中国房地产上市公司为样本,紧紧扣住房地产企业的银行信贷依赖特征,从规范和实证分别研究了银行监督对公司治理效率的影响及其内部作用机制和制度作用机制,不仅为企业外部治理机制(如产品市场竞争、劳动力市场竞争、审计服务和媒体披露等)与公司治理效率的关系研究提供了一种思路,而且丰富了代理理论与资本结构理论的实证文献。本研究的结论说明,我们应该从多角度理解“政企关系”、“银企关系”和法律制度。尽管现在大量的文献研究表明政府控制提高了代理成本,降低了企业价值,损害了外部投资者的利益,本研究表明,政府控制提高了两类代理成本,但是政府控制在获得土地储备和银行信贷方面具有独特的优势,能够改善企业绩效。所以,政府控制并不是一无是处。银行监督的治理效应并不是完全被扭曲,至少在房地产上市公司中,这种治理机制能够降低控股股东代理成本。法律环境的改善虽然有助于降低两类代理成本和提高企业绩效,但是银行监督与法律环境的交互作用有时候表现不尽人意,完善的法律制度可能会导致银行的“懒惰”,导致代理成本提高,如本研究的第五章,银行监督与法律环境的交互项与控股股东代理成本之间表现出正相关关系。此外,在改革实践中应该警惕两种危害：一是在市场经济还很不完善的前提下一味地反对政府控制,盲目学习和借鉴西方发达国家市场运行机制将会造成社会无序,导致社会无序成本的提高；二是在市场经济制度很完善的背景下,如果政府控制还普遍存在,那么很容易形成社会专制,导致社会专制成本的提高。更多还原

【Abstract】 The real estate industry depends remarkably on bank credits, such as land reverse, real estate development, construction, investment, terminal consumption etc., none of these activities could do without support from bank credit, therefore, bank play an important role in the real estate companies. Then, the credit policy becomes an important tool to regulate real estate market. "Circular on Further Strengthening the management of real estate credit business" (DOCUMENT 121) issued by the People’s Bank of China on June 5,2003, increased monitoring of real estate development companies, such as the prohibition of loans with liquid assets and loaning money from construction enterprises, strict control on the loans for land reverse. After that, a variety of financial policies have been put forward to maintain the health and scientific development of the real estate market. On the one hand, such frequent issuing of financial policies highlight the key position of banks in the real estate industry, on the other hand, it also exposed the credit risk confronted by banks.Due to the absence of state-owned enterprises and the control of large shareholders in private enterprises, the phenomenon of insider control (controlling shareholders and managers) in listed companies are so prevalent in China. The opportunistic behavior of insiders among listed companies will bring some negative effects, such as high consumption, high salaries, expansionary desire for "Corporate Empire", engrossing funds of controlling shareholder and related party transactions, all of which are threatening the vital interests of banks and other creditors. While the loan "three looked up (loan, to investigate, in loan examined, loan, inspection)" system can help the bank recognize the business and financial condition to some extent, but after the acting of loan contract, the bank as the "outsider" has always been difficult to intervene business activities, even though the "inspection" is also difficult to monitor the opportunistic behavior of insiders. Therefore, the risk of bank credit is not only from financial risks, but also from the risk of corporate governance; bank credit risk is not only from the pre-selection, but also from the ex post moral hazard; it is not only from internal corporate, but also from institutional factors. Many scholars believed that creditors can improve the corporate governance efficiency (e.g. Grossman & Hart,1982; Diamond,1984; Fama,1985; Jensen,1986; etc.). This study suggests that, because of the dispersive characteristics of creditors, the influence of commercial credit and corporate bonds on the corporate governance may be weakened and the cost of monitoring will be high. But the bank can act as the "trustee" for plenty of spread creditors to supervise the loan business, relying on their "expert-type" specialties and information superiority. So it will be more meaningful to separate the bank credit from other liabilities and study the efficiency of supervisory on corporate governance.China is going through the transition period, governmental control and intervention, information problems, misguided regulations and inefficient judicial systems are widely existed (Khanna & Palepu,1997; Peng & Heath,1996; Peng, 2003), while the two strategic resources of real estate companies (bank loans and land reserves) are controlled in the hands of government. In addition, creditors still need a perfect legal system to play the monitoring role (Shleifer & Vishny,1997). Therefore, this research integrated the bank monitoring, corporate governance, governmental control and legal environment into a logical framework, in order to study of relationship between real estate companies, banks, government, and (legal) institution. Generally, this paper analyzed the relationship between bank monitoring and the effectiveness of corporate governance based on three main lines:the "bank monitoring and agency costs of manager", "bank monitoring and agency costs of controlling shareholder" and "bank monitoring and firm performance". Besides, this study described the institutional environment from four aspects:institutional change of commercial banks, governmental control, relationship between banks and real estate business, legal environment. At the same time, it combined the institutional environment with the three main lines. This paper gathered data from 41 listed real estate companies during 2003-2008 and applied document study, comparative analysis, mediation effect test and econometric modeling, finally obtained a number of conclusions of theoretical and application value.The results show that:(1) the relationships between bank monitoring and corporate governance efficiency were significantly different. Specifically, the bank monitoring and the managerial agency costs have a positive relationship, while agency managers are not reducing the cost related to strict bank monitoring, but improving the agency costs; Bank monitoring and controlling shareholder agency costs negatively related, while monitoring helps to reduce holding shareholder agency costs; Bank monitoring and firm performance negatively related, and the efficiency of bank monitoring is in the twisted state. (2) The relationships between governmental control (the actual controller) and corporate governance efficiency were significantly same; that is both the relationship between government-controlled and manager agency costs, and the relationship between the costs of controlling shareholder agency and corporate performance (ROA and ROE) have shown a positive correlation. This shows that both of controlling shareholder agency costs and managerial agency costs in state-owned enterprises were significantly higher than non-state enterprises, but government-controled is help to improve business performance in real estate listed companies. (3) Banking monitoring and managers agency costs were more positively related, and the controlling shareholder agency costs and firm performance were more negatively related in state-owned listed real estate companies compared to non-listed ones. When the dependent variable is the manager agency costs or business performance, the government-controlled has led bank monitoring to soft budget constraint, and the effectiveness of banking monitoring has been distorted. But the bank monitoring can significantly reduce the controlling shareholders agency costs, and such kinds of relations in state-owned enterprises could be more significant. (4) As the impacts on managers agency costs, controlling shareholder agency costs and firm performance, bank monitoring, as an external governance mechanism, shows interaction with most of the internal mechanism, which means to alternative or complementary relationship. (5) The improved legal environment for creditor protection can significantly reduce these two kinds of agency costs and improve firm performance. So the legal environment in corporate governance is very important. (6) As the impacts on controlling shareholder agency costs and corporate performance, bank monitoring and legal environments show significant interaction effect. On the one hand, the legal system itself is a governance mechanism that can play a role in corporate governance; on the other hand, banks and enterprises constitute a contractual relationship, which also needs a perfect legal system as a guarantee.This study has the following innovations drawn from the above conclusions: First, this paper studied the relationship between bank monitoring and the effectiveness of corporate governance based on Chinese institutional context (government-controlled, legal environment), which is an important expanded on capital structure theory, Berle-Means and LLSV paradigms; Second, this paper studied the interaction between bank monitoring, as an external governance mechanisms, and the traditional internal corporate governance mechanisms (such as the largest shareholder, check and balances of ownership structure, the Board size, executive compensation, manager ownership, etc.) and legal environment. This interaction (referring to alternative or complementary relationship) do existed. Third, this study applied a sample of listed real estate companies in China, following closely characteristics of bank credit in real estate industry. It studied interaction mechanisms and the relationship between bank monitoring and corporate governance effectiveness respectively from the normative and empirical methods. It not only provided a channel for the re’itionship study between external governance mechanisms (such as product market competition, labor market competition, audit, and media, etc.) and the effectiveness of corporate governance, but also enriched the empirical literatures of agency theory and capital structure theory.The study concluded that we should understand "government-enterprise relations", "bank-enterprise relationship" and legal institution from multiple aspects. Despite the large amount of literature shows that government control increased the agency costs, reducing the corporate value and harming the interests of outside investors, this study shows that government control increased agency costs, but the government control has unique advantages to land reserves and bank credit that can improve firm performance. Therefore, government control is not without merit. Role of bank monitoring is not completely distorted, at least in the listed real estate companies; this mechanism can reduce the agency costs of controlling shareholders. In addition, although the improvement of legal environment will be benefit to reduce agency costs and improve firm performance, but the interaction between legal environment and bank monitoring is sometimes unsatisfactory, a perfect legal system may lead the bank to be "lazy" and increase the agency costs, just as Chapter V of this research, the interaction term between bank monitoring and the legal environment constitute a positive correlation with the controlling shareholder agency costs. Therefore, the practice of reform should be wary of two hazards:First, if we stubbornly oppose to government control and learn from western market mechanism blindly as the market economy system is still imperfection, it will lead to social disorder and high disordered costs of our socity; second, if we have developed a very perfect market economy system in the background, if government control is still widespread, then it is easy to form a social tyranny, and high costs of social tyranny will be formed.更多还原