【作者】 刁大明；

【导师】 张光；

【作者基本信息】 南开大学 ， 行政管理， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 拨款是美国联邦政府公共财政支出决策的重要环节,关乎联邦政府各个行政部门能否获得维持基本运行和实施政策的充分财政支持。美国联邦政府财政拨款的参与者众多,包括总统及其管理与预算办公室等白宫办事机构、国会及其拨款委员会等各委员会等等,其中以国会在拨款决策中发挥的作用最为关键。国会掌握的控制联邦政府收入与支出的“钱袋权”,是其权力的来源与基础。而本文所讨论的拨款,被称为“钱袋的拉链”美国联邦政府拨款过程中的核心机构是国会两院的拨款委员会。这种制度安排在大多数国家的代议机构中可谓罕见。事实上,专门的拨款委员会并非始于首届国会,而是随着国家财政规模的扩大,国会必须更为专业而严格地控制支出,又加之府会关系、党派利益等政治因素的交互影响,拨款委员会才应运而生。在美国相对稳定发展的时期,国会及其拨款委员会量入为出,保证了联邦财政的平稳；而一旦国家面临战乱或经济危机,国会及其拨款委员会则无力有效管理支出,致使赤字频现。自19世纪末期成立以来,因财政状况变化和党争政治等因素影响,拨款委员会的管辖权几经拆分与整合,并曾与授权委员会分享拨款权力。这种混乱造成了严重的财政后果,支出过度致使在稳定发展期间出现赤字。本文指出,这一历史时期内,拨款委员会往往通过削减授权委员会的拨款要求来维持其权势,倾向于“守财”。随着20世纪40、50年代冷战军备和社会福利项目等引发的大量支出,联邦财政状况堪忧,赤字常态化。1974年,国会两院设立预算委员会以对财政收支实现整体管理。由于预算委员会的建立,以及强制性项目交由授权委员会管辖等变化,拨款委员会失去了原有的影响力,被要求在预算委员会制定的预算决议案框架下展开立法。为维持权势,拨款委员会出现改变甚至增加支出、塞入专项拨款项目等倾向,形成“散财”动机。基于历史梳理,本文认为拨款委员会在制度安排与立法风格上的变迁具有明显的历史路径依赖。同时,拨款委员会的变化也折射出200多年来美国府会间的宪政关系、国会内部党团、委员会等权力结构的变迁。从政府过程的角度看,当今美国联邦拨款过程充分诠释着分权与制衡的精神。宪政层次上,总统与国会之间存在着明显的权力分享与制约关系。立法权力结构上,国会内部各委员会之间也呈现出分权化趋势。两院中的预算委员会确定各个政策项目的支出限制,为拨款委员会划定拨款立法的范围；授权委员会与拨款委员会之间形成“先授权后拨款”规则的同时,还掌握着大量强制性项目的拨款权。拨款委员会领导将支出限制再次细化分配到各分委员会,限制着各分委员会的拨款范围。本文认为,这些参与者拨款目标之间的差异性是分权制衡得以形成的必要条件,但分立的府会关系、对峙的两院、极化的国会党团等可能在这种分权制衡的某一层次上制造僵局,降低拨款立法的效率,甚至最终导致拨款立法的夭折。通过对第108至110届国会两院拨款委员会构成的量化统计分析,本文验证了拨款委员会已失去了“守财者”的合作角色。就众议院而言,在基本尊重区域分布平衡的同时,党团基本控制了拨款委员会成员组成,议员与本党党团领袖的政治立场一致度、领袖对议员的信任度、议员与领袖具有共同利益甚至私人关系等,都是普通议员能否成为拨款委员会成员的影响因素,资历几乎不起作用。在参议院中,虽然党团控制加强,但资历仍旧最为关键。与此同时,国会两院拨款委员会及其分委员会的领导人选仍旧以资历为前提。本文指出,从财政效果的整体上看,联邦政府拨款保持相对审慎的决策风格。国会的拨款立法既稳定地满足行政部门的财政需要,又在前一财年的拨款水平上略有增幅。从财政效果的细节上看,合同项目分布较为广泛但数额较小与国会政治基本无关；援助项目数额更大但分布相对有限,更多倾向于经济相对落后的地区。援助项目的分布与其选区议员是否为国会多数党有关,与拨款委员会成员无关。作为一种特殊拨款的专项拨款项目,与拨款委员会明显相关。具体而言,参议院拨款委员会成员更多来自经济落后州,更容易给本州实现更多专项拨款。当参议员以诉求和资历而进入拨款委员会后,通过专项拨款形成一个“自我强化”的循环,一定程度上促进着财政资源均等化。与此同时,众议院拨款委员会普通成员并非以选区专项拨款为首要目标,而是遵循党团领导,推动符合本党团立场的拨款,以实现更大的政策影响。众议院拨款委员会及其各分委员会领导的专项拨款行为空间较大。由于众议院拨款委员会成员与其选区的经济情况没有关联,拨款委员会及其分委员会领导的专项拨款行为往往无助于财政资源的均等化,更多为私人利益服务,导致财政的浪费和腐败的滋生。更多还原

【Abstract】 The U.S. federal appropriation is one of the most important policy processes of the federal spending, which influence the normal operation of the U.S. federal government. During the appropriations process, many political actors involve, such as the President and his OMB, the Congress and its appropriations committees. With the highest legislative power granted by the Constitution, the U.S. Congress and its appropriations committees play a key role in U.S. federal appropriations. As a representative body, Congress holds the legislative power in charge of the federal revenue and expenditure policy making, which is called "power of the purse", and considered as the source and foundation of the power held by Congress. This dissertation focused on the politics of Congressional appropriations politics, which directly affects the federal expenditures and normal operation of the federal government, known as the "zipper of the purse"Nowadays both chambers of the U.S. Congress respectively set up specialized standing committees for appropriations, which are considered as the key agenda in U.S. federal appropriations system. Compared with the composition of representative institutions in most other countries, such institutional arrangements are exceptional. To explain this exception, the paper traces the historical evolution of the U.S. Congressional funding legislative system. In fact, the First Congress did have no committee for appropriations. With the expansion of federal governmental financial scale, Congress should be more specific and strict to control expenditures. Because of this aim and other factors such as more partisan interests, harder work intensity and the system of checks and balances, the Appropriations Committees came into being. During the relatively stable development period of the United States, Congress and its Appropriations Committees kept the stability of federal financial situation successfully. Once war or economic crisis sweeping the country, Congress and its Appropriations Committees had no capacity for effectively controlling the federal spending, causing the frequent federal deficit. Since established in the late 19th century, because of the changing financial situation and other political reasons, the Appropriations Committees’funding jurisdiction has been split and integrated for several times, even once been shared with other authorizing committees, which caused great confusion with serious financial waste and deficit during the stable development period. The dissertation points out that, in order to maintain their power, the Appropriations Committees often cut funding request from authorizing committees, tending to "save" the money. Sine 1940 and 1950, with large spending caused by the Cold War and social welfare entitlements, the federal government financial situation fell into lasting deficit again. After 1974, the House and Senate Budget Committees were established for macrobudgeting management of the revenue and expenditure. The dissertation finds that, since the establishment of the Budget Committees and the jurisdiction of entitlements split and transferred to relative authorizing committees, the Appropriations Committees lost original legislative influence, instead they must take in charge of funding legislation under the budgetary framework in the Budget Resolution passed by the Budget Committees. To maintain influence, the Appropriations Committees appeared to change or increase spending, by creating more earmark projects, and then the committees tended to "spend" the money. Through the historical analysis, the dissertation suggests that the institutional arrangements and legislative styles of the Appropriations Committees changed with very strong historical path dependence. It is also noted that changing legislative style of the Appropriations Committees reflects the changing history of constitutional relations between President and Congress, and the changing history of the power structures of party causes and committees on Capitol Hill during more than 200 years.With the governmental process analysis, today’s U.S. federal appropriations process fully shows the spirit of checks and balances. At the Constitutional level, there is a clear power-sharing arrangement between the President and Congress. Within the legislative power structures, the various committees in Congress shared powers. The Budget Committees in both chambers establish the baseline and other limits of federal spending to set up the scope of the Appropriations Committee legislation; the relations between authorizing committees and the Appropriations Committees follow the rule "no appropriations without authorizations", then the authorizing committees also hold a great deal of entitlements funding appropriations. Leaders of the Appropriations Committees allocate the spending ceilings with various subcommittees, limiting the scope of the funding legislation of all subcommittees. This dissertation argues that different goals of actors involved in the appropriations process set up the necessary conditions for the checks and balances among separative powers, but also created barriers for legislative efficiency. The political deadlock such as the divided government, the separation between two chambers and the polarization of Congress reduced the efficiency of the appropriations legislation and even caused to collapse of the federal appropriations.Through the empirical data-statistical analysis of the assignments of the Appropriations Committees in both chambers during the 108th to 110th U.S. Congress, the dissertation finds that the Appropriations Committees have gradually lost their cooperative "saver" role. In the House of Representatives, on the basic respect for the regional distribution of balance, party caucuses control the assignments of the Appropriations Committee. For rank-and-file members, the consistency with their parties, the trust with party leaders, the interests shared with party leaders and even the personal relations with party leaders determine whether they could take part in the Appropriations Committee or not. The seniority almost does not work. In the Senate, although the party control strengthens, the seniority is still considered as the most crucial qualification for the Appropriations Committee. However, the seniority plays a basic and the most important role in process of choosing leaders of the Appropriations Committees and its subcommittees for both parties in both chambers.The dissertation finds that, taking the overall financial effect as the point of view, U.S. federal appropriations relatively keep prudent financial principles. While stably meeting the financial needs of the executive branch, Congressional appropriations also increase slightly above the baseline of the previous fiscal year’s spending. Among kinds of spending projects, the contract projects are distributed more widely, but have a small amount, which Congress has little political impact on. The assistance projects have greater amount but limited coverage, which are relatively distributed into many poorer areas. The distribution of assistance projects depends on majority party in Congress, but has no connection with membership of the Appropriations Committees. As a special kind of funding projects, earmark projects have strong links to the Appropriations Committees, partly because they are easily taken place during the appropriations process. In particular, members of the Senate Appropriations Committee seem more likely to represent for the poor states and more easily achieve more earmarks for their states. When Senators get seats in the Appropriations Committee with application and seniority, they will launch a "self-reinforcing" cycle by earmark projects, to some extent have help to the equalization of the federal financial resources. Relatively, the main goal of members of the House Appropriations Committee is not focused on earmarks for their constituencies. Instead they should follow the party leadership and be consistent with funding legislation policy position of their party, in order to achieve greater impact on policy-making. Leaders of the House Appropriations Committee and its subcommittees have larger spaces and chances for earmarks. As there is no clear connection between the House Appropriations Committee membership and the economic conditions of their constituencies, the earmark behaviors of leaders of the House Appropriations Committee and its subcommittees often have no help to the equalization of the federal financial resources, but serve for more private interests and cause federal financial wastes and corruptions.更多还原