【作者】 李善杰；

【导师】 林木西；

【作者基本信息】 辽宁大学 ， 政治经济学， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 本文研究软预算约束条件下的宏观经济表现及其政策实践。本文首先对软预算约束的成因和性质给出说明,这也是对软预算约束的存在性给出证明。本文选择从信息与动态承诺、产权与成本分离两个角度来对软预算的存在性给出证明:前者可以有效说明软预算约束的一般性存在问题;后者可以有效说明为什么社会主义经济和转轨经济软预算约束更为严重。本文建立了一个严格的逆向选择模型来说明信息不对称如何产生软预算约束,不仅把财政分权和地区竞争对于软预算约束的影响、政策性负担对于软预算约束的影响等分析统一到一个框架里,而且把从信息与动态承诺角度所做的分析和从产权与成本分离角度所做的分析进行了有效嫁接,从而可以在更加一般化的框架内理解软预算约束的成因与性质。在本文看来,成本分离不是软预算约束的局部,而是软预算约束的全部,问题只是导致成本分离的原因不同罢了。在私有产权下,也有成本分离,这种成本分离因为信息不对称(交易费用)而起,而约束下利益最大化公理意味着这种分离一定是约束下的最小分离。在私有产权下,也可以有软预算约束,但这样的软预算约束是在给定信息结构(交易费用)约束下的最小程度的软预算约束。在公有产权下,成本分离不仅因为公有产权本身之规定而起,还因为与公有产权相伴而生的高扭曲及高交易费用而起——在公有产权下缺少价格信息,交易费用变高,经济的软预算约束也就更普遍、更严重了。这就是在经验上所观察到的社会主义经济和转轨经济中软预算约束更普遍、更严重的缘故,也是政府和公共组织更容易对预算约束体提供救助,而产权私有的支持体并不普遍的缘故。整个经济学解决的就是一个信息结构和激励相容的问题,而产权本身正是被发明用来解决这个问题的。虽说在一个产权公有和存在大量扭曲的经济中软预算约束严重,不过原则上,仍然要把公有产权下的软预算约束理解成(公有产权)约束下的最小程度的软预算约束。在本文看来,硬化预算约束(减少成本分离)的根本措施:一是产权明晰,尽可能将产权清晰地界定给个人,同时努力降低私人经济运行中的信息之不对称(交易费用),让价格机制充分发挥作用;二是行政分权,对于不得不存在的大量的公共组织和领域进行行政分权,要增加公共资产使用中的谈判协商费用,尽可能地减少政府干预。接下来,本文探讨软预算约束对于宏观经济表现及政策实现的影响。在本文看来,软预算约束不仅导致投资的利率弹性变低,投资对利率变化不敏感,同时还导致消费倾向变小和乘数效应变小,其结果,在软预算约束经济中,虽然和货币政策相比较,财政政策的政策效应相对要强一些,财政政策相对于货币政策要高效一些,但与硬预算约束经济相比较,财政政策、货币政策的政策效应都减弱了,财政政策、货币政策的政策有效性都降低了。正是因为在软预算约束下,财政政策、货币政策是低效的,政府才不得不采用行政手段以及信贷控制、土地审批这样的控制数量变量的手段来调控经济。因此,不宜简单反对政府使用行政手段以及信贷控制、土地审批这样的控制数量变量的手段来调控经济,而是必须首先在根本上改变软预算约束。正是因为软预算约束下的“投资冲动”和“消费压抑”,同时软预算约束下政府不得不采用行政手段以及信贷控制、土地审批这样的控制数量变量的手段来调控经济,致使经济调整缺乏弹性,因此经济才表现出波动幅度大,扩张期和收缩期短,“一放就活”,“一收就死”,以及在上一轮周期中出现了原材料等投资品价格上涨但最终产品价格不涨、通货紧缩与经济高速增长相伴随等不同于一般市场经济的特征。中国的经济波动既有市场经济的一般性原因,更有产生“投资冲动”和“消费压抑”的体制特殊性原因。进一步,本文对中国经济的的特殊增长结构给予了探讨,对于中国经济的增长性质以及华尔街金融危机下的应对措施给予了分析。在本文看来,中国经济的高增长及其所呈现出的特殊增长结构可以由“新兴”、“转轨”、“全球化”三个基本因素来得到解释。中国过去的高增长乃是特定约束条件下的高增长,到目前为止,“中国奇迹”本质上仍然只是另一个“东亚奇迹”。当约束条件发生转变以后,中国经济必须实现增长方式的转变。华尔街金融危机并不简单地是一个金融制度存在缺陷和金融监管缺失的问题,而是一个世界经济在特定条件下非常态高增长之后的自然调整过程。这个特定条件主要是IT革命和柏林墙倒塌对于供给端的持续有利影响。由于柏林墙倒塌不可复制,而替代IT革命的新的技术革命短期内恐难形成,从而决定了上一轮世界经济的持续高增长乃是特定背景下的非常态高增长。华尔街金融危机意味着中国经济过去高增长赖以实现的外部有利条件已经发生了改变。为此中国经济必须实现增长方式的根本转变,从主要依靠投资和外需拉动经济增长转变到外需和内需(主要是国内消费)共同拉动经济增长的轨道上来。但这首选需要解决国内经济因软预算约束而产生的“投资冲动”和“消费压抑”。对于因软预算约束而产生的宏观经济结构性失衡,解决的根本办法不是利用财政政策、货币政策进行需求管理和调节,而是必须要通过改革、创新才能有效解决。未来中国经济的问题是要刺激国内消费,但又不是一个简单地刺激消费的问题。不解决软预算约束,“投资冲动”就不能得到抑制,生产过剩和投资效率低下的问题就不能解决;不解决软预算约束和其它压抑消费的体制性障碍,消费就不可能真正得到刺激。在产能过剩、消费不足,同时国外吸收由超常增长向常态增长回归的情况下,过度的财政扩张可能使中国经济再次陷入通缩的境地,而财政政策、货币政策的双重过度扩张则可能使中国经济陷入“滞胀”的风险之中。最后,本文对于为学界广泛承认的促使中国经济奇迹产生的地区竞争(县际竞争)发挥作用的机制、条件以及可能产生的问题做出分析,并根据内、外部经济环境的转变,对于中国经济进一步的增长前景和政策选择做出分析。层层承包责任合约的扩张是地区竞争的制度基础。地区竞争主要表现为县际竞争。县际竞争围绕土地而展开,主要以招商引资的形式表现出来。由于层层承包责任合约的实行,中国的土地在事实上是进行了向个人的权利界定的,不过这种界定毕竟不充分、不完全。这种不充分、不完全不是因为界定产权有费用,因而任何资源在边际上都存在“公共域”的缘故,而是因为名义上要求国有的缘故,是实际所有权和名义所有权不一致所导致的不充分、不完全。于是软预算约束、“过度利用”、“过度投资”就难以避免。然而这种“过度利用”和“过度投资”正好是在存在大量剩余劳动力和外部吸收强劲条件下,现实人口红利和经济增长的一个有效手段。但是,当劳动市场上人口红利逐渐消失或外部吸收降下来时,就要求竞争方式跟着发生转变了。县际间围绕土地而展开的以招商引资为主要形式的竞争,虽然有助于人口红利的实现,但同时也伴有软预算约束和“过度投资”。今天,让美国维持高消费、低储蓄、借钱消费和提前消费生活方式的制度背景已经不复存在,于是软预算约束、“投资冲动”、“消费压抑”就会让经济不能持续高速增长。今天,由于剩余劳动力消失,增加生产的收益相对来说是下降了的,而由于外部吸收的下降、开发国内消费需求而不是增加生产,就变得至关重要起来。为此,将土地等重要生产要素清晰地界定给私人可能是重要的政策选项,正确处理人民币汇率和以房地产为主的资产泡沫,维护制造业的竞争力,也是中国经济未来持续增长的关键。更多还原

【Abstract】 This thesis researches the macroeconomic performance and policy practice under soft budget constraints.Firstly, this thesis gives instructions about the causes and properties of the soft budget constraints, and also proves the existence of soft budget constraints. The article selects two angles to do it, one of which is the information and dynamic commitment, and the other is the property right and cost separation. The former can explain the general existence problems of the soft budget constraints, the latter can explain why the socialist economy and the transition economy soft budget constraints are even more serious. This thesis develops a strict adverse selection model which can explains how information asymmetry produces soft budget constrains, not only puts the analyses of the influence from fiscal decentralization and regional competition to soft budget constraints, and the influence from policy burden into a framework, and also effectively grafts the analyze from the information and dynamic commitment and the analyze from the property right and cost separation. This can make us understand the causes and properties of the soft budget constraints in a more general framework.The view in this article is that the cost separation is not the part of the soft budget constraints, but the whole. The problem is only different of the cause leading to the cost separation. Under the private property rights, there will be cost separation, which because of information asymmetry (transaction cost), but the justice of maximizing interests under constrains means that the separation must be the smallest one under constrains. Under the private property rights, we can also have the soft budget constraints, but this kind of that is the minimum under the given information structure (transaction cost) constrain. Under the public property right, the cost separation is not only because of the requirements of the public property rights itself, but also because of the high distortion attendant with the public property rights, and the high transaction costs. That is to say under the public property rights, lacking of price information, variable high transaction costs, make the economic soft budget constraints more general and more serious. This is the reason we observed by experience that the soft budget constraints are more general and more serious in the socialist economy and the transition economy, and is also the reason why the government and public organizations provide assistance to the budget constraint body more easily, but the support body of private property rights is not universal. The all economic solution is a problem about the information structure and the incentive compatibility. And the property itself was invented precisely to solve this problem. While the public ownership and a large number of distortions exiting in the economy, the soft budget constraint is serious, but in principle, we should still understand the soft budget constraint under public property rights as the minimal one under the constraint of public property rights.In this article’s view, there are only two fundamental measures to harden budget constraints(reduce the cost separation): (1) Ownership shall be privatized and defined to individuals as clarified as possible, transaction cost in the operation of private-based economy shall be lowered in the mean time with no efforts spared, and price mechanism shall be brought into full play. (2) In those innumerous public organizations and realms which have to exist, political rights shall be divided, negotiation costs concerned with how to use public assets shall be increased, and government interference shall be decreased as much as possible.Next, the article discusses the influence from soft budget constraints to the macroeconomic performance and policy practice. In the view of this article, soft budget constraints not only lead to lower the interest rate of the investment, investment is not sensitive to interest rate changes, but also lead to the propensity to consume smaller, and the multiplier effect smaller. As a result, although the effectiveness of fiscal policies is stronger, fiscal policies are relatively more effective than monetary policies in the economy under soft budget constraints, effectiveness of both fiscal and monetary policies are diminished compared to those in the economy under hard budget constraints. Just because of this less effectiveness, government has to regulate and control economy by taking such quantitive-variable controlling measures as administrative methods, controlling credit and land-use approval. So, we can not simply oppose that government regulated and controlled economy by taking such quantitive-variable controlling measures as administrative methods, controlling credit and land-use approval, but must change soft budget constraints fundamentally at first.Due to investment impulse and consumption repression under soft budget constraints, and government having to regulate and control economy by taking such quantitive-variable controlling measures as administrative methods, controlling credit and land-use approval, economic adjustment was lack of flexibility, economy showed large fluctuations, short expansions and contractions,“the live as long as relaxation”,“the death as long as tightening”, and some characteristics different from the general market economy appeared in the before cycle, such as the price of investment goods consisting raw material rise, but the final product prices didn’t rise, deflation and rapid economic growth accompanied by and so on. China’s economic fluctuations result not only from common market reasons but also from special economic system and institutions producing investment impulse and consumption repression.At the last, this thesis deals with china’s high economy growth and the special growth structure accompanied with, the growth property of china’s economy and the growth prospect of china’s economy under the Wall Street’s financial crisis. In the view of this thesis, the high growth of china’s economy and its special growth structure can be explained by three basic factors: emerging, transition and globalization. China’s high growth in the past is the high growth under special constraints, until now, the China Miracle is essentially another East Asian Miracle. When the constraints shift after, china’s economy must achieve growth pattern.The Wall Street financial crisis is not an easy problem of financial system weaknesses and lack of financial supervision, but a global economy’s natural adjustment process after the abnormal high growth under certain conditions, which are mainly the IT revolution and the sustained beneficial effects for supply-sides due to the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Since the collapse of the Berlin Wall is not copied, and the new technology revolution which can replace the IT revolution can not be formed in the short time, the sustained high growth of the word economy in the last cycle is the abnormal high growth under certain conditions. The Wall Street financial crisis means that the favorable external conditions which China’s high growth achieved by have been changed. So China’s economy must achieve the fundamental transition of the growth structure, economy growth dependences changed from investment and overseas market demands to domestic demands (mainly domestic consumption). But first we should solve domestic economy’s problems of investment impulse and consumption repression because of soft budget constraints.The essential measure to solve the macroeconomic unbalance caused by soft budget constraints is not to adjust demand by using fiscal and monetary policies, but by reforming. The future problem of China’s economy is to stimulate domestic consumption, but not an easy problem. If the soft budget constrains are not solved, the investment impulse will not be solved, the overproduction and the inefficient investment will not be solved; if the soft budget constraints and the systematic obstacles caused by consumption repression are not solved, the consumption will not be stimulated really. In face of production capacity surplus and consumption repression as well as regression of overseas absorption from hyper-growth to normal-growth, fiscal overexpansion may land China’s economy into deflation again, and overexpansion of both fiscal and monetary policies may put China’s economy at the risk of stagflation.更多还原