【作者】 宋俊荣；

【导师】 朱榄叶；

【作者基本信息】 华东政法大学 ， 国际法学， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 本文主要从法学角度研究应对气候变化的贸易措施与WTO规则之间的关系,通过挖掘和梳理两者之间可能存在的冲突,继而分析和探索化解冲突的有效方法和途径,从而在最大程度上促进自由贸易与应对气候变化两大目标在WTO体制下的和谐共存。此外,本文还对我国在相关领域的立法和实践进行了全面的总结和检讨,分析了各类应对气候变化的贸易措施对我国进出口贸易的影响和挑战,并提出了应对之策。本文由导言、正文和结束语三大部分构成。导言主要阐述了本文的研究背景、国内外研究现状、研究目的和意义、研究方法、研究思路和内容架构、以及本文的不足之处。正文包括五章。第一章概述了人类社会在当前所面临的气候变化问题、应对气候变化的国际、国内法律制度和措施、气候及气候变化与贸易自由化之间的相互影响、以及应对气候变化的贸易措施与WTO规则之间的关系。第二章考察的是碳排放贸易措施与WTO之间的关系。目前,碳排放贸易主要有两种类型。一是基于配额的碳排放贸易,又称总量控制与排放贸易,二是基于项目的碳排放贸易,主要有基于《京都议定书》的CDM/JI项目。WTO体制中与碳排放贸易有关的多边协定主要有GATT、GATS和SCM。由于碳排放配额不属于有形商品,因此,至少在现阶段,一国直接针对碳排放配额进出口采取的措施不受GATT规制。但是,碳排放配额进出口在将来被纳入GATT调整范围也并非完全没有可能。具体而言,一国针对碳排放配额进出口采取的措施与GATT规则之间的潜在冲突主要有两种情形。一种情形是一国可能会对碳排放配额的进出口数量施加限制,从而违背了GATT第11条有关禁止数量限制的规定。另一种情形是一国可能会针对特定国家施加碳排放配额的进口限制,从而违背了GATT第11条有关禁止数量限制的规定,同时也有可能违背第1条有关最惠国待遇的规定。但是,只要实施的方法得当,第一类措施是很有可能基于GATT第20条(b)款获得豁免的,而第二类措施也有可能基于GATT第20条(b)款获得豁免,但是难度更大。另外还需要注意的是,由于碳排放贸易的实施会增加企业的成本继而影响到产品的竞争力,所以推行此种措施的国家通常会对相关产品的进口设置一定的要求或限制,如要求产品出口国也建立了类似的碳排放贸易机制等。由于此类与碳排放贸易有关的贸易限制措施针对的是传统的有形产品,因此毫无疑问是受到GATT规制的。由于碳排放配额本身不属于服务,因此,WTO成员方所采取的影响碳排放配额贸易的措施不属于GATS的调整范围。但是,CDM/JI项目属于GATS所界定的服务范畴。因此,WTO成员方所采取的影响此类项目投资与开发的措施便应当适用GATS的相关规定。并且,CDM/JI项目应划归WTO成员方具体承诺表中的环境服务部门。此外,WTO成员方所采取的影响与碳排放贸易有关的服务贸易的措施也属于GATS的调整范围。碳排放贸易各环节中与SCM有关的主要是碳排放配额的初始分配。其中,免费分配全部碳排放配额的措施不构成补贴,而免费分配部分碳排放配额的措施构成可诉补贴。就碳排放贸易而言,我国所面临的挑战将来自以下两个方面。首先,在与温室气体排放有关的传统货物贸易和服务贸易领域,我国可能会遭遇其他国家所采取的单边限制措施。其次,在碳排放贸易领域,我国CERs的出口可能会遭遇其他国家的数量限制或其他歧视性措施。此外,如果投资CDM项目在WTO体制内被视为一种服务的提供,那么我国针对CDM项目投资和运行所采取的措施就将受到GATS规则的约束。面临上述挑战,我国可从以下四个方面寻求应对之策:充分利用WTO规则来维护我国的权益和利益,加强有关温室气体排放控制的立法,打造碳排放交易信息平台、培育碳排放交易市场,以及在适当的时候建立总量控制与排放贸易机制。第三章探讨的是应对气候变化的边境税收调整措施与WTO之间的关系。边境税收调整措施主要包括两大类。一类是对进口产品征收与同类国产品同样的国内税,另一类是对出口产品退税。根据征税对象的不同,各国对进口产品所采取的应对气候变化的边境税收调整措施主要可分为两种类型。一种是直接对化石燃料征收碳税或能源税,另一种是对内涵碳(embodied carbon)或内涵能源(embodied energy)产品1征收碳税或能源税。前者针对产品的消费所造成的温室气体排放,而后者则是针对产品生产过程所造成的温室气体排放。前者属于直接针对进口产品开征的间接税,因此,只要WTO成员方对进口化石燃料课征的税负不高于对同类国产化石燃料课征的税负,并且对来自于另一成员方的化石燃料课征的税负不高于对来自任何第三国的同类化石燃料课征的税负,就不会构成对WTO规则的违背。后者则与WTO规则存在根本性的冲突,其根本原因在于该措施造成了“同类产品”之间的差别待遇。因此,要想在WTO框架内采取此类措施,就必须保证其符合GATT第20条例外条款的规定。如果以GATT第20条(b)款为依据,那么成员方应当注意的是该款所规定的“必需性”要求。如果以(g)款为依据,那么成员方应当注意的是该款所规定的“与……有关”以及“与国内措施一同实施”的要求。最后,此类措施还必须符合第20条引言的要求,即不得对情况相同的国家构成武断的、不合理的歧视待遇,也不得构成对国际贸易的变相限制。根据退税依据的不同,碳税或能源税的出口退税也可分为两种情形。一是化石燃料的出口退税,二是针对产品生产过程所耗化石燃料的出口退税。就第一种情形而言,只要WTO成员方对出口化石燃料的退税额或免税额不超过实际收缴税额或应缴税额,均不构成出口补贴。第二种情形的退税依据是出口产品生产过程所耗化石燃料所背负的碳税或能源税,属于出口国对出口产品生产过程中所消耗的投入物开征的前期累积间接税,因而应当适用SCM附件1出口补贴清单中(h)款后半段的规定。也就说,WTO成员方可以对出口产品退还或免除该国对作为其生产投入物的化石燃料已征或应征的税款,即使其同类产品在供国内消费时无法享受此待遇。当然,所退还或免除的税款不能超过已征或应征税款。应对气候变化的边境税收调整措施对我国这样的能源密集型产品出口大国的影响是显而易见的。对此,我国应从以下几个方面来进行应对:调整优化能源结构,提高能源资源利用效率;调整优化出口结构,限制两高一资产品(即高耗能、高污染、资源性产品)出口;推行税制绿化改革,强化税收的资源保护功能;加强对WTO相关规则的研究,充分利用WTO争端解决机制。第四章关注的是产品碳标识认证与WTO之间的关系。产品碳标识是一种以应对气候变化为最终目的,以披露产品碳足迹为主要内容的环境标识。根据认证主体的不同,产品碳标识认证可分为政府部门主导和民间机构主导两大类。而根据产品碳标识的使用是否具有强制性,政府部门主导的产品碳标识认证还可进一步分为强制性产品碳标识认证和自愿性产品碳标识认证两大类。相对于其他类型的产品标识而言,产品碳标识最为突出的特点就在于它所披露的信息是与产品特征无关的生产加工过程和方法。产品碳标识的认证主要涉及GATT以及TBT两项多边协定。由于TBT是对产品标识做出具体规定的协定,所以,在WTO框架下对产品碳标识认证进行分析应首先适用TBT的相关规则,然后适用GATT的相关规则。政府部门主导的强制性的涉及产品使用过程的碳标识认证属于TBT的调整范围。具体而言,WTO成员方根据TBT所承担的义务主要有四项:国民待遇和最惠国待遇义务;不得对国际贸易造成不必要的障碍;以相关的国际标准作为拟定技术法规的基础;以及与透明度相关的通知、磋商等义务。而GATT中与政府部门主导的强制性产品碳标识认证相关的义务主要有国民待遇、最惠国待遇和一般性禁止数量限制义务。政府部门主导的自愿性的涉及产品使用过程的产品碳标识认证也属于TBT的调整范围。WTO成员方因此而承担的义务主要体现在TBT第4条以及附件3的规定。GATT项下与政府部门主导的自愿性产品碳标识认证相关的义务主要是国民待遇和最惠国待遇义务。对于境内民间机构主导的产品碳标识认证,WTO成员方也应当采取一切可能的合理措施以确保其符合TBT附件3所规定的良好行为规范。如果从事产品碳标识认证的民间机构实际上是听命于政府,且对政府有较强的依赖性,那么该民间机构所从事的产品碳标识认证就应当被认定为政府行为。如果该民间机构在产品碳标识认证方面违背了GATT国民待遇和最惠国待遇原则,那么其政府应当承担相应的法律责任。目前,国外已有不少学者建议利用产品碳标识认证来向我国施加减排压力。对此,中国应从以下三个方面展开应对工作。首先,应加快开展我国的产品碳标识认证工作。其次,积极寻求与其他国家和地区的产品碳标识的相互认可。最后,积极参与WTO框架下相关议题的谈判,以促成有利于我国利益之规则的形成。第五章研究的是应对气候变化补贴与WTO之间的关系。应对气候变化补贴对于贸易的负面影响主要在于其降低了本国产品的生产成本,从而减损了其他未实施补贴国家同类产品的市场准入机会。以应对气候变化补贴的目的为标准,可将其划分为两种类型。第一种类型的应对气候变化补贴本身具有应对气候变化的真实目的,但其实施后果造成了对国外生产商的歧视。此种补贴应当被允许在一定限度内使用。另一种应对气候变化补贴则纯粹是国内产业寻租的结果,其本身并不具有应对气候变化的真实目的。这种类型的应对气候变化补贴应当成为多边贸易规则重点防范的对象。但是,依据现有WTO补贴与反补贴规则,很多以应对气候变化为真实目的的补贴都可能被判定为禁止性补贴或可诉性补贴,从而在很大程度上限制了WTO成员方采取正当的应对气候变化补贴措施的自由。因此,要为各国推行正当的应对气候变化补贴铺平道路,就必须对现有WTO补贴与反补贴规则进行完善。目前比较可行的办法是借鉴GATT第20条模式,在SCM中增加环保例外条款。由于存在科学上的不确定性和政治因素的介入,正当性应对气候变化补贴与保护主义性质的应对气候变化补贴之间的界限在目前还比较模糊。因此,WTO专家小组和上诉机构在考察相关措施的实质内容以外,还需要对其决策过程进行考察。此外,依据现有WTO规则,一国在应对气候变化领域放松管制的行为不构成补贴。他国无权对其出口产品采取反补贴措施。我国应坚定不承担强制性减排义务的立场,同时坚决反对将SCM有关补贴的定义扩大到应对气候变化领域放松管制的行为。最后,结束语概述了本文的主要结论。更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper will undertake a study on the relationship between the trade-related measures addressing climate change and WTO rules from legal perspective. First, it analyzes the possible conflicts between them. Secondly, it seeks the effective means to resolve the conflicts. Lastly, it takes an overview of China’s legislation and practice in related areas, summarizes the challenges and influences the various trade-related measures addressing climate change impose on China’s trade, and provides the countermeasures.This paper consists of three parts, namely, the introduction, the main body and conclusion.The introduction provides an overview of the research background, the current research results domestically and abroad, the purpose and significance, the research methods, and the framework of this paper. The main body includes five chapters. Chapter one summarizes the issues of climate change we are confronted with currently, the international and domestic laws and measures addressing climate change, the influence between climate change and trade liberalization, and the relationship between the trade-related measures addressing climate change and WTO rules.Chapter two examines the relationship between carbon emission trading system and WTO rules. Currently, there’re two types of carbon emission trading. One is based on allowances, also called cap-and-trade. The other is based on project, mainly including Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation project based on Kyoto Protocol. The multilateral agreements related to carbon emissions trading within the WTO framework include GATT, GATS and SCM. The measures applied directly to the trade of carbon emission allowances fall outside the scope of GATT at least in short term since the allowances are not goods.However, it is not impossible that the trade of carbon emission allowances will be covered by GATT in the future. Specifically speaking, the measures applied directly to the trade of carbon emission allowances will conflict with the provisions of GATT in two situations. The first situation is that the quantitative restrictions on the trade of carbon emission allowances would violate Article XI of GATT. The second situation is that the import restrictions on the carbon emission allowances issued by certain countries would violate Article XI and Article I of GATT. However, the first type of measures would very likely be justified under paragraph (b) of Article XX of GATT if they are implemented appropriately. Nevertheless, it is more difficult for the second type of measures to be justified under paragraph (b) of Article XX of GATT. Moreover, the countries adopting carbon emissions trading system would very likely impose certain requirements or restrictions on related products, such as requiring that the exporting countries also adopt the similar system, since the production cost of the domestic products would be increased due to the application of carbon emissions trading system. Such measures undoubtedly fall within the scope of GATT because they are applied to tangible products.GATS does not apply to the measures affecting carbon emissions trading adopted by WTO members since the allowances could not be deemed as services. However, the CDM/JI projects should be deemed as services defined by GATS. Therefore, the measures affecting the investment and development of such projects taken by WTO members fall within the scope of GATS. Moreover, the CDM/JI projects should be classified as environmental services sector in the Schedule of WTO members. Besides, the measures affecting the trade of services related to carbon emissions trading also fall within the scope of GATS.Among all the components of the carbon emissions trading, what is relevant to SCM is the initial allocation of allowances. To allocate all of the allowances freely does not constitute subsidy, while to allocate part of the allowances freely constitutes actionable subsidy.As for carbon emissions trading, the challenges confronting China include two aspects. First, China may be confronted with unilateral trade restriction measures in the traditional areas of trade of goods and trade of services. Second, the export of CERs may be confronted with quantitative restrictions or other discriminatory measures. Furthermore, the measures applied to the investment and operation of CDM projects should be governed by the rules of GATS if such projects are deemed as services. Facing the above challenges, China should take countermeasures from the following four aspects: (1) to make full use of WTO rules to protect our country’s interest; (2) to reinforce the legislation on controlling the emission of greenhouse gases; (3) to build carbon emission trading information exchanging platform and cultivate carbon emissions trading market; and (4) to establish carbon emission trading scheme when it is appropriate.Chapter three focuses on the relationship between border tax adjustment measures addressing climate change and WTO.Border tax adjustment measures include two types. One is to apply the same domestic tax to imported products as to like domestic products. The other is the rebate of tax with regard to exported products. Based on the objects of tax, border tax adjustment measures addressing climate change can be divided into two types. One is to apply carbon/energy tax directly to fossil fuels. The other is to apply carbon/energy tax to the imported products based on embodied carbon/energy.1 The former is aimed at the greenhouse gas emission during the consumption of the products, and the latter is aimed at the greenhouse gas emission during the manufacturing process of the products. Since the former is indirect tax applied directly to imported products, it will not violate WTO rules as long as the tax rate applied by the WTO members to imported fossil fuels is not higher than that applied to like domestic fossil fuels, and the tax rate applied to the fossil fuels originating from one WTO member is not higher than that applied to the like fossil fuels originating from any other country. The latter is essentially in conflict with WTO rules, since it creates discrimination among like products. Therefore, WTO members must ensure that such measures meet the requirements of Art.XX of GATT so that they could be justified. If citing paragraph (b) of Art.XX, the WTO member should pay special attention to the requirement of“necessity”. If citing paragraph (g) of Art.XX, the WTO member should pay special attention to the requirements of“relating to……”and“in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption”. Lastly, such measures must meet the requirement of the chapeau of Art.XX, namely, not to constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade.Rebate of carbon/energy tax upon export can also be divided into two types in accordance with the basis. One is rebate of carbon/energy tax upon export of fossil fuels, and the other is rebate of carbon/energy tax applied to the fossil fuels consumed in the production of the exported products. As for the first type, the exemption of exported fossil fuels from carbon/energy taxes, or the rebate of such duties or taxes in an amounts not in excess of those which shall accrue or have accrued, shall not be deemed to be export subsidies. The basis for the second type of carbon/energy tax rebate is the carbon/energy tax applied to the fossil fuels consumed in the production process of the exported products, which belongs to prior-stage cumulative indirect tax on goods or services used in the production of exported products, so the latter part of paragraph (h) of Annex I of SCM shall apply to such a situation. In other words, WTO members could exempt or return the carbon/energy tax applied to the fossil fuels consumed in the production of the exported products, even if the like products sold for domestic consumption can not enjoy such treatment. Of course, the amounts of exemption or rebate of carbon/energy taxes shall not exceed those which shall accrue or have accrued.As a big exporting country of energy-intensive products, China will undoubtedly suffer serious impact from border tax adjustment measures addressing climate change. Therefore, China should take countermeasures from the following aspects: (1) to adjust and optimize the energy sources, and improve energy efficiency ; (2) to adjust and optimize the pattern of export, and restrict the export of energy-intensive, pollution-intensive, and resources-intensive products; (3) to green the tax system, and reinforce the resource protection function of tax; (4) to reinforce the research of related WTO rules, and make full use of the WTO dispute settlement system.Chapter four considers the relationship between product carbon labeling and WTO. Product carbon label is a kind of environmental label which reveals the carbon footprint of certain products. Product carbon labeling can be divided into two types in accordance with the institution in charge of it. One is conducted by government, and the other is conducted by non-governmental bodies. Product carbon labeling conducted by government can be further divided into enforceable carbon labeling and voluntary carbon labeling. As compared with other kinds of product labels, product carbon label is prominent in revealing the production and process method which is not related to the product’s characteristics.Product carbon labeling is mainly relevant to GATT and TBT. According to the general interpretative note to Annex 1A, the provision of TBT shall prevail in the event of conflict between a provision of the GATT and a provision of TBT. Enforceable carbon labeling conducted by government and related to consumption of products falls within the scope of TBT. The obligations for WTO members stipulated by TBT include: (1) most-favored-nation treatment and national treatment; (2) not to be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective; (3) to use relevant international standards as the basis for drafting technical regulations; and (4) the obligations related to transparency such as notice and consultation.Voluntary carbon labeling conducted by government and related to consumption of products also falls within the scope of TBT. The obligations for WTO members are provided by Art. IV and Annex III of TBT. The obligations for WTO members stipulated by GATT are mainly national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment. As for the product carbon labeling conducted by non-governmental bodies, WTO members also shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to them to ensure that non-governmental bodies comply with the code of good practice in Annex III to TBT. If the non-governmental bodies are controlled by the government in practice, and dependent on the government to a great extent, the product carbon labeling conducted by such non-governmental bodies shall be deemed to be actions of government. If such non-governmental bodies violate the obligations of national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment of GATT, the government shall assume the legal responsibilities accordingly.Currently, many scholars abroad suggest using product carbon labeling to urge China to adopt measures to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases. Accordingly, China should take countermeasures from the following aspects: (1) to promote the product carbon labeling domestically; (2) to seek mutual acknowledgement of product carbon labels with other countries or districts; (3) to take part in WTO negotiations on relevant issues initiatively so as to facilitate the formation of rules in favor of China.Chapter five analyzes the relationship between climate change subsidy and WTO rules. The adverse effect of climate change subsidy on trade is that the subsidy reduces the cost of domestically produced products so it impairs the market access chances of like products from other countries which do not provide such subsidies. Climate change subsidy can be divided into two types in accordance with the purpose. The first type is really aimed to address climate change, but its effect leads to discrimination towards producers abroad. Such kind of subsidies should be allowed to be used to a certain extent. The second type may have no real impact on climate change, but the result of domestic industry rent seeking. Such kind of subsidies should be prevented and prohibited by multilateral trade rules. However, many subsidies really aimed to address climate change may be classified as prohibited subsidies or actionable subsidies in accordance with the current subsidies rules, so this will limit the freedom of WTO members to adopt legitimate climate change subsidies. Therefore, it is necessary to reform existing WTO subsidies rules in order to provide adequate scope for legitimate subsidies. Currently, the feasible approach is to supplement subsidies rules with an explicit environmental exception along the lines of Article XX of GATT. Due to scientific uncertainties and interception of politics, it is difficult to draw a clear line between legitimate subsidies and protectionist subsidies. Thus, it requires that WTO panels and Appellate Body examine both the substantive context for and the process leading to the choice of the subsidy. Another point deserving attention is that the action of maintaining lax regulations on climate change shall not be deemed as a subsidy in accordance with existing WTO rules. Other WTO members are not empowered to take countervailing measures towards products originating from such countries. China should firmly hold the stance of not bearing enforceable obligations of reducing emission of greenhouse gases. Furthermore, China should firmly oppose to broaden the definition of subsidy so as to embrace the action of maintaining lax regulations on climate change.The last part identifies the main conclusions of the article.更多还原