【作者】 底偃鹏；

【导师】 王韬；

【作者基本信息】 华中科技大学 ， 企业管理， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 1980年代开始,发展中国家普遍对原有的集权财政体制进行了分权改革,以此来提高公共服务效率,促进经济增长。发展中国家的这种转变使得人们开始关注财政分权问题,已有的文献研究了财政分权对经济增长、政府治理以及环境保护等各方面的影响,然而,关于财政分权对减贫的影响却缺乏研究。贫困是发展中国家面临的一个重要问题,财政分权在促进经济增长的同时是否有利于减贫,财政分权对政府减贫工作又有哪些影响?本文据此研究了发展中国家财政分权对减贫的作用机制,并根据中国和印度的财政分权实践与减贫状况进行了实证研究。首先,研究了财政分权通过经济增长对减贫的间接作用机制,认为发展中国家的财政分权虽然促进了经济增长,但同时也加剧了地区间经济发展的不平衡；另一方面,经济增长速度的提高有利于减贫,但是收入分配不均的经济增长性质又会对减贫产生不利影响。因此,财政分权通过上述经济增长速度和经济增长性质会对减贫产生两种相反作用,实际中就需要进行权衡。一般当贫困程度较高而贫富差距较小时,财政分权提高经济增长速度对减贫的有利影响处于主导地位,反之亦然。其次,从财政收入和财政支出两个角度研究了分权制度安排对减贫的直接作用机制,认为发展中国家普遍的“财政收入集权、财政支出分权”的部分财政分权模式更有利于减贫政策的实施。其一,中央政府的财政收入集权保证了贫困地区足够的减贫资金,其二,地方政府的分权减贫支出保证了减贫资金的使用效率。中国1994年分税制改革前后的财政分权实践可以划分为完全财政分权和部分财政分权两个时期,实证研究表明部分财政分权的减贫效应优于完全财政分权。然后,在部分财政分权基础上,研究了发展中国家任命制和选举制下地方政府的减贫行为和减贫瞄准机制。由于不同制度下监督约束和激励机制的不同,模型分析表明,任命制下的地方政府容易产生“代理问题”和转移减贫资金的行为,而选举制下的地方政府容易被富人利益集团俘获,使减贫服务向有利于富人的方面倾斜,这两种情况都会扭曲减贫政策的瞄准机制。研究表明,任命制下的大规模减贫瞄准效果较好,而选举制下的小规模减贫针对性较强。最后,本文在上述研究基础上实证分析了中国和印度财政分权的减贫绩效。结果表明,中印的部分财政分权模式都通过经济增长对减贫产生了积极影响,但是从地方政府的减贫行为来看,中国任命制下地方政府的减贫工作是显著有效的,表明中央政府的监督机制较强；而印度选举制下地方政府的减贫工作不显著,说明地方政府俘获现象较严重。据此,不仅了解了中印财政分权对减贫的影响,也为其他发展中国家分权减贫政策的实施提供了借鉴。更多还原

【Abstract】 Since 1980s, fiscal decentralization has been becoming more and more popular in developing countries. It is used for improving the efficiency of public services and promoting economic growth. The transition of developing countries makes the people began to focus on fiscal decentralization. They have studied the effect of fiscal decentralization on economic growth, government governance, and environmental protection etc. But the effect of fiscal decentralization on antipoverty has not been studied. Antipoverty is an important task of developing countries. Fiscal decentralization promotes economic growth, whether it is conducive to antipoverty? Whether it has other effect on antipoverty? The dissertation studies action mechanism of fiscal decentralization on antipoverty in developing countries on the basis, and does an empirical study by fiscal decentralization practice and poverty status in China and India.First, the dissertation studies indirect action mechanism of fiscal decentralization on antipoverty through economic growth. It argues that fiscal decentralization promotes economic growth but exacerbates the imbalance in regional economic development meanwhile. On the other hand, the increase of economic growth rate is conducive to antipoverty, but the character of imbalanced income distribution will have negative impact on antipoverty. Thus, fiscal decentralization will have two opposite effects on antipoverty, so it needs tradeoff in practice. When the level of poverty is higher and the gap between rich and poor is smaller, fiscal decentralization is conducive to antipoverty through promoting economic growth, and vice versa.Second, the dissertation studies direct action mechanism of fiscal decentralization on antipoverty through institutional arrangement from fiscal revenue and expenditure. Theoretical study shows that partial fiscal decentralization (fiscal revenue centralization and fiscal expenditure decentralization) in developing countries is conducive to implementation of governments’ antipoverty policies. Because on the one hand, fiscal revenue centralization of central government ensures adequate antipoverty funds for poor areas, and on the other hand, fiscal expenditure decentralization of local governments ensures efficiency of antipoverty funds. After reforming and opening, the practice of China’s fiscal decentralization can be divided into full fiscal decentralization and partial fiscal decentralization two periods by tax reform in 1994. By empirical study comparing antipoverty performance of two periods, partial fiscal decentralization is better.Third, on the base of partial fiscal decentralization, the dissertation studies behavior of local governments in antipoverty program delivery and targeting of antipoverty program in appointment system and election system. Due to different systems, the supervision and incentive of local governments are different. Local governments in appointment system are prone to take place "Agency problem" and transferring antipoverty funds behavior. While local governments in election system are prone to been captured by the rich and makes the antipoverty program delivery incline to the rich. Both the two situations can distort the targeting of antipoverty program. The study shows that the targeting of large-scale antipoverty program in appointment system is better and small-scale antipoverty program for election system.Finally, the dissertation studies the effect of fiscal decentralization on antipoverty in China and India by empirical study on the base of above-mentioned analysis. The partial fiscal decentralization in China and India both have positive impact on antipoverty through economic growth. But the efficiency of local governments’ antipoverty program delivery is different. Local governments in appointment system in China promote antipoverty, while local governments in election system in India have not significant effect. It illuminates the supervision of central government to local governments is effective in China, but the capture to local governments by rich is serious in India. Hereby, the conclusion not only explains the effect of fiscal decentralization on antipoverty in China and India, but also provides experience for other developing countries.更多还原