【作者】 刘红梅；

【导师】 刘海云；

【作者基本信息】 华中科技大学 ， 西方经济学， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 20世纪90年代以来,随着关税与贸易总协定/世界贸易组织对关税和非关税壁垒使用的成功削减和限制,以提升技术水平、维护消费者利益为由的技术性贸易壁垒成为世界各国特别是发达国家保护本国产品和产业的最主要手段,对国际贸易和世界经济特别是发展中国家的经济产生了深远的影响。传统的国际贸易理论和新贸易理论都无法为技术性贸易壁垒贸易保护的一面提供有力的理论依据。如何解释技术性贸易壁垒形成动因,贸易的政治经济学为其提供了更具解释力的研究视角。本文首先对现有文献进行了回顾,对技术性贸易壁垒问题的研究主要集中在对技术性贸易壁垒的测度、经济学角度解释技术性贸易壁垒的形成机制以及技术性贸易壁垒产生的影响三个方面,贸易的政治经济学文献也提出了大量的理论和实证模型,但极少有把技术性贸易壁垒作为一种贸易保护措施从政治经济学的角度进行分析。这为本文的研究提供了方法。为了确定制度市场上技术性贸易壁垒如何产生,本文首先运用公共选择理论进行分析,得出技术性贸易壁垒的形成过程是不同利益集团和政府部门在权力资源基础上的利益表达和政策选择的结果。对政策的选择是在利益冲突条件下的博弈过程,即政府与利益集团、利益集团与利益集团之间的政治交易过程。由于“政治市场”存在特有的不对等,技术性贸易壁垒的性质倾向于贸易保护的一面。然后运用博弈理论,分析了技术性贸易壁垒决策的国内传动机制和国际博弈过程。对于国内利益集团的保护需求,没有负外部性时政府是否进行保护取决于政府关注利益集团利益的权数；有负外部性时政府会倾向于进行保护,设置更高的技术性贸易壁垒。当存在他国报复的可能性时,政府将设置更低的技术性贸易壁垒。而在关税或补贴的使用减少时,在垄断市场下政府倾向于设置更高的技术性贸易壁垒；在双寡头市场下,仅当政府赋予关税收入相当大权数时或当标准减少单位外部性的边际效应很大时,关税或补贴下降将使得政府设置更高的技术性贸易壁垒。其他情形下,关税和补贴下降时政府最优的选择是设置更低的技术性贸易壁垒。在国家之间的博弈中,一国将会有较强的动机设置较高的技术性贸易壁垒,但由于不能预知他国是否采取报复措施,又会采取相对谨慎的态度最后形成一种均衡。同时,一国是否报复取决于外国技术性贸易壁垒贸易保护的程度。在理论分析的基础上,为了检验利益集团对政府技术性贸易壁垒决策的影响力,.本文采用了“利益集团”和“国家利益”特征指标分别对美国和中国技术性贸易壁垒频数进行了回归。结果显示,当美国国内利益集团的利益诉求与政府的基本目标相一致时,其利益诉求就能在美国技术性贸易壁垒政策的制订中得到一定程度的反映,相反则不能；而中国技术性贸易壁垒决策是政府最大化国家利益的结果,表明中国缺少有组织的利益集团,另外中国技术性贸易壁垒与关税在统计上显示为互补的关系。此外,本文通过中美之间技术性贸易壁垒摩擦的案例来验证分析国家之间设置技术性贸易壁垒的博弈,结果显示两国没有持续斗争下去而是选择了合作的方式。最后得出本文的主要结论并从政治经济学角度提出中国应对和应用技术性贸易壁垒之策。更多还原

【Abstract】 Since the 1990s, with the sucessful reductions and limitation of customs duties and nontariff barriers by GATT/WTO, the technical barriers to trade(TBT), which is used to promote technique level and maintain the consumer’s benefits, has been the most important means to protect domestic products and industries by various countries, especially by the developed countries. And TBT has and will have profound influence on the international trade and the world economy, particularly on the economy of developing countries. Traditional theories of international trade and the new trade theory cannot provide strong theoretical basis for trade protectionism side of TBT. As for how to explain the formation of TBT, the political economy of trade provides a more explainable perspective.The dissertation first review the existing literature. Research on TBT is concentrated at three aspects:measurement of TBT, the economic explanation for the formation mechanism and the effects of TBT. The literature of political economy on trade put forward a lot of theories and empirical models, but few analyzes the TBT as a protective measure from the perspective of political economy. The review of literature provides approaches to the research in the dissertation.Public choice theory is used to analyze the formation of TBT in the policy market, the formation process of TBT is the result of interest expression and policy choices made by different interest groups and the government. Policy choice is a game under the interest conflicts. It’s a political process between the government and interest groups, and among interest groups. Because of the asymmetry in "politics market ", the nature of TBT inclines to trade protection. Then game theory is used to analyze the national transmission mechanisms and the international game process of decision-making on TBT. When there is no negative externality, whether the protection is provided depends on the weight of considering the benefit of domestic interest groups given by the government. When there is negative externality the government tends to provide protection by setting a higher TBT. And the government will set a lower TBT when there are possibilities of revenge from other countries. To explore the impact of tariffs or subsidies reductions on TBT setting, we conculde as following:In monopoly market, reducing tariffs of subsidies creat incentives for the government to raise TBT. In duopoly market, only if the government cares mainly about the tariff revenue or the TBT’s marginal impact on the per unit externality is large, will it raise TBT following tariffs or subsidies reductions. And in other cases,the government’s optimal response to tariffs or subsidies cuts will be to lower TBT. A country has stronger motivation to set higher TBT in the game among countries. But the country will take more cautious attitude because it doesn’t know whether the other country takes retaliatory measures or not. Then the eventual equilibrium is emerged.In order to test the interest group’s effects to the decision-making of TBT by the government, the paper takes a regressive analysis to the characteristics indicators of the "interest group" and "state interest" on the TBT frequency of America and China respectively. The result shows that when the appealed interest of interest groups is in accordance with the government’s basic aim its interest will be embodied in TBT policy decision-making in USA,. On the contrary, it will not be so. The result shows there is a lack of the well organized interest groups in China. Using a case of TBT frictions between China and USA, this article analysiszes the game of setting TBT between countries. The result shows that the two countries choose the way of cooperation but not continued fighting. Finally this dissertation summarizes the conclusions in all the chapters and points out what will be the solution and choice of China’s TBT policy.更多还原