【作者】 李静；

【导师】 张宗成； 田新时；

【作者基本信息】 华中科技大学 ， 数量经济学， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 20世纪60年代以来,全球金融市场的一个突出表现就是机构投资者的迅速发展,特别是英美等国家机构投资者所掌控的资本占GDP的比重逐年增加。机构投资者的壮大,彻底改变了公司股权结构,形成了公司治理中的一股重要的力量,即机构投资者成为了监督上市公司的中坚力量。中国股票市场的发展更容易沿袭英美(AS)模式。中国股票市场05年启动的股权分置改革从根本上使上市公司大小股东利益趋同,优化了公司治理结构,为中国股市稳定健康发展奠定了良好的基础。股权分置这一特殊的制度设计即将成为历史,股票“全流通”也将随之成为现实。未来由谁来监督上市公司,成了世人关注的中心。1999年中国管理层提出“超常规发展机构投资者”的决断,目的和初衷也正在于此：希望中国的机构投资者也能像美国等发达国家的机构投资者一样,发挥其稳定股票市场监督上市公司的作用。在新的环境和背景下,机构投资者是否能够担负起监督上市公司的重任?本文通过对上市公司2003-2007五年之间的非平衡面板数据进行研究,发现机构投资者偏好投资公司治理质量优良的公司,企业盈利水平较高的公司。我们第四章的数理模型显示,在考虑机构投资者的监督成本以及公司“内部人”道德风险的前提下,公司高管人员持股比例越大的公司越容易得到机构投资者的青睐,我们的样本数据实证检验的结果支持了该模型的结论；在考察机构投资者是否偏好持有易于操纵的小盘股进行投机时,研究结论显示,他们偏好的是大盘股而非小盘股。因此我们对机构投资者的持股偏好进行研究的结论是：中国的机构投资者在选择股票时,是预备进行“主动式”监督长期投资的,他们并非只想通过“坐庄”和“炒作”来谋求短期利益。我们还发现,上一期的机构投资者持股比例,能明显影响到公司当期的公司治理水平,对公司治理水平的提升有正面作用。我们也发现,机构持股后,通过“主动式”监督提升上市公司的治理水平从而提升了公司的盈利水平。研究结果显示,上期的机构持股比例与资产收益率ROA正相关,说明由于机构投资者的介入,提升了上市公司的治理水平从而使得上市公司的盈利水平得以提高。实证研究还发现滞后期机构持股比例与当期反映市场价值的变量Q之间存在显著的正相关关系,说明由于机构持股介入上市公司治理之后,公司在二级市场的表现得到了提高。这是因为公司被机构持股之后,机构投资者积极介入公司治理,提升了上市公司的治理质量从而使公司获得了较高的市场认可度。所以我们断言机构投资者通过参与公司治理提升公司治理水平从而提高公司的市场价值。接下来,本文对机构投资者中最有代表性的一类机构——“证券投资基金”进行了重点研究。研究方法与研究机构投资者的方法类似,且实证结论也与研究机构投资者的结论基本一致。即我们通过对基金的持股偏好的研究发现,中国的证券投资基金在选择股票时是“预备”进行长期投资的“主动式”监督,他们并非只想通过“坐庄”和“炒作”来谋求短期利益,这种在基金业发展初期所出现的情况,并非我们当前市场中的主流模式。研究还发现基金持股有利于上市公司治理水平提升；基金通过参与公司治理提升公司治理水平从而改善公司的业绩水平；基金通过参与公司治理提升公司治理水平从而提高公司的市场价值。本文最后针对中国上市公司中普遍存在的控股股东侵害行为,将机构投资者纳入分析的框架,考察机构投资者是否在参与公司治理的过程中监督了上市公司的控股股东,减少“掏空”行为的发生。无论是t检验还是最小二乘法的实证结果都显示,机构投资者持股越多的公司,其控股股东私有收益规模越小。所以我们认为：机构投资者持股,减少了上司公司控股股东私有收益规模,说明机构投资者在参与上市公司治理的过程中是进行了“主动式”监督的,但监督的力度和效果还不够,还需进一步加强。更多还原

【Abstract】 Since the 60s of the 20th century, the global financial market which is reflected in a rapid development of institutional investors, particularly institutional investors of Anglo-American countries control of the capital-GDP ratio increased year by year. The growth of institutional investors completely changed the shareholding structure, becoming an important power of corporate governance, that is, institutional investors became the backbone of supervision of listed companies. China’s stock markets more easily follow the Anglo-American (AS) mode. China’s stock market in 2005 to start Split Share Structure Reform of listed companies Fundamental make the interests of all shareholders of listed companies convergence, optimizing the corporate governance structure, and laid a good foundation for stable and healthy development of China’s stock market. Split Share Structure, this particular design of the system, will soon become history, all share of the listed company becoming tradable will subsequently become a reality.In the future who will supervise the listed company become the center of world attention. In 1999, China’s administration put forward the decision of "extraordinary development of institutional investors" aiming at this purpose:we hope that China’s institutional investors also like the United States and other developed countries, to stabilize the stock market and become a good supervisor. In the new environment institutional investors are able to assume oversight responsibilities of listed companies?Based on the unbalanced panel data study of listed companies between 2003-2007, we found that institutional investors prefer to invest higher quality of corporate governance and higher earning capacity of listed companies. The model in chapter four shows considering the cost of supervision of institutional investors and corporate "insiders" moral hazard the Senior management of the company holding the larger proportion of the shares the more easy to get institutional investors favor, the results of our empirical study support the conclusion of the model. We also study whether the institutional investors prefer to invest small capitalization stocks which easily manipulated to speculate, and we found that they preferred the large capitalization stocks than small ones. Therefore summary we draw a conclusion about the above study of the preference of sharesholding of institutional investors that China’s institutional investors in choosing stocks, is ready to "active" monitoring listed company and prepare long-term investment, they are not only wish to "dominate" and "speculation" to seek short-term interests.We also found that the variable lag-instratio (lag proportion of institutional ownership) can significantly affect the company’s current corporate governance quality, and it has a positive effect on improving corporate governance quality. We also found that by "active" supervision institutional investors can enhance the corporate governance quality of listed companies so as to enhance the company’s profitability. The results showed that the variable lag-instratio and return on assets (ROA) positively correlated, indicating the involvement of institutional investors can improve the corporate governance quality of listed companies so as to enhance the company’s profitability. Empirical study also found the variable lag-insratio and the variable Q which response to the market value of listed companies have a significant positive correlation, indicating involvement as shareholders can improve the corporate governance quality of listed companies so as to make the company’s performance in the secondary market to be enhanced. Therefore, we assert that institutional investors participate in corporate governance by enhancing the level of corporate governance to enhance company’s market value.Next, this paper focus on the most representative kinds of institutions of institutional investors-"Securities Investment Fund". The research methods and empirical findings are similar to the study of the institutional investors. By studing the preference shares of the Fund we found that China’s securities investment funds is ready to "active" monitoring listed company and prepare for long-term investment, and they are not only wish to "dominate" and "speculation" to seek short-term interests. What has happened in the early stage of the development of Fund industry is not the mainstream model in current market.Finally, for the widespread violations by controlling shareholder in China’s listed companies, institutional investors will be included in the analysis framework in order to investigating whether institutional investors supervise the controlling shareholders of listed companies while the participating in corporate governance and reduce the "hollowing out" behavior. Either T test or Ordinary Least Square empirical results shows that the more share hold by institutional investors, the smaller scale of Private Benefits of Control. So we draw the conclusion that:the scale of Private Benefits of Controle is reduced by institutional shareholding, that means institutional investors is the "active" monitor while participating in corporate governance, but the strength and effectiveness of supervision is not enough and need to be further strengthened.更多还原