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大学组织变革中的博弈分析

Game Analysis in the University Organization Change Interest, Choice and Equilibrium

【作者】 张红峰

【导师】 谢安邦;

【作者基本信息】 华东师范大学 , 高等教育学, 2010, 博士

【副题名】利益、选择与均衡

【摘要】 大学组织作为一个复杂、多维的系统在知识的传承、创造和应用活动中越来越具有不确定性、模糊性等特征。古典组织模型在构建完美结构形式的同时,往往将人或者群体当作分离的、甚至孤立的对象,从而导致关系型思维的缺失。本研究从方法论意义上的利益“关系”切入,运用博弈的理论和分析范式,沿着价值、结构、权力政治三个视角中的动态路径,对大学组织变革中的博弈现象进行深入的解读。充分把握价值选择层面、组织内部各利益实体、利益相关者之间所采取的策略选择,利用理论推演或模型分析求得博弈的均衡所在,并在期望“纳什均衡”的引导下,调整各利益主体的行为策略和行动规则,从而为重构大学组织秩序形成思路,也开拓了用博弈理论研究大学组织的崭新领域。大学组织中利益的生成与表达存在着不确定性、被导向性、比较性以及互动性等特征要素,大学组织的特殊性决定了利益本身存在着“超越经济理性”的一面。大学组织的利益结构中既有着冲突性和一致性特征,还表现为不同得益之间的共存,所以用博弈论分析大学组织变革中的问题,需要从利益关系、主体策略选择以及均衡出发,形成完整的博弈分析范式。博弈理论思维下的大学组织是需要从多个视角进行解读的。在价值视角中,围绕着大学组织的价值关系始终处在一种矛盾的状态下,而其中历史和文化是大学组织价值选择过程形成博弈“聚点”时赖以说明选择行为动机的一种方式。虽然在历史进程中大学组织体现出“依附”的价值倾向,但是这一倾向必须建立在对学术内涵最大的包容和尊重上、必须要能体现出大学学术人员“心灵的良知”;组织发展中追求卓越的真实内涵应该是建立在对长远公平基础之上的卓越,管理文化中的效率思想也应是对自由和创造性探索充分思考以后的价值选择。大学组织需要对传统的理性观点作重新的思考,在结构视角中,工作权利的分配随着大学组织底层厚重的特质变得更加值得探讨。权利下放是代理成本和信息成本之间的权衡,同时权利转移的博弈数学模型分析应以基层院系“努力”作为一个协调期望策略,通过模型的数学求解洞察博弈的过程与根源所在。在结构视角的协作环节,论文还分析了院系之间围绕资源配置的“囚徒困境”博弈以及围绕“优异经验学习”的主题构成有限理性的进化博弈,通过协调博弈矩阵和构造动态微分方程,揭示了学科组织学习中的困境;论文也指出科际联合的矩阵结构中许多学术利益和资源利益冲突的成因。组织政治中的利益是分析任何组织情境政治维度的出发点,通过组织中的身份来表达,而权力则是组织政治中的一个工具性维度。从对大学组织中权力的语义辨析中,认为当前权力研究话语的批判者借助于自我建构的权力体系试图充实、完善大学组织中的权力理论,但消解以后的重构依然是建立在语义不清的基础之上,所以提出以问题为导向,“主语”式的大学组织权力所形成的结构。权力的体现与联盟的形式密切相关,通过对大学教授评议会中夏普利值的测定,看出联盟投票权分配方式导致了参与式民主和授权的幻觉。从大学组织中的各种谈判现象可以发现,无论是价值创造还是价值索取,都可以通过类似于“标杆”或者“可信承诺”的策略,找到彼与此之间的解决办法。论文最后通过个案——P学院组织变革实践中的博弈现象分析,揭示了三个视角之间有着割舍不断的联系,并且在自然情境下验证了前面所阐述的理论分析。用博弈论对大学组织变革中的诸多问题进行求解,可以通过:第一,期望均衡下博弈聚点的不断调整;第二,遵循制度化的回应以及合作理性走出“困境”;第三,亦“此”亦“彼”,利用大学组织变革中协调策略找出彼与此之间相互的关联。最后依据博弈的机理构建一个合乎逻辑的大学组织秩序。

【Abstract】 University organization as a complicated, multidimensional system seems to be uncertain and blurry in knowledge’s original objectives of transmission, creativity and application. A classical organizational model at the same time of framing a perfect structure models, will easily treat an individual or a group as a separated or even an isolated object that cause to a lack of relational thinking eventually. This study is cutting-in from interests "relationship" of methodology angle, using the game theory and game analysis pattern, through three dynamic perspectives of value, structure, power and politics to further study on the game phenomenon during University organization change. To firmly grasp the strategy choices of value, each relevant interest entity and stakeholders within the university organization, and to obtain a final equilibrium of the game by pushing hard the theory performing or model analysis. And to adjust the behaviour strategy and action rule of each interest party under the guideline of expected "Nash Equilibrium", to form a thinking in order to reframe the orders of University Organization and also to open up a new field in which game theory will be used for University organization study.The appearance and expression of interests in University Organization still contains essential elements including uncertain, be oriented, comparative and interactive. The specific characteristics of University Organization have already determined the interests itself as of "over economic rationality". In the interests structure of University organization not only contains both features of conflict and consistence, also performs to be coexisting of different payoffs. Therefore, to use game theory as a tool to analyze the problem that comes from University organization change, must to start from relationship of interests, strategy adoptions of the parties and the equilibrium as well, in order to form a perfect analysis pattern of game theory.The university organizations which are under the game theory thinking have to be interpreted via different perspectives. In the value perspective, the value relations in around the university organization will always be in the status of conflict, in which the history and culture will be a method to be used to explain the motivation of selection. This selection occurs when a "Focal Points" of a game is formed in the process of value selection of the university organization. In a historical process, although the value trend of "to attach" has been shown from university organization, this trend must be built up based on the level that will be at the most tolerance and respectful to the academic content. And also need to reflect the "conscience of the mind" of the academic staff of the university. To chase an excellent trustable content during organization development, it must be built up on a long lasting fair basis, an efficient thinking is also a value selection after a detail consideration to the freedom and creativity in the management culture.University organization should rethink the traditional rationality viewpoint. From the structural perspective, it is worth to discuss the distribution of the rights at work since the bottom level of university organization becomes important. Delegation is the balance between agency costs and information costs, at the same time, the game model analysis of rights transfer should use the "hard-working" aspect of colleges and departments as an expected coordination strategy. Through the model of mathematical solver, it helps to penetrate the process and the source of the game. In the collaboration of structural perspective, the thesis has analyzed the "prisoner’s dilemma" game regarding the resources allocation and the bounded rationality evolutionarily game comprised regarding the theme of "excellent learning experience". Through the coordination games matrix and dynamic differential equations, it reveals the difficult time of subject construction in learning. This thesis also points out the reasons of conflict of many academic interests and resources interests in the matrix structure of interdisciplinary association.The interest in organizational politics is the starting point to analyze the political dimension in the context of any organizations, it is expressed through an identity in the organization, and power is an instrumental dimension in an organizational politics. From the semantics analysis of power in a university organization, it is believed that the present critics on power study discourse try to enrich and perfect the power theory in a university organization with the help of self-construction of power system. Nevertheless "reconstructing" after "dispelling" is still built on the basis of unclear semantics. As a result, questions are put forward to be the orientation, structure formed by "subjective" university organization power. Power incarnate and coalitions form are closely related. Through measuring Shapley Value in the professor council of university, it shows that the allocation of coalitions’voting rights causes illusion of participatory democracy and authorization. It can be discovered from different kinds of negotiation phenomena, regardless of value creation or value request which can go through the strategies like "benchmarking" or "credible commitment", finding ways to solve problems of each other.The thesis is ended up by a case-game analysis of the practice of the P college organization change. It shows a inseparate relation among the three perspectives, moreover, it verifies the above theory analysis under the natural situation. Game theory can be used to solve the problems caused by university organization change.The method of that is:First, continuous adjusting of game "Focal Points" under expected equilibrium; Second, leave "dilemma" through responding adhering the institutionalization and cooperative rationality; Third, both "this" and "that", find out the relation between "this" and "that" by using coordination strategy in a university organization change. At last, build the logical university organization order based on the mechanisms of game.

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