【作者】 张骏；

【导师】 顾功耘；

【作者基本信息】 华东政法大学 ， 经济法学， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 我国正在建设社会主义市场经济,但由于历史和现实的种种原因,市场上存在着各种限制竞争行为,抑制了市场竞争,影响了市场秩序。其中有一种突出的现象就是纵向限制。我国已经出台了《反垄断法》,反垄断执法机构也正在积极拟订规章,但是从现有规范来看,则显得过于原则性,可操作性欠佳,因而规制结果并不乐观。美国作为世界上最早制定反垄断法的国家之一,积累了丰富的反垄断法理论研究与司法实务经验,理应取其精华为我所用,完善我国《反垄断法》的纵向限制规定。本文立足于比较法的视野,主要研究了美国纵向限制的经济学和法学理论,并在此基础上分析了美国纵向限制法律规范的历史演进路径,继而分别阐述了美国的纵向价格限制法律规范及纵向非价格限制法律规范,最后回归到我国《反垄断法》的纵向限制规定及其完善。论文主要从六个方面进行了论述：第一章,美国纵向限制的经济学理论。本文研究了哈佛学派、芝加哥学派及后芝加哥学派的纵向限制观点,分析了其对司法实务的影响。哈佛学派提出了杠杆理论、芝加哥学派阐述了委托—代理和交易成本理论、后芝加哥学派则运用非合作博弈模型来研究各种策略行为。纵向限制竞争效果的经济学解释主要有两种：一种是非效率解释,即纵向限制可以推动零售商卡特尔和制造商卡特尔来反竞争。另一种是效率解释,即通过交易成本、搭便车解释、经销网点假说、质量和时尚的认证假说等理论来说明纵向限制的促进竞争作用。通过对上述问题的研究,本文认为美国的纵向限制经济学理论遵循了效率路径,其中的弊端甚为明显。一方面,它不完善。这种效率路径所力图消除的围绕经销商的关切问题仍将继续出现在各种情况和反垄断以外的法律理论中。另一方面,它也不现实。消费者始终不认为纵向限制会使他们的福利增加。第二章,美国纵向限制反竞争问题的法律理论。本文界定了美国纵向限制的概念及类型,继而研究了解释纵向限制反竞争问题的各种法律理论。首先是解释纵向共谋的高露洁理论、压迫理论及因果关系理论。其次是解释排除竞争者问题的杠杆理论、掠夺性定价理论、提高竞争对手成本理论以及信息不完全理论。基于纵向限制的反竞争效果容易产生判断上的不确定性,所以本文进而研究了美国反垄断法的规制方式,即本身违法规则及合理规则。在这两个规则的适用过程中,又出现了新的变形——非严格本身违法规则和快速合理规则。而在这两个规则的理论研究上,也出现了两分法、三分法、目的分析法及极端举证责任分析法的争鸣。第三章,美国纵向限制法律规范的历史演进路径。本文研究了美国纵向限制的成文法规定：《谢尔曼法》第1条、第2条、《克莱顿法》第3条及《联邦贸易委员会法》第5条。而后,分析了执法部门指南的纵向限制规定,其中典型的有司法部、全美检察长协会的《纵向限制指南》,继而对两者进行了比较。再次,通过里程牌式案例的判决要点串联勾勒了美国纵向限制判例法的基本图景。最后,阐述了美国学界拟议的纵向限制法律规范的综合改革,即引入结构合理规则来规制纵向限制。第四章,美国纵向价格限制的法律规范。首先,论文从《谢尔曼法》第1条着手,通过判例法的发展——基弗—斯特瓦案所揭示的本身违法规则、阿尔布莱特案的本身违法规则到康安案所适用的合理规则全面地展示了最高转售价格的法律规范,并进一步地分析了最高转售价格维持与纵向非价格限制并存的情况。其次,从《谢尔曼法》第1条、第2条以及《克莱顿法》的第3条着手,通过判例法的发展——迈尔斯案所体现出的偶然的本身违法规则、以通用电器案为代表的对代理的利用、以高露洁案为代表的价格协议的证明、丽锦案所适用的合理规则厘清了美国规制转售价格维持、最低转售价格维持的基本脉络,并进而论述了不会被定性为转售价格维持的行为以及纵向价格限制与非价格限制并存时是否本身违法的问题。最后,从《谢尔曼》法第1条规定及合法价格推荐方式的构成要件这两个角度研究了价格推荐制度。第五章,美国纵向非价格限制的法律规范。首先,本文研究了纵向地域和顾客限制。阐述了基本类型,通过怀特汽车公司案、施温案、希尔维尼亚案及希尔维尼亚案后的判决体现了针对这类限制,判例法从本身违法规则进展到合理规则的路径,并比较了纵向地域和顾客限制与其他类型纵向非价格限制的异同,还分析了它们并存时的限制竞争情况。其次,从《谢尔曼法》第1条、《克莱顿法》第3条以及《联邦贸易委员会法》第5条入手,通过美孚石油公司所揭示的数量测试标准和坦帕电器公司所揭示的市场比例测试标准阐述了独家交易对竞争的影响因素,并进一步地比较了独家交易与其他类型的纵向非价格限制以及它们并存时对竞争的限制情况。再次,研究了反垄断法对搭售的评价,通过对搭售要件的分析——两种可分的产品以及搭售协议,搭售的违法性判断——足够的市场支配力、妨碍被搭售品的市场竞争以及作为抗辩的正当商业理由来展示美国对搭售规制的。最后,通过特许经营合同中常包含的排他性交易、地域和顾客限制、营业表征控制、搭售、转售价格维持、竞业禁止等条款来分析美国对特许经营的反垄断法律规范。第六章,我国《反垄断法》的纵向限制规定及其完善。本文首先讨论了《反垄断法》中规制纵向限制的具体条款,主要是14-15条和17-19条。第14-15条规定了纵向垄断协议,本文认为符合我国当前的具体国情,顺应了国际上一般的立法趋势,但是立法模式有缺陷、授权条款不明。第17-19条也有相应条款规制了独家交易和搭售,但是立法缺陷明显,有待完善。而后,探讨了美国纵向限制法律规范对我国转售价格维持、纵向地域和顾客限制、独家交易和搭售所带来的启示。最后,提出针对可行的进一步完善纵向限制规定的方法是由反垄断委员会出台《纵向限制指南》,并阐述了主要内容。更多还原

【Abstract】 China is building a socialist market economy, but due to historical and practical reasons, there are all kinds of anti-competition behavior in the market, which suppressing competition and affecting the market order. Among them, there is a striking phenomenon that is the vertical restraints. China has Promulgated the Anti-Monopoly Law(AML), the AML Enforcement Agencies are also developing regulations, but the existing norm are too principled and lack of practical feasibility, the results of regulation are not optimistic. The United States is one of the first countries to introduce the AML in the world, which have accumulated rich theoretical and practical experience of the AML, so our country should absorb the mature experience of the USA, improving the regulation on the vertical restraints. This article is based on comparative law perspective, studying the economics and the legal theory of vertical restraints in the USA, and then discussing the historical evolution of AML norms and the rule of vertical price restraints and vertical non-price restraints, finally returning back to study our country’s AML. Thesis is discussed from the following six aspects:The first chapter:The United States’Economic Theory of Vertical Restraints. In this paper, the author reviewed three school’s view of vertical restraints, such as Harvard School, Chicago School and Post-Chicago School, and analyzed their practical impact of justice. Harvard School raised lever theory, Chicago School expounded principal-agent theory and transaction cost theory, and Post-Chicago School used a non-cooperative game model to study the behavior of a variety of strategies. Economic analysis of vertical restraints can be broadly divided into two categories:theories stressing the danger of anti-competitive effect, such as retail-level cartels and manufacturers’cartels, on the other hand, and efficiency theories explaining vertical restraints can be used to reduce transaction costs, prevent free-rider, certify quality and fashion and so on. Through on these issues, this paper revealed that in light of the ascendancy of the economic efficiency approach in antitrust, vertical restraint law appeared to be all but dead. But in fact, the economic efficiency approach to vertical restraints is incompletant, which has eliminated from the antitrust calculus all consideration of the various concerns centering on the dealer-fairness issues still continue to surface in a variety of contexts and legal theories outside of antitrust. On the other hand, this approach is failure to comport with reality, consumers do not believe that vertical restraints will enhance their welfare.The second chapter:The United States’Legal Theory On The Issues of Anti-competitive of Vertical Restraints. This paper defined the concept and the kind of vertical restraints in the United States. Then studied a variety of legal theory on issue of anti-competitive of vertical restraints. The Colgate principle, oppression theory and causality theory can be used to explain the vertical collusion. On the other hand, the leverage theory, predatory pricing theory, raising rivalry’s cost theory and incompletant information theory can analyze the issue of excluding competitors. Because of anti-competitive effects of vertical restraints prone to make uncertainty judge, so this paper focused on studying the U.S. antitrust regulatory approach, that is per se rules and rule of reason. In the course of the application of these two rules, there appeared new form, such as non-strict per se rule and truncated rule of reason. In this theoretical research on the two rules, there also have been much debate, such as dichotomy, trichotomy, the purpose of analysis and the extreme burden of proof analysis.The Third Chapter:The Historical Evolution of the U.S. Legal Norms of Vertical Restraints. This paper studied the statute provides applying to vertical restraints, such as the Section 1, Section 2 of the Sherman Act, Section 3 of the Clayton Act and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Then, analyzed the AML Enforcement Angencies’Vertical Restraints Guidelines, which typically were the Ministry of Justice’s Guidelines and the National Association of Attorneys General’s Guidelines. After that, through stressing the most important case of vertical restraints outlined the general picture of the case law. Finally, described the proposed comprehensive reform of vertical restraints law in U.S. academic, introducing the structure rule of reason to regulate vertical restraints.The fourth Chapter:The Vertical Price Restraints Law of the USA. First, this papers studied the statutory provision:1 Section of the Sherman Act, through the development of case law-Kiefer—Stewart Co., v. Sheagram & Calvert Co., Albrecht v. Herald Co., and State Oil v. Kahn, revealing that the per se rule has changed into the rule of reason in the case involved maximum resale price maintenance, and further analyzed the situation when there were both maximum resale price maintenance and vertical non-price restraints. Secondly, studied the Section 1, Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 3 of the Clayton Act, though the development of case law-Dr. Miles Medicine Company, Petitioner, v. John D. Park & Sons Company., U. S v. General Electric Co., United States v. Colgate & Co., and Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., dba Kay’s Kloset…Kay’s Shoes…, revealing that there were much antitrust legal essential in the resale price maintenance and minimum resale price maintenance, further analyzed the permissible means to control downstream and wether it was illegal when there were vertical price restraints and vertical non-price restraints. Finally, researched the price recommendation system from two perspectives:Section 1 of the Sherman Act and the lawful price recommended elements.The Fifth Chapter:The Vertical Non-price Restraints Law of the USA. First of all, this paper studied the vertical geographic and customer restraints, describing the type of such restraints, through the development of the case law-White Motor Co. v. United States, United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., and Post-Sylvania case, revealing the per se rule has changed into the rule of reason when the case involved such restraints, and then compared such restraints with the other types of vertical non-price restraints, analyzed the situation when there were both such restraint and the other types of vertical non-price restraints. Second, starting through the statutory law, such as Section 1 of the Sherman Act, Section 3 of the Clayton Act and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, Article 5, through the case law-Standard Oil Co. v. United States and Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co revealing the important factors of anti-competitive effect of exclusive dealing, and further comparing exclusive dealing and other types of vertical non-price restraints, analyzing the situation when there were both exclusive dealing and other types of vertical non-price restraints, in sum got the useful experience of regulating exclusive dealing. After that, studied the U.S. antitrust law against tying, through the analysis of elements of tying, which can be divided into two kinds of products and tying agreements and the illegality of tying, which can be described as enough market power, impeding the tying product market competition and the legitimate business reasons as a defense, overall showed the United States tying regulation. Finally, studied the franchise contracts which frequently contained exclusive dealing, geographic and customer restraints, business representation control, tying, resale price maintenance and so on, and then analyzed how the United States antitrust law regulated franchising.The Sixth Chapter:The Provides of the Anti-Monoply Law of China on the Vertical Restraints and Its Improvement. This article first discussed specific provisions regulating vertical restraints, mainly Articles 14-15, and Articles 17-19. Articles 14-15 provided the vertical monopoly agreements, this paper held that they meet the specific conditions of our country and complyed with international legislation on the general trend, but the legislative models were flawed, the license terms was uncertain. Articles 17-19 regulated the exclusive dealing and tying, but the there were apparent defects, which needed to be improved. Then, explored the mature experience of the United States vertical restraints law, which can enlighten our AML At last, suggested the feasible way to improve the regulatory system of vertical restraints is publishing the Vertical Restraints Guidelines by the Anti-Monopoly Committee, and further described its main elements.更多还原