【作者】 谢银玲；

【导师】 丁伟；

【作者基本信息】 华东政法大学 ， 国际法学， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 本文以全球跨境企业对中国内地上市公司的敌意收购为考察对象,以公司自身治理的法理基础为起点,通过世界并购浪潮对现代企业的洗礼、国际组织有关并购的立法和实践分析,以及世界两大法系代表性国家、地区产业政策与经济发展政策的研究与借鉴,试图为现行的中国外资并购相关立法提供进一步完善的建议,以及中国上市公司对外资敌意并购的防御献策,并建立一个更加坚实的法律后盾。本文正文五章,前缀绪论,正文焦点有三:一、发展中国家外资并购之价值分析(第二章第三节);二、现行外资并购法制体系之商榷(第四章第三节);三、完善我国反收购法制之对策(第五章第三节),各章内容概述如次:第一章“上市公司并购防御与治理原则微观分析”彻底揭露上市公司并购中各个公司主要内部机构之间的权利、义务制衡关系,以便从法理上确认管理层并购防御权的正当性。本章以上市公司“所有权”与“经营权”分离的价值为起点,从公司治理角度,较深入地分析并购活动与公司治理的联系,以及上市公司治理原则对反收购的作用,论证上市公司管理层并购防御权之法理基础,并在文中确认:中国上市公司在被收购的过程中,核心管理层──董事会对外来并购防御有法定的防御权,这为上市公司面临敌意收购的防御判断建立了一个更加专业的基础。内容包括第一节“上市公司经营权与所有权分离之价值分析”(经营权与所有权分离相关的治理问题)、第二节“经营权的法理基础”(董事权利与义务论证)以及第三节“上市公司并购防御措施之治理基础”(反收购理论争议之核心及并购防御权之归属)。本章结语:“反收购措施不破公司治理原则”将上市公司董事会的防御决策置于其经营权的本职任务,视反收购措施为经营管理的至高表现。第二章“跨境敌意并购之反收购动因、风险及东道国价值论证”为本文所涉有关经济方面之核心理论,涉及古典优势理论、要素禀赋理论、帕累托效率概念以及国家竞争力钻石模型理论等多种与市场经济追求有效竞争的相关理论,目的是对当代企业跨境并购的缘起有一根本性的掌握。为完全透视企业外部成长的价值及发展中国家的两难性,本章以比较充裕的篇幅从经济及管理学角度论证企业并购的不可避免性及反收购的必要性,阐述了发展中国家在外资的需求以及国家经济安全发展全局的平衡中,应谨慎规范跨国并购的防御规制。内容包括第一节“跨境敌意并购之理论进路”、第二节“反收购措施之风险结构”以及第三节“发展中国家外资并购之价值分析”。从本文的题名“上市公司对外资敌意并购之反收购对策研究──以发展中国家可持续发展为视角”可看出,发展中国家的价值选择将成为本文的根本点,本节将提示本文最终将要传达的:国家对利用外资有怎样的价值选择就会有怎样的经济政策,同时就会有怎样的外资立法(当然包括外资并购立法)。本章结语最终得出:“发展中国家之并购防御法制必慎裁独断”,意指外资政策思虑要审慎、果决,谨防迷失核心价值。第三章“国际跨境并购竞争规制之比较分析”涉及国际间有关并购的法理、实际法规、实务分析,具体依该国或地区并购法制史在两大主要法系之代表性、与中国竞争立法的相关性、亚洲并购竞争法制最先进代表国家、中国社会条件相似性,以及与我国国情紧密性等五个因素为标准,选取美国、德国、欧盟、日本、印度以及我国台湾地区等六个代表性国家及地区作为阐述目标,分析了世界历经几次并购浪潮后,两大法系的几个代表性国家及地区的并购与反收购规制的发展进程及其竞争法制的实践经验,观察在并购活动全球化下,各国家、地区乃至各国际组织的竞争政策与规制之发展概况,何以为中国现行相关制度参照系。内容包括第一节“普通法系国家竞争法制与反收购规制之实践分析”、第二节“大陆法系国家及地区竞争法制与反收购规制之实践分析”、第三节“区域组织竞争规制典范──欧盟”以及第四节“国际组织关于投资竞争规制之现况”。本章的结语“趋同乃现实不必是理想”说明经济全球化后,世界各国外资立法的自然融合现象。第四章“我国上市公司外资倂购法制体系分析”旨在为我国现行倂购与反收购法制概念与体系及其缺漏之总体检。本章为本文研究的“重磅区”,在检阅国际有关竞争法制及外资立法例后,回到中国的现行上市公司并购立法与实践现况。全文涉及我国现行规范并购业务数十部主要法律法规的梳理,以及整体并购系统成长空间的抽象总结,为尽量顾及规范阐释的忠实性,本章行文平铺直述,诌议不讳,期能比较准确地掌握我国现行并购法制的优势与缺点。内容包括第一节“现行并购基本法制”、第二节“外资并购专门法制”以及第三节“现行外资并购法制体系之商榷”。结语题为“今非昔比的价值选择”,从我国现行外资立法的政策与思路,揭示国家坚持走可持续发展道路的价值选择。第五章“再完善我国上市公司反收购法制对策之诌议”作为本文的研究目的及结论,本章试图从我国自成体系的现行并购相关法制中,为上市公司的反收购措施抽离出适法的与无法规支持的,并于当下无法施行的反收购措施分析之中,开辟解决的途径,最终也是最重要的任务是为再完善我国上市公司反收购法制提出对策与修法建议,希望为未来“中国企业并购规范与制度指南”提供建设性的意见。内容包括第一节“现行法制下反收购措施之适用分析”、第二节“现行法制适用反收购措施之瓶颈”以及第三节“完善我国反收购法制之对策”。第五章作为本文的结论,其结语“巨人肩膀的登高望远”也传达了本文的重要精神。英国首相布朗(Gordon Brown)于2009年4月2日在英国伦敦的全球最大经济体G20高峰会议的闭幕新闻发布会称“《华盛顿共识》的时代已经结束”,事实上“华盛顿共识”时代的结束暴露的是一种思维(美国式新自由主义经济观念)在历史长河中因过度消费而导致的能量耗尽。人类理性之所以高贵就在于其“选择性”,理性的动能创造了世界的多样性,欧洲的“社会市场经济”、美国的“自由市场经济”或者中国的“中国特色社会主义市场经济”都是选择项,每个社会都有自己的选择项,将某种价值观强加于所有的对象就是一种“思维的过度消费”,这种傲慢恰恰是反理性的。是以,即使在多元复杂的全球化经济网络,无所谓从一而终的经济发展理论,“永远的宏观微调”是政策不妨碍法制的不二原则。欧洲的“社会市场经济”与美国的“自由市场经济”双方过招,对比的结果,明显可见:政府那只鞭策市场的手,轻重不一,则效果各异。1997年的东南亚经济危机首次见证了极端“自由市场经济”的败笔,2007年美国次贷风波引起的全球金融危机则突显了“社会市场经济”那只宏观的手确实不可偏废。本文将国家宏观调控的“手”视为自由竞争市场的“巨人肩膀”,也将“法制化”的反收购措施视为被收购目标公司的“巨人肩膀”;上市公司反施购措施的法制化,小而言之,是政府保障市场健康发展有关部门对上市公司最具有现实意义的礼献,大而宣之,也是政府对市场自由竞争的理性化支持。我们期待:法律规制成为政府经济计划与政策的真正载体,而法制体系是国家意志抵御社会破坏者的防火墙,更是执法机构与境内外守法个体或组织共同仰望的靠山。经济社会秩序建筑无所谓上层或下层,无论内外资的并购活动,皆应依赖相同的法制系统,法制化规则将使外资对东道国的计划与政策无须比内资更加忧虑,目光只需停留在输入地的法律上,此举必为中国政府对市场施以最少干预的强力体现。更多还原

【Abstract】 This dissertation examines the hostile acquisition of local Chinese public companies by global international enterprises. Its starting point is the legal basis of companies’self-governance. By analysing the challenge to modern companies from the global tide of takeovers and the legislation and practice of international organisations with respect to takeovers, and by investigating and drawing lessons from the property policies and economic development policies of countries and areas representative of the two great systems of law in the world, this study attempts to offer some suggestions for further improvement in the current Chinese laws relating to acquisitions by foreign investors; it also tries to contribute some ideas for countermeasures to be used by Chinese public companies facing the threat of hostile takeover by foreign investors, and seeks out a more solid defence in law.The main text is in 5 chapters preceded by an introduction. The conclusion is presented in the final section of chapter 5, and not in a separate part. The key sections of the main text are three in number: 1) the value analysis of foreign takeovers in developing countries (in chapter 2 section 3); 2) the discussion of China’s current law on foreign acquisitions (in chapter 4 section 3); 3) ways of improving China’s anti-takeover law (in chapter 5 section 3). The contents of each chapter are summarised as follows:Chapter 1,‘Public Companies’Resistance to Takeover and their Principles of Governance– a Microcosmic Analysis’, is a thorough exposition of the balance of rights and duties of the various bodies inside a public company facing takeover. In order to establish a basis in legal principle for the managers’right to resist takeover, the chapter takes as its starting point the value of the distinction between‘ownership rights’and‘operational rights’; from the perspective of company governance it explores deeply the relationship between takeovers and company governance and in particular the effect of public company governance principles on takeover resistance, demonstrating the basis in legal principle of the right to resist takeover of the managers of a public company. The argument establishes that when a Chinese public company is facing a takeover its core managers, the company board, have a legal right to resist an external takeover, and this furnishes a yet more authoritative basis for defensive measures taken by a public company against a hostile bid. There are three sections: section 1‘a value analysis of the distinction between“operational rights”and“ownership rights”in a public company’(some governance issues relating to this distinction); section 2‘the legal basis of“operational rights”’(showing the rights and duties of the Board); section 3‘the governance basis of takeover resistance by public companies’(the central arguments of the theoretical debate on takeover resistance, and the basis of the right to resist). The conclusion of this chapter, that‘anti-takeover measures are not in breach of principles of company governance’, finds that when the Board of a public company resists a takeover, its decision is grounded on the proper exercise of‘operational rights’, and anti-takeover measures can be seen as the highest expression of operational management.Chapter 2,‘On the Motives and Risks of Resistance to Cross-Border Hostile Acquisitions and the Values of the Host Country’. This chapter provides the central theory of the economic aspects of the dissertation. It deals with a number of theories concerned with market economies’pursuit of effective competition, including Classical Competitive AdvantageTheory, Factor Eendowment Ttheory, the concept of Pareto Efficiency, and the Diamond Model of International Competition. The aim is to achieve a basic understanding of what drives modern companies to engage in cross-border acquisitions. In order to attain a complete insight into the value of external growth for companies and the dilemma of developing countries, this chapter gives a comparatively full account, from the perspective of economic and management theory, of why acquisitions are inevitable and why it is necessary to resist them; it sets out why developing countries, balanced between the need for foreign capital and the safe development of their national economy, must be careful in formulating the rules for resisting foreign acquisitions. There are three sections: section 1‘a theoretical approach to cross-border hostile acquisitions’; section 2‘the risk structure of anti-take-over measures’; section 3‘a value analysis of foreign takeovers in developing countries’. It is evident from the title of the dissertation,‘A Study of Anti-Takeover Strategies for Public Companies to Counter Hostile Foreign Acquisitions - from the Perspective of Sustainable Development in Developing Countries’, that the value choices of developing countries are at the heart of this dissertation, and this section will flag what the dissertation finally wishes to communicate: that the value choices countries make about using foreign investment, whatever they are, entail certain economic policies and also certain legislation on foreign investment (naturally including legislation on foreign take-overs). The chapter arrives at the final conclusion that‘for developing countries the law on resisting take-overs must be judicious and forthright’, suggesting that policy thinking on foreign investment must be circumspect but also firm and resolute.Chapter 3,‘A Comparative Analysis of International Competition Rules for Cross-Border Acquisitions’. This chapter addresses legal principles, substantive regulations and real case analyses relating to acquisitions internationally. Six example countries and regions are chosen for description, namely USA, Germany, the EU, Japan, India, and Taiwan, the criteria for their selection being representativeness in the history of national acquisition law of the two main types of legal system, relevance to China’s competition law, representativeness of the most developed acquisition and competition law in Asia, similarity to China’s social conditions, and closeness to the state of the Chinese nation. It investigates how, in the wake of a succession of global waves of acquisitions, acquisition and anti-acquisition rules developed in a number of countries and regions representing the two great systems of law, and it looks into the practice and experience of competition law in these places. The purpose is, within the context of the globalisation of acquisitions, to provide a comparative analysis of the overall development of competition policy and rules in the various countries, regions and indeed international organisations, and to use this as a touchstone for the corresponding system now in force in China. There are four sections: section 1,‘competition law and anti-acquisition rules in common law countries– a practical analysis’; section 2,‘competition law and anti-acquisition rules in continental law countries– a practical analysis’; section 3,‘the EU, an example of competition rules in a regional organisation’; section 4,‘international organisations and their regulations on investment competition– the current state of play’. This chapter concludes that‘convergence in reality is not necessarily ideal’.Chapter 4,‘An Analysis of the Chinese Law on Acquisitions by Foreign Investment’, is a general appraisal of the legal concepts and practices current in China concerning take-overs and resistance to take-overs and the deficiencies of those concepts and practices. This chapter is the turning-point of the study, where after scrutinising international legislation on competition and foreign investment we turn back to the present realities of China’s current legislation and practice on the acquisition of public companies. Altogether we sort through nearly 30 important laws and regulations with which China currently seeks to regulate acquisitions, and draw some general conclusions about the growing space of the whole acquisition system. To ensure that the rules are described as faithfully as possible, the chapter adopts a straightforward descriptive style, with no fear of plainness, in the hope that in this way the pros and cons of China’s current acquisition law can be understood with some degree of accuracy. There are three sections: section 1,‘the basic law on acquisitions now current in China’; section 2,‘China’s law on acquisitions specifically related to foreign investment’; section 3,‘a discussion of China’s current law and practice on foreign acquisitions’. The conclusion is‘new value choices for new times’, China’s current policies and ideas on legislation concerning foreign investment display a value choice in favour of continuing resolutely along the road of sustainable development.Chapter 5,‘Further Improvement of Legal Strategies for Chinese Public Companies when Resisting Takeover– Some Suggestions’. This chapter, being the target towards which the whole study is directed and its conclusion, takes the current law on acquisitions as it has evolved in China and attempts to draw out from the measures available to public companies resisting takeover what is in accordance with the law and what lacks the support of laws and regulations, and through an analysis of anti-takeover measures which are currently unavailable tries to find a way forward towards solutions. The chapter’s final and most important task is to suggest some measures and amendments which would improve further the law on resisting acquisitions for Chinese public companies, in the hope of providing some constructive ideas for a future handbook to the rules and the system of company takeovers in China. There are three sections: section 1,‘a practical analysis of anti-takeover measures under China’s current law’; section 2,‘China’s current law is a bottle-neck in resistance to acquisitions’; section 3,‘some measures to improve China’s anti-takeover law’.Chapter 5 is the conclusion of the whole dissertation and its final words‘standing on the shoulders of giants to see into the distance’express the main spirit of the study. On 2nd April 2009, at the closing press conference of the G20 global economic summit in London, Gordon Brown, the Prime Minister of the UK, said‘The old Washington consensus is over.’In truth what the end of the age of the Washington consensus brought to light was that a certain ideology, American neo-liberal economics, had in the long course of history come to a point of exhaustion brought about by excessive consumption. Human rationality is valued for its power of choice, and the driving force of this rationality has given rise to a world of diversity in which Europe’s social market economy, USA’s free market and China’s socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics are all possible choices. Societies make their own choices, and to force any single set of values on everybody else is indeed a kind of ideological overconsumption. This kind of arrogance is counter-rational if anything is. For this reason, given the pluralism and complexity of the global economic fabric, in any sustainable theory of economic development‘continuous micro adjustment of the macro economy’is an inevitable principle of policy that does not stand in the way of the legal system. The European social market economy and the American free market economy each make their own claims, but a comparison of the two makes it clear that the hand of government as it comes down on the market varies in effectiveness according to the weight of its interventions. The 1997 South East Asia economic crisis showed up for the first time the flaws in free market economics taken to extremes, and the global financial crisis triggered by the sub-prime loan turmoil in the USA demonstrated clearly that the hand of macroeconomic intervention as evidenced in social market economies is by no means to be put to one side. This dissertation sees the‘hand’of national macroeconomic adjustment as the‘shoulders of the giant’which support a free competitive market; it also sees the incorporation into law of measures used to resist take-overs as the‘shoulders of the giant’on which targeted companies can stand; this incorporation into law is at the least the gift of the greatest real significance that can be given to public companies by the government departments responsible for ensuring the healthy growth of the market, and at the most is a more rational way for the government to support free market competition. Our hope is that the law will become the true vehicle for government economic planning and policy, and that the legal system will not only act as a firewall in the country’s resolute defence against the forces of social destruction, but that it will furthermore be the fortress that law-enforcement agencies and law-abiding individuals and organisations all look to as a refuge. The edifice of economic and social order at both high levels and low, and take-over moves made with foreign and domestic capital alike must rely on the same legal system; and the incorporation of regulations into law will ensure that foreign investors need be no more concerned about the plans and policies of the host country than domestic investors are, and need only focus their attention on the laws governing the introduction of foreign capital. Such an act would be the strongest indicator of an intention to keep government intervention in the market to a minimum.更多还原