【作者】 吴晓晖；

【导师】 顾功耘；

【作者基本信息】 华东政法大学 ， 经济法学， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 2008年席卷全球的金融危机向中国的经济发展和经济法律规则提出严峻挑战。首当其冲的便是宏观调控法,尤其是宏观调控决策法。它要求我们必须对“现代民主国家如何通过法律制度的设计来实现宏观调控决策有效性”这个问题做出回答。改革开放以来,我国的宏观调控法制虽有长足发展,但仍然存在着法治化水平不高、经济权利供给需求严重不匹配的症结,现有学术研究成果和实践经验远不足以解决这个难题。系统研究法律调整宏观调控决策,将宏观调控决策纳入法治框架,实现其有效性目标,既是现代民主国家进行宏观经济管理的实践所需,更是我国宏观调控法律理论研究所求。宏观调控决策法律调整缺乏系统研究的现状迫使本文必须对宏观调控决策法律结构和具体法律制度进行全面而崭新的思考。通观全文,笔者沿着明暗两条线索,对宏观调控决策法律进行了三个层面的研究。如何通过法律制度的设计实现宏观调控决策有效性是本文的一条明线索。专业性与民主性的平衡是宏观调控决策法律需要解决的基本矛盾,是本文的一条暗线索。法律调整宏观调控决策的目标应该是什么,这是规范层面上的研究;以目标为导向,吸纳经济学、管理学等关联学科的研究成果,探寻影响目标实现的制约因素,进而构建其法律结构,这是实证层面上的研究;沿着法律结构的线索,研究如何从可能不是最优化的现实制度过渡到一种比较理想的制度,这是工程层面上的研究。第一章宏观调控决策的实质及其对法律调整的影响本章的核心内容是沿着“管理学、经济学——法律”的分析路径,对宏观调控决策的实质进行剖析,进而考察了宏观调控决策是否应当法治化这个基本法律问题。文章提出了“宏观调控决策是宏观调控的核心”,“宏观调控决策主要是财政政策决策和货币政策决策”、“宏观调控决策是程序化决策”、“宏观调控决策是团体决策”和“宏观调控决策是规则性决策”五大命题,从宏观调控决策的法律地位、决策主要内容、决策常规性、决策机制和决策表现形式五个方面对其实质进行诠释,进而得出结论:宏观调控决策就是制定财政政策(法律)和货币政策(法律)的行为或过程,对宏观调控决策的法律调整就是对制定财政政策(法律)和货币政策(法律)行为或过程的规范。以此为基础,文章从决策主体、决策过程、决策内容三方面论证了宏观调控决策法治化的必要性,认为决策主体有限理性和邪恶假设的固有属性、决策过程的复杂性、财政货币政策自身的运行规律及协调需要决定了宏观调控决策法治化的必要性。宏观调控决策是否应当法治化的命题还必须建立在可行性分析基础之上。文章对否定宏观调控(决策)法存在的“法律、政策区分说”进行了反驳,一方面,认为经济波动、宏观调控手段的不确定性存在程度之分,其是否足以导致宏观调控实体法的生存危机,需要具体问题具体分析;另一方面,认为宏观调控(决策)法既是对行政法的一种延续,也是一种断裂。宏观调控(决策)法与行政法原理存在相通性,但也存在特殊性:行政法解决的基本矛盾是行政权与公民权之间的矛盾,其法律制度的设计偏政治性和民主性;宏观调控(决策)法律要解决的基本矛盾是专业性与民主性之间的平衡,其法律制度的设计偏技术性和专业性。最后得出宏观调控决策应当法治化的结论。第二章宏观调控决策的法律结构本章的核心内容是对宏观调控决策法律结构进行构建,这既是对宏观调控决策法律的理论构建,又是全文写作的逻辑线索。文章考察了宏观调控决策法律结构的开放性特征,提出法律实用主义的理念,采用一种点对点、选择性的,重点围绕具体问题的普通法研究思路与宏观调控决策法的研究更具契合性。文章认为,确定宏观调控决策法律结构的依据应该沿循目标导向的功能主义思路,通过确定宏观调控决策法律结构核心要素的方法对其进行构建。借鉴经济学、管理学、政治学关于宏观调控决策有效性的研究成果,并经绩效标准、民主标准和法律技术标准的衡量,文章提出,决策独立性、参与性、透明度和问责性是宏观调控决策法律结构的核心要素。另一方面,文章在考察决策独立性、透明度、参与性、问责性与决策有效性之间的关联时,发现两个规律:其一,决策独立性对决策有效性的促进作用是通过保证决策主体专业决策空间而实现,决策透明度、参与性和问责性对决策有效性的促进作用主要是通过对决策主体专业决策空间的制约而实现;其二,这种正相关性存在于一定范围内,“适度”是法律需要解决的核心问题,其解决途径是通过决策透明、决策参与、决策问责对决策独立的制衡来实现的。因此,法律保障上述正相关关系的核心在于平衡决策专业性与民主性这对基本矛盾,具体表现为平衡决策自主权与知情权、决策自主权与参与权、决策自主权与监督权之间的矛盾。最后,在构建宏观调控决策的法律结构方面,宏观调控决策法律应以解决决策专业性与民主性这个基本矛盾为主线,具体分解为决策自主权与知情权、决策自主权与参与权、决策自主权与监督权三对矛盾,分别由宏观调控决策信息公开法律制度、宏观调控决策参与法律制度和宏观调控决策法律责任加以解决,三大法律制度也相应成为宏观调控决策法律结构的主体部分。第三章宏观调控决策信息公开与法律调整本章的核心内容在于如何通过法律制度的设计保障宏观调控决策信息的适度公开,平衡决策自主权与知情权这对矛盾。文章以信息公开范围、信息公开程序及方式、信息公开的监督为主要内容,对货币政策决策和财政政策决策的信息公开问题进行了具体分析。在货币政策决策信息公开中,文章考察了美、英、欧元区和日本的相关法律,得出如下结论:第一,信息公开范围的确定。应将各国立法规定的共性内容作为我国信息公开的内容;对尚存争议的内容,应结合我国国情,具体问题具体分析。具体到货币政策目标是否应当量化以及决策会议记录是否应当公开两个争议问题,我国量化货币政策目标存在制度障碍——中国人民银行缺乏独立性;且我国货币政策的主要决策机构党中央和国务院决策会议并没有采用合议制,投票结果意义不大,是否能够对其进行公开值得怀疑。因此,应尽快修改《中国人民银行法》,将货币政策委员会由议事咨询机构提升为决策机构,并通过规范的投票表决方式进行决策,将会议记录和表决结果进行公开。第二,信息公开程序及方式。我国应根据信息重要性选择不同效力级的公开方式,发挥例外信息规定与信息发布保密审查机制的相互支撑作用。第三,信息公开监督。我国要充分发挥立法监督、行政监督和司法监督的功能,并在具体法律制度上进行改进。在财政政策决策信息公开中,文章得出如下结论:第一,预算信息公开范围。我国应当在立法上具体规定预算前报告的编制和公开事宜;应保障预算决策信息公开的完整性;为保障预算审批过程的公开,可以通过修改全国人大议事规则,明确规定人大会议以外会议的公开问题;立法应对预算公开的内容进行具体化规定,在预算大类、款的基础上,细化预算科目,设立分项目、分部门的数据并附以必要的说明材料。第二,预算决策信息公开方式。容易理解、及时和准确可靠是选择预算决策信息公开方式的原则;我国预算报告的审议和公开应按照法律的形式和程序进行;法律应规定,一般情况下,预算决策草案应该提前一段时间向人大代表发送,为其审议提供足够的思考判断时间,特殊情况下,可以适当缩短提前时间,对于公众而言,预算决策信息应该与决策过程同步公开。第三,预算决策信息公开的监督。应加强对全国人大的监督和对预算决策信息真实性的监督,增加对预算使用会计政策的规范,法律应规定,各项预、决算及执行报告所采行之会计政策应一致,任何与一般公认会计原则不同的作法,应加以说明,会计政策如有变更需要,其变更与理由应予揭露,并调整前期报告。第四章宏观调控决策参与与法律调整本章的核心内容在于如何通过法律制度的设计保障对宏观调控决策的适度参与,平衡决策自主权与参与权这对矛盾。文章根据决策参与的不同深度,将宏观调控决策参与分为有决策权参与和无决策权参与两种类型,重点阐述了非正式咨询、公开方案供公众评论、公众通知和评论程序、公开听证、顾问机构、投票表决机制六种公众参与形式,并分析了参与形式与参与类型之间的匹配关系,得出结论:“专业性与民主性”之间的力量对比是参与类型和参与形式选择的决定性因素。货币政策决策适宜于前述两种参与类型,投票表决形式、专家论证形式(顾问机构)和非正式咨询形式是其适宜的参与形式,进而文章对投票表决法律制度和专家论证法律制度进行了分析和完善。关于投票表决法律制度,应赋予央行分行一定席位的决策投票权;应优化现有的委员会人员构成,加大分行代表、学术界和实务界代表、减少其他横向经济管理部门的人数或限制其投票权;协调委员会的投票表决机制与行长负责制,不能失去委员会投票多数决的本质特征,法律可以直接规定一人一票,同票同权,最多赋予委员会主席在票数等同时的最后决定权。关于专家论证法律制度的设计,要克服专家论证符号化、空洞化的问题,立法需要规定专家选择的平衡机制,确立专家论证的公开制度,保障专家的决策参与权。财政政策决策的主体——预算决策同样适宜于前述两种参与类型。公开方案供公众评论和公开听证是适合预算决策的参与形式。针对地方政府参与预算编制不足的问题,应建立由各级政府编制主体为组成人员的预算编制委员会,加强中央政府与地方政府的沟通,充实地方政府的预算编制参与权。针对预算听证的立法缺位问题,应在遵循立法听证基本原理的基础上,考虑两点制度设计上的特殊之处:其一,预算对听证的适用要广于其他专业领域的决策问题,在预算编制和审批环节都应当进行预算听证;其二,相对于一般立法听证,预算听证对听证陈述人的广泛性和专业性均有较高要求,法律应该明确规定,预算编制应遵循易懂原则,对听证陈述人进行“内部专业升级”,增添对预算草案的专家解释环节,对听证陈述人进行“外部专业升级”。第五章宏观调控决策的法律责任本章的核心内容在于如何通过法律责任的理解和设置来平衡决策自主权与监督权这对矛盾,以促进宏观调控决策有效性的实现。文章研究了宏观调控决策主体的决策法定义务,决策违法行为的判断和法律责任的追究三大问题,并对货币政策和财政政策决策的特殊法律责任进行了具体分析。文章借鉴公司法上的董事受信义务,将决策法定义务称为“受托义务”,包括宏观调控决策主体应将国家利益置于部门利益、个人利益之上的忠实义务和宏观调控决策主体应当以适当的注意管理宏观经济以免国家宏观经济剧烈波动的注意义务。在决策违法行为的判断上,考虑到违反忠实义务的决策违法行为类型较为固定,可以采用列举加概括式的立法方式加以明确;对违反注意义务的决策违法行为类型,应借鉴发达国家经验,将董事注意义务的判断标准——商业判断规则引入到宏观调控决策领域,称为“专业判断规则”。在宏观调控决策法律责任追究中,违法决策主体承担的法律责任形式主要是经济管理责任,其实质是基于“委托——代理”关系而形成的受托责任,其制裁方式表现为限制或剥夺其宏观调控决策权和纠正、调整其宏观调控决策行为。在法律责任追究机制上,要建立司法审查制度,强化司法追究机制。在货币政策决策法律责任部分,文章主要研究了决策独立性对法律责任追究的影响,得出结论:决策独立性并不排斥法律责任追究的适当性;决策自主权及其法律责任应统一于同一法律;行政机关不能成为货币政策决策法律责任的追究主体;在追究货币政策决策主体法律责任时,应当以故意和重大过失为其主观要件。在财政政策决策法律责任部分,文章认为财政政策决策法律责任的特殊性源于其决策过程的阶段性以及涉及主体的多元性,并结合我国预算决策法律责任立法缺陷,研究了编制环节、审批环节和调整环节的预算决策法律责任,得出结论:编制环节预算决策法律责任的惩罚力度过轻;审批环节,全国人大应当享有预算修改权,立法应规定预算方案未通过的法律责任;追究预算调整法律责任的前提是要对其定义进行科学界定,并对预算调整依据、调整幅度和调整程序进行完善。结论部分,文章再次阐述了专业性与民主性是宏观调控决策法律所解决的基本矛盾的观点,并指出了需要进一步研究的问题。更多还原

【Abstract】 The 2008 Financial Crisis sweeping the globe presents a serious challenge on China’s economic development and economic legal rules. It is the macro-control law, in particular the macro-control decision-making law, which bears the brunt of the challenge. It requires that we must response to the question that "how do modern democratic states achieve the effectiveness of macro-control decision-making through designing of their legal system". Since the reform and opening up, China’s macro-control legal system, despite considerable progress, still remains many problems, which include that the rule of law level is not high, the supply and needs of economic rights are not in balance, the existing academic research results and practical experience are not enough to solve the problem. Systemic study of legal regulation of the macro-control decision-making, incorporating macro-control decision-making into the framework of rule of law to achieve its goal of effectiveness, is not only needed by the practice of macro-economic management of the modern democratic countries, but also required of China’s macro-control legal theory.A lack of a systematic study on legal regulation of macro-control decision-making leads this article to have a comprehensive and innovative thinking on the legal structure of the macro-control decision-making and the specific legal system. In this article, I will study three levels of macro-control decision-making laws along the trail of both light and shade. How to achieve the effectiveness of macro-control decision-making through system design is a light clue of this article. The balance of professionalism and democracy of macro-control decision-making, deserving to be addressed as a fundamental contradiction, is a dark thread of this article. What should be the aim of the legal regulation of macro-control policy? This is a kind of normative research. A goal-oriented research, taking research achieves of economics, management and other related disciplines, exploring the constraints which impacts the achievement of goals, and thus to build its legal structure, which is a positive research. Along the clues of the legal structure, a study, which focuses on transferring an actual system to a more ideal one, is a projective study.ChapterⅠis on the substance of macro-control decision-making and its impacts on the legal regulation. The core contents of this chapter are analysis of the substance of macro-control decision-making, following the analysis path of "management science, economics——law", and then examination of a basic legal issue that if should the rule of law. This paper presents five propositions, which are "macro-control decision-making is the core of macro-control", "macro-control decision-making is mainly fiscal policy and monetary policy decision-making", "macro-control decision is a programmed decision-making", "macro-control decision-making is a corporate decision-making" and "macro-control decision-making is a regulative decision-making". From the legal status of macro-control decision-making, the main content of decision-making, decision-making routine, decision-making mechanisms and decision-making forms, the article interprets five aspects of the substance of macro-control decision-making and then concludes that the macro-control decision-making is the process of making fiscal policy (law) and monetary policy (law), and the legal adjustment of macro-control policy is the formulation of process of making fiscal policy (law) and monetary policy (law).On this basis, the article, from decision-making body, decision-making process, contents of decision-making, demonstrates the need for legalization of macro-control decision-making and holds that the need for legalization is based on the hypothesis of inherent properties of limited rationality and herein evil of a decision-making body, the complexity of decision-making process, the operation rule of fiscal and monetary policy and need for coordination. The proposition that macro-control decision-making should be legalized must also be based on feasibility analysis. The article refutes the theory of "legal, policy distinction", which holds that there are no macro-control laws (policies), and considers that on one hand, there is some difference in terms of degree of economic fluctuations and uncertainty of macro-control means, which remains need to analyze specifically that if these factors sufficiently lead to survival crisis of the substantive macro-control law; that on the other hand, the macro-control (decision-making) law is not only an extension, but also a fracture of the administrative law. Macro-control (decision-making) law and administrative law science have both similarities and peculiarities. Administrative Law resolves the basic contradiction between the executive power and civil rights, and the design of its legal system is decline to political and democratic. The basic contradiction of macro-control (decision-making) law resolves is the balance between professional and democracy, and the design of its legal system pays more attention on technical and professional issues. Finally the conclusion achieves that macro-control decision-making should be legalized.Chapter II is on the legal structure of macro-control decision-making. The core of this chapter is to construct the legal structure of macro-control decision-making, which is not only a theory construction of macro-control decision-making law, but also the logic writing clues of this text. The article examines the openness characteristics of the legal structure of macro-control decision-making and adopts the idea of legal pragmatism that using a train of common law research thought, which includes point-to-point, selective, focusing on specific issues surrounding, fits the study on macro-control law better. According to the article to determine the legal structure of the macro-control decision-making should be based on object-oriented thinking way of Functionalism that constructs legal structure by determining the core elements of them. Drawing on research results of economics, management science, political science on the effectiveness of macro-control decision-making, and measuring by the performance standards, democratic standards and the legal technical standards, the article suggests that the decision-making independence, participation, transparency and accountability are the centre elements of legal structure macro-control decision-making.On the other hand, when studying the association between decision-making independence, transparency, participation, accountability and effectiveness of decision-making, this article found two rules: first, the role in promoting effectiveness of the decision-making by independence of decision-making is achieved through ensuring decision-making body of professional decision-making space; The role in promoting effectiveness of decision-making by transparency, participation and accountability in decision-making is primarily achieved by constraints space of professional decision-making of a decision-making body. Second, this positive correlation was found in a certain range. The "moderate" is a heart issue that law should address, and the resolution is relied on checks and balances between transparence, participation, accountability and decision-making independent. Therefore, the key point of legal protection for the positive correlation above lies in the balance professionalism and democracy of decision-making, manifested in a balanced contradictions of decision-making autonomy and right to information, decision-making autonomy and participation, decision-making autonomy and supervisory powers.Finally, in building the legal structure of the macro-control decision-making, the macro-control decision-making law should be to mainly address a fundamental contradiction between decision-making specialty and democracy, specifically broken down into decision-making autonomy and right to information, decision-making autonomy and participation in decision-making, decision-making autonomy and supervisory powers, respectively resolved by information open system, decision-making participation system and legal liability of macro-control decision-making, which are correspondingly the main body of the legal structure of macro-control decision-making.Chapter III is related to the macro-control decision-making information publicity and legal regulation. The kernel of this chapter is how to protect moderate an openness of macro-control decision-making information through the design of legal regulations, and to balance the power of decision-making autonomy and the right to get information.The chapter discusses the scope of information disclosure, procedures and methods of information disclosure, monitoring means on information disclosure, and conducts a detailed analysis on information disclosure of monetary policy and fiscal policy decision-making.On the monetary policy decision-making information publicity, the article examines relevant laws of the United States, Britain, the euro zone and Japan, and draws the following conclusions. First, determine the scope of information disclosure. The common contents of national legislations should be as the content of China’s information disclosure law; those controversial contents should be combined with China’s national conditions, adopting a concrete analysis on specific issues. There are two contentious issues: if the monetary policy objectives should be quantifiable and if decision-making meeting records should be open to public. In fact, China’s monetary policy quantitative objective has an obstacles——lack of independence of the People’s Bank of China. And the main decision-making body of China’s monetary policy decision-making, Central Committee of CPC and State Council, whose meetings do not adopt collegiate system, which leads to voting results of little significance; and whether they can be opened remains questionable. Should therefore "Law of the People’s Republic of China on the People’s Bank of China" be amended as soon as possible, monetary policy committee for legislative advisory body be enhanced to a decision-making institution, and standardized decision-making be used by way of poll, the results of the meeting and votes be on open records. Second, the article discusses the information disclosure procedures and methods. China should choose a classified information publicity system to explore the mutual upholding between exception of information requirements and crypto-censorship of confidential information. Third, the chapter focuses on the information public supervision. China should give full play to legislative oversight, administrative supervision and judicial oversight functions, and improve the specific legal system.As to fiscal policy decision-making information disclosure, the article reached the following conclusions: Firstly, as for the scope of budget information disclosure, China should specify pre-budget report preparation and publicity matters in legislation, protect the integrity of the disclosed budget decision-making information. To ensure the openness of budget approval process, we can modify the rules of procedure of National People’s Congress, clearly regulating the publicity problem other than those of in the session of National People’s Congress. legislations should specify the scope of in budget publicity, based on budget categories, sections, details budget accounts, the data of establishment of sub-item and sub-sector together with the necessary explanatory materials. Secondly, as regards the means of budget decision-making information publicity, easy to understand, timely and accurate and reliable information on budgetary decision-making is the principle of choosing a disclosure approach. The consideration and publicity of budget report shall be in accordance with legal form and procedures. The law should provide that, under normal circumstances, the draft budgetary decision-making should be sent to the representatives of National People’s Congress in advance for their consideration and making judgments within adequate time, while during special circumstances, the time advanced may be appropriately shortened. For the public, the publicity of budgetary decision-making information should be synchronized with the decision-making process. Third, as far as the public supervision on budget decision-making information, National People’s Congress should strengthen the supervision and the authenticity of decision-making information and increase the oversight of budget using of accounting policies. Laws should provide that the accounting policy of pre-and final accounts should be consistent with one of implementation of the report. Any different approaches that differ to general generally accepted accounting principles should be made clear. If there is any need to change in accounting policy, the changes and rationale should be disclosed and the pre-report should be accordingly modified.Chapter IV passes to macro-control decision-making participation and legal regulation. The nucleus content of this chapter is how to legally ensure the moderate participation in macro-control decision-making, and to balance power of decision-making autonomy and right to participation.The chapter, according to different depths in decision-making participation, divides macro-control decision-making participation into two types of participation, authorized decision-making participation and unauthorized decision-making participation. This part is focusing on six forms of public participation——the informal consultation, circulation of regulatory proposals comment, public notice-and-comment, public hearings, advisory body, the voting mechanism, and analyzes the matching relation between forms and types of participation and concluded that the balance of power of "specialty and democracy" is the decisive factor in selection of types and forms of participation.Monetary policy decision-making is suitable for the aforementioned two kinds of participation and voting by ballot, discussion by experts (advisory bodies) and informal consultation are the most appropriate form of participation. The part then discusses and perfects the voting by ballot and discussion by experts. With regard to voting regulations, this article holds that branches of the central bank should be given seats in the decision-making. We should optimize the composition of existing committees by increasing branch representatives, representatives of academia and practitioners and reducing representatives who are from other horizontal economic management departments.The vote mechanism of Coordinating Committee and presidential accountability should not lose the essential characteristic of a majority-rule voting in the Commission. The law can impose one person one vote with the same right and give the Chairman of the Committee’s power of final decision when same vote’s situation happens. As to expert advisory system, legislations should overcome the question of symbolic and hollowing, provide a balancing mechanism of choice of experts, establish an open system for discussion by experts, and ensure experts’right to participate in decision-making. The main part of fiscal policy decision-making——budgetary decision-making is suitable for the aforementioned two kinds of participation too. The public notice-and-comment and public hearing are appropriate forms of participation in budgetary decision-making. To deal with the problem of local government involved in budgeting making, the budget making committee should be mainly composited by governments at all levels, in order to strengthen communication between the central and local governments and to enrich the local governments’right to participate in budgeting making. Pointing at the absence of legislation for the budget hearings, it should have followed the basic principle of legislative hearings, considering the special features of the design of two systems. First, the budget hearings should be widely applied including in budget preparation and approval of the budget sessions. Second, relative to the general legislative hearings, the budget hearing putts higher requirements of breadth and professionalism on the speaker. The law should be clear that budget preparation should follow the principle of easily understanding, specialized upgrading the speaker in-house, and added the expert interpretation of part of the draft budget, upgrading the speaker out-house.Chapter V focuses on the legal responsibility of macro-control decision-making. The main content of this chapter is the balance of contradiction between power of decision-making autonomy and supervision power, through the understanding and setting of legal responsibility, in order to promote the realization of the effectiveness of macro-control decision-making. This part studies legal obligations of the decision-making body, the judgment of unlawful decision-making acts and legal responsibility, and specifically analyses special legal responsibilities of monetary policy and fiscal policy decision-making.Drawing on director fiduciary obligations of Company Law, the article names a legal obligation of decision-making as "fiduciary obligation", including duty of loyalty that the macro-control decision-making body should place the national interests over departmental interests and personal interests, and appropriate attention obligation that it should appropriately manage state macroeconomic o as to avoid the state’s macroeconomic dramatically fluctuation. The judgments of illegal acts in decision-making, taking into account the acts breaching duty of loyalty are more types of fixed and can be cleared through listing and summarizing. For the violations of attention obligation, the legislation should learn from experience of developed countries, which introduce the judgment standard of directors’care duty——a business rule to the field of macro-control decision-making, known as "professional judgment rule." At the macro-control decision-making of legal accountability, the main forms of legal responsibility are economic management responsibility, which essence is a fiduciary responsibility based on the "principal-agent" relationship, and its punishments include limiting or depriving them of their macro - control decision-making power and correcting, adjusting their macro-control decision-making behaviors. In the legal accountability mechanism, it is necessary to establish the judicial review system to enhance judicial accountability mechanism.In the legal liability of monetary policy decision-making, the article mainly studies the impact that the decision-making independence putts on of the legal accountability, and concludes that decision-making independence does not exclude the adequacy of the legal accountability; the decision-making autonomy and legal responsibility should be unified in the same law; the executive should not become a body to investigate the monetary policy decision-making; to look into legal liabilities of the monetary policy decision-making body, should be intentional and gross negligence of its subjective element.In the part of legal liabilities of fiscal policy decision-making, the article holds that the special nature of legal liability stems from its step by step in decision-making process and diversity of decision-making body. Combined with the defect on legal liability in our budgetary decision-making legislation, this chapter investigates the legal liabilities in process of draft, approval and adjustment of the budgetary decision-making, and concludes that the punishment in draft process is too light; in the approval session, the NPC should enjoy the right to amend the budget, and the legislation should provide the legal liabilities for failure to pass the budget plan; the premise to look into the legal liability of budget adjustments is to define the scientific definition, and to perfect the regulation, scope and procedure of budget adjustments.In the part of conclusion, the article again explains that the specialty and democracy are the basic contradiction that macro-control decision law should resolve, and pointes out the issues that need for further research.更多还原