【作者】 王旭辉；

【导师】 计明军；

【作者基本信息】 大连海事大学 ， 交通运输硕士（专业学位）， 2024， 硕士

【摘要】 我国航运贸易繁荣的同时,也伴随港口的高污染和高能耗,其中船舶在靠港停留时的辅机排放,已成为港区污染物的主要来源。岸电技术能够将船舶与岸上电力系统连接,替代辅机耗油为船舶供能,是推动港口绿色转型的关键途径。我国岸电建设经过十余年的发展,在供应能力上已达到全球领先水平,但与港口岸电覆盖率相比,船舶岸电使用率仍有待提高。对港口而言,若没有大量船舶使用岸电,港口很难回收建设及运营成本;从船公司角度看,面对航运市场的不确定性,如果岸电没有发展到理想阶段,企业难以承受投入高额资金升级船舶的风险。因此,如何在不损害各方利益的前提下,分析制约岸电难上船的关键因素,对打破岸电发展僵局和推进绿色航运建设具有重要意义。首先,本文以船公司靠港停泊时关于岸电的战略选择为切入点,从时间动态视角研究船公司使用岸电和低硫燃料之间的差异对港航企业运营决策和利润的影响。构建由一个港口和两个竞争船公司组成的港航供应链,考虑在船公司不同选择策略下的市场导向和政府行为。利用微分博弈和最优控制理论,求解各利益相关方在不同情景下的动态反馈策略、最优值函数以及岸电发展演化轨迹。并基于求解结果,分析燃料价格波动、竞争强度等因素对当前岸电发展阶段的影响。其次,研究当系统达到稳态后,岸电改造成本对两家船公司在岸电选择上的均衡策略影响,得到改造成本阈值和囚徒困境的形成边界。进一步通过比较港口在不同纯策略均衡下的利润,论证港口参与改善供应链的动机。最后,根据收集到的事实数据和已有研究数据进行数值仿真,对岸电改造成本、市场竞争强度、政府补贴力度等关键参数展开灵敏度实验,并基于港口动机设计成本分担契约,分析供应链协调机制对系统均衡的干预作用。结合理论分析和数值算例发现:(1)由于改造成本、油价波动等因素,两家船公司始终存在岸电选择的囚徒困境。(2)港口装卸效率的提高对岸电的应用具有抑制效应,表明在港口发展进程中,存在智慧港口和绿色港口相冲突的阶段;与进港优先权相比,成本分担契约可以将船公司双方的囚徒困境转变为都使用岸电帕累托最优。(3)政府的高补贴并不会直接扩大岸电使用均衡,反而会在市场趋于稳定后加剧船公司陷入损害自身利益的囚徒困境,不利于航运业的长期健康发展。本文从动态视角探讨航运运输过程中的绿色港口建设问题,对均衡策略的分析有利于寻求实现供应链帕累托改进的可控条件,为政府和港航企业的策略制定提供管理见解。更多还原

【Abstract】 The prosperity of China’s shipping trade is also accompanied by high pollution and high energy consumption in ports.The emissions from auxiliary engines when ships dock at ports have become the main source of pollutants in the port area.Shore power technology can connect ships to the shore power system,replacing auxiliary fuel consumption to supply energy for ships,which is a key way to promote the green transformation of ports.After more than ten years of development,China’s shore power construction has reached the global leading level in terms of supply capacity.However,compared with the coverage of shore power in ports,the utilization rate of shore power on ships still needs to be improved.For ports,without a large number of ships using shore power,it is still difficult for ports to recover the cost of shore power construction in the early stage.From the perspective of shipping companies,in the face of uncertainty in the shipping market,if shore power has not developed to a mature stage,companies will be unable to bear the risk of investing high amounts of money to modify ships.Therefore,how to analyze the key factors restricting the difficulty of shore power on board without harming the interests of all parties is of great significance to break the deadlock in the development of shore power and the construction of green shipping.Firstly,this thesis takes the shipping company’s strategic choice of shore power when berthing at the port as an entry point,and studies the impact of the difference between the use of shore power and low-sulfur fuel on the operating decisions and profits of port and shipping companies from a time dynamic perspective.The shipping supply chain consisting of one port and two competing shipping companies is constructed,and the market orientation and government behavior companies are considered under different selection strategies of shipping.Differential game and optimal control theory are utilized to solve the dynamic feedback strategy,optimal value function,and the evolutionary trajectory of each stakeholder under different scenarios.Then,based on the results of the solution,we analyze the impact of fuel price fluctuations,competitive intensity and other factors on the current stage of shore power development.Secondly,thesis studies the impact of shore power retrofit costs on the equilibrium strategies of the two shipping companies in the choice of shore power when the system reaches the steady state,and derives the retrofit cost threshold and the boundary for the fo rmation of the prisoner’s dilemma.It also demonstrates the motivation of ports to participate in improving the supply chain by comparing their profits under different pure strategy equilibria.Finally,numerical simulation is carried out based on the collected facts and existing research data,and sensitivity experiments are carried out on key parameters such as the shore power retrofit costs,the intensity of market competition,the strength of government subsidies,etc.And design a cost-sharing contract based on port motivations,and analyze the intervention effect of the supply chain coordination mechanism on system equilibrium.Combining theoretical analysis and numerical examples,it was found that:(1)Due to factors such as modification costs and fuel price fluctuations,the prisoner’s dilemma between the two shipping companies regarding the choice of shore power has always existed.(2)The improvement of port handling efficiency has a dampening effect on the application of shore power,suggesting that there is a conflicting phase of smart and green ports in the process of port development.Compared with port entry priority,the cost sharing contract can transform the prisoner’s dilemma of both shipping companies into the Pareto optimal use of shore power.(3)High government subsidies will not directly promote the balanced use of shore power,but rather exacerbate the prisoners’ dilemma faced by shipping companies after the market stabilizes,which is not conducive to the long-term healthy development of the shipping industry.This thesis explores the issue of green port construction in the shipping and transportation process from a dynamic perspective.The analysis of equilibrium strategies is helpful in seeking the conditions for achieving Pareto improvement in the supply chain,and provides management insights for the government and port and shipping enterprises to formulate strategies.更多还原