网络攻击防御对策研究

【作者】 徐蜜；

【导师】 高红伟；

【作者基本信息】 青岛大学 ， 应用数学， 2012， 硕士

【摘要】 文章研究一类包含网络设计者和攻击者的非合作对策。从网络设计出发,假设网络的设计者同时承担网络防御的任务,针对网络设计、防御和攻击发生的所有时序关系,系统研究设计者根据每个阶段攻防结果所实施的设计动态。论文的主要贡献是分别给出了单阶段及多阶段的动态网络设计、防御和攻击所应遵循的一些基本准则。文章的创新性在以下几个方面均有体现。第一,提出了在单阶段网络设计问题、多阶段网络设计问题下的关于支付、成功攻击、攻击在路径间传播的假设,并通过详尽的网络图和支付表来证明主要结论。第二,对于单阶段的网络设计问题,给出了当给定网络中的节点数目、防御以及攻击资源时设计者最优的网络结构设计方式；同时给出了攻击资源和防御资源相对于节点数目较大时的关于均衡网络结构的定理。第三,针对网络设计者提出并建立了全局最优准则,即多阶段动态网络设计情形下设计者面对策略攻击或随机攻击时的支付总和最大化原则,而假设网络攻击者致力于阶段支付最大化的结果。更多还原

【Abstract】 The paper considers a non-cooperative game which includes only designer and attacker. Begin with the network design, and assume that the designer also undertakes the obligation of defending the network while he is designing it. According to the different orders of the network design, defense and attack, mainly discuss the dynamic network design processes, which are carried out by the designer on the basis of the defense-attack results of each period.The ideas are brought up innovatively as follows:first, give the assumptions of payoff, successful-attack and spread of attacks of single-period network, the corresponding graphs and payoff-tables are shown. Second, facing to fixed numbers of nodes and resources, show the best design structure of network and the equilibrium theorem when the numbers become large. Third, establish the global optimal principles for the designer, that is, in a multiperiod dynamic network design environment, the principles of the designer to maximize the payoff summation when facing the strategic or random attack. Besides, also assume that the attacker aims at maximizing the period payoff. The primary contribution is giving the fundamental principles of the dynamic network design and defense.更多还原