【摘要】 在线零售市场中,新兴产品的质量不确定性和企业动态定价可能导致消费者策略等待,延迟购买时机.当具有内生性时间偏好时,消费者自主选择购买策略(短视型/策略型),但在选择为策略型时需付出时间精力等额外的沉没成本(策略成本).基于消费者效用理论,构建两阶段博弈模型,考虑企业和消费者在第二期可同时从在线评论信息中学习并更新感知质量,研究消费者具有内生性时间偏好时的购买策略,及其对企业定价策略的影响.研究结果表明,消费者感知质量和策略成本影响其购买策略,同时导致企业实施不同的动态定价策略.策略成本的增加既可使企业利润、消费者剩余和社会福利同时提升,也可能在提升企业利润的同时损害消费者剩余和社会福利.此外,评论信息精度的提高并非总能使企业获益.当消费者的策略成本和感知质量均较高时,更准确的评论信息甚至会使企业利润和消费者剩余同时受损.相对于均为短视型消费者的情形,消费者的策略等待行为并非总能使自身获益.更多还原

【Abstract】 In online retail markets, uncertainty about the quality of emerging products and firms’ dynamic pricing lead to the possibility that consumers may engage in strategic waiting and delay the purchase of products. When considering the endogenous time preferences, consumers choose their own purchasing strategy(myopic or strategic), while spending an additional sunk cost of time and effort(called strategic cost) if choosing to be strategic. Based on consumer utility theory, we develop a two-period game-theoretic model, where the firm and consumers simultaneously learn and update perceived quality from online reviews in the second period. We study consumers’ purchasing strategies when they have endogenous time preferences, and the impact of such consumers on the firm’s pricing strategy. The results suggest that the perceived quality and strategic cost affect consumers’ purchasing strategies and lead the firm to implement different dynamic pricing strategy depending on consumers’ purchasing strategies. An increase in strategic cost may either increase the firm’s profit, consumer surplus and social welfare, or increase the firm’s profit at the expense of consumer surplus and social welfare. In addition, an increase in the accuracy of review information does not always benefit the firm. When both the strategic cost and perceived quality are at a high level, more accurate review information may even hurt both the firm’s profit and consumer surplus. Also, consumers do not always benefit from strategic waiting behavior compared with the case where all consumers stay myopic.更多还原