【摘要】 关于黑格尔哲学的“无前提性”，学界通行的观点是要么把它理解为一种单纯的怀疑主义或批判精神，要么去论证作为黑格尔逻辑学开端的“存在”本身是“无前提的”。文章首先指出怀疑主义或批判精神不足以刻画黑格尔哲学的根本特性，以及所谓“无前提”的“存在”在黑格尔那里是自相矛盾的，然后辨析了黑格尔哲学在“无前提”“本原”“开端”等关键概念语境下的开端问题，最终通过澄清黑格尔在逻辑学之本质论部分里关于“设定”和“预先设定”等概念的思想，表明黑格尔哲学的“无前提性”的真正意义在于破除一个绝对在先的开端，扬弃开端和终点之间的对立。更多还原

【Abstract】 The prevailing view on the “premise-freeness” of Hegel’s philosophy is either to understand it as a mere skepticism or critical spirit, or to argue that “being” as the beginning of Hegel’s logic is itself premise-free.This article firstly points out that skepticism or critical spirit is not sufficient to characterize the fundamental feature of Hegel’s philosophy and that the so-called premise-free “being” is a self-contradictory, and then analyzes the problem of the beginnings in Hegel’s philosophy in the context of key concepts such as “premise-free”, “beginning”and “principle”. And finally, by clarifying Hegel’s ideas on the concepts of “setting” and “presetting” in Hegel’s doctrine of essence-logic, it is shown that the real meaning of the “premise-freeness” lies in the elimination of any absolutely prior beginning and the abandonment of the opposition between the beginning and the end.更多还原