【摘要】 考虑延迟赔付率、车主延迟风险、货主物流时效关注度的影响下,研究两种延迟赔付定价策略的选择问题,通过逆向求解法获取最优均衡。发现:(1)车主网络外部性大于货主两倍的情况,平台始终选择C策略。反之,若车主延迟风险低于某临界值、货主对物流时效的关注度高于某临界值,应选F策略;否则选C策略。(2)无论F策略还是C策略,平台收益均随车主延迟风险的降低、货主对时效性关注度的提升而提升,不受赔付率影响。(3)若选F策略,则不对货主补贴。若选C策略,车主的网络外部性大于货主的情况下始终实行补贴;反之,只有当车主延迟风险、货主物流时效的关注度满足条件时进行补贴。最后,用数值仿真结论进行验证。更多还原

【Abstract】 Considering the compensation rate from the platform, transportation delay risk from drivers and the attention of timeliness from the consigners, this paper studies two kinds of decisions about two delay compensation pricing strategies, and tries to obtain the optimal equilibrium depending on the reverse solution method. The results show that:(1)When the network externality of the drivers is more than twice that of the consigners, the platform should choose strategy C; conversely, when the delay risk of drivers is lower than a certain threshold and the attention of timeliness from the consigners is higher than a certain threshold, strategy F should be chosen, otherwise, strategy C should be chosen.(2)Platform revenue will increase both for strategy F and C with the reduction of delay risk of drivers and improvement of the attention of timeliness from the consigners, which will not be affected by the compensation rate.(3)If strategy F is selected, the consigners will not be subsidized. When strategy C is selected, if the network externality of the drivers is more than that of the consigners, subsidy will be implemented. if not, only when the drivers’ s delay risk is lower than a certain threshold value and the attention of timeliness from the consigners is higher than a certain threshold, the subsidy could be implemented. Finally, numerical simulation is used to verify.更多还原