【作者】 许静静；

【导师】 徐惠珍；

【作者基本信息】 江苏大学 ， 会计学， 2011， 硕士

【摘要】 19世纪,以会计盈余为基础的管理层奖励报酬率先在英国开始实行,随后,整个欧洲以及美国和日本也相继采用这种办法,由此引发了管理层为获取自身最大报酬而进行盈余管理的行为。近年来,我国会计学者开始对高管薪酬与盈余管理的关系进行研究,然而研究结论并不一致。关于该领域的研究尚不全面,家族控股上市公司经理人薪酬激励与盈余管理的关系就是被忽略的内容之一。考虑到家族企业的特殊性,以及它对国民经济的重大贡献,研究其经理人薪酬激励对盈余管理的影响很有必要。本文正是从这独特的视角出发,探索其中的奥妙,以期获取两者关系的启示。本文首先对国内外研究高管激励与盈余管理关系的文献进行了梳理与分析,并提出了全文的研究框架。在借鉴国内外研究结论的基础上,分析了盈余管理产生的理论基础与动因以及激励的理论基础与必要性。然后,从现实出发,利用单样本T检验的方法,分析了目前家族控股上市公司盈余管理的现状,发现家族控股企业存在显著的盈余管理行为。在此基础上,本文运用实证的方法探究家族控股上市公司经理人薪酬激励与盈余管理之间的关系。本文以沪市家族控股上市公司2009年及2010年两年的数据为总样本,经过整理得到189家,两年共378个有效数据值。为了探讨家族经理人与职业经理人盈余管理程度的差别,进一步以家族经理人和职业经理人为标准将样本划分为A和B两个子样本。在实证研究过程中,采用横截面修正的琼斯模型分别对总样本和子样本进行实证检验,结果表明：经理人薪酬水平与盈余管理负相关,即经理人薪酬水平越高,盈余管理越不显著；经理人持股比例与盈余管理没有显著相关性；家族经理人薪酬水平与盈余管理没有显著相关性,但职业经理人薪酬水平与盈余管理负相关。最后,本文针对研究结论提出应对措施,认为公司应完善经理人激励机制,加强股权激励等长期激励的的应用；改善公司治理结构,对经理人权力进行制衡。相关监管部门应强化信息披露机制,提高信息披露质量。社会各界应共同努力,建立和规范职业经理人市场。更多还原

【Abstract】 Management incentive compensation based on accounting management was implemented in England first in 19th century. Then the whole Europe area, America and Janpan followed this method. Management began to carry on the behavior of earnings management for their greatest rewards. In recent years, scholars have begun to study on the relationship between executive pay and earnings management. But the conclusions are inconsistent. And the research scope is not also comprehensive, such as he relationship between family-controlled listed companies’manager compensation incentive and earnings management. Considering the particularity of the family enterprise and its significant contribution to national economy, it’s necessary to research it. This paper starts from the unique perspective and try exploring the relationship in order to getting some enlightenment.Firstly, this paper analyzes previous related literatures. and take shape the chart in foundation of them, analyze the theoretical basis and motivation of earnings management and the theoretical basis and necessity of incentive; then investigate current earnings management situation in family-controlled listed companies with the method of single sample T-test, finding that there are significant earnings management behavior in family-controlled listed companies. On this basis, this paper uses empirical methods to inquire the relationship between managers’incentive compensation and earnings management in family-controlled listed companies. This paper uses family-controlled listed companies of Shanghai stock exchange in 2009 and 2010 as the total study sample. I finally get 378 valid data of 189 companies in two years, and further divide the whole sample into A and B subsamples by the standard of manager’s origin in order to get their differences. In the process of research, modified Jones model is used to test the whole and subsamples. The conclusions are as following:the higher manager compensation, the lower earnings management; there is no significant correlation between managers’shareholding ratio and earnings management; family managers’ compensation hasn’t significant relevance with earnings management, while professional managers’compensation has a negative correlation with earnings management. Lastly, suggestions have been raised like these:companies should improve the management incentives mechanism, strength the long-term incentive mechanism, such as stock incentive; corporate governance structure should be improved, the manager’s power should be effectively checked and balanced; regulatory authorities should strengthen the information disclosure mechanism in order to enhance the quality of information which is disclosed; Interested party should work together to establish a normalized professional manager market.更多还原