【摘要】 过高的股权集中度会导致显著更高的应计盈余操控行为,而对真实盈余管理行为的影响总体上不显著;无论对于应计盈余操控还是真实盈余操控,机构持股均具有较好的抑制作用;国有控股会导致显著更高的应计盈余操控,但在真实盈余操控方面,更多地体现在异常酌量费用方面;国有控股上市公司管理层持股越高,其应计盈余管理行为越显著,而在真实盈余管理行为方面,显著影响更多体现在异常现金流和异常生产成本方面。更多还原

【Abstract】 A study is conducted in this paper to analyze the relationship between the ownership structure and accrued and true earnings management behavior since the listed companies in the A-share market from 2007 to2018 are the research object. The result indicates that too high ownership concentration will lead to significantly higher accrued earnings manipulation behavior,but its impact on real earnings management behavior is generally insignificant. The institutional ownership has a better restraint effect on both accrued earnings manipulation and real earnings manipulation. State-owned holding will result in significantly higher accrued earnings manipulation,but in terms of real earnings manipulation,it is more reflected in the abnormal discretionary expenses. The higher the share ratio of the managers of state-owned listed companies is,the more significant the accrual earnings management behavior is. In terms of the real earnings management behavior,it is reflected in abnormal cash flow and abnormal production costs.更多还原