【摘要】 为了研究大型政府投资工程中合理的被举报人惩罚办法以抑制潜在被举报人的违规行为动机,引入了演化博弈理论研究政府与潜在被举报人在仅存在经济处罚处理机制时的行为演化,构建了最优经济惩罚系数模型,利用数值仿真的方式进行了示例。由于仅靠经济处罚机制无法完全消除潜在被举报人的违规行为动机,在经济处罚机制的基础上提出了信息公示机制,构建了违规行为声誉激励损失最优值模型。并根据研究成果提出了被举报人惩罚机制的优化措施。更多还原

【Abstract】 In order to study the reasonable punishment method of the informer to restrain the infringement motive of the potential informer in large-scale government investment projects,the evolutionary game theory is introduced to study the behavior evolution of the government and potential informants when there is only an economic punishment mechanism. The optimal economic punishment coefficient model which is demonstrated by numerical simulation is constructed. Since the economic punishment mechanism alone can not completely eliminate the motive of potential informers’ violations,this paper proposes an information publicity mechanism based on the economic punishment mechanism and constructs an optimal value model of reputation incentive loss of violations. Finally,according to the research results,the optimization measures of the punishment mechanism of the informer are put forward.更多还原