【摘要】 选取沪、深A股2005～2007年的数据为样本,结合不同所有权安排和在职消费支出构成,揭示了企业构建政企网络的寻租动机及对我国经济改革进程中制度化建设的迫切需求。研究发现,国有企业的政治关系网络给企业带来了更大的在职消费规模,非国有经济中的政治关系网络则显著抑制了企业的在职消费,加速法律、产权等正式制度的建设对于抑制企业的政治寻租倾向十分有效。研究结果表明,在我国法治水平较低和产权保护不强的制度背景下,抑制在职消费、减轻企业负担不仅仅要解决传统的代理关系问题,更重要的是要考虑制度缺失给企业带来的高昂交易成本。更多还原

【Abstract】 Taking the selected data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share in 2005-2007 as a sample,combining different ownership arrangements and forms of perks,this paper reveals the motivation of rent-seeking of network-built between government and enterprises,and the urgent needs of construction of institutionalize in the China’s innovation process.The research finds that the network of political relations of stated-owned enterprises brings a larger scale of perks;in contrast the network of private companies significantly restrains the scale;it is much more effective to speed up developing the law,property rights and other restrain to suppress the tendency of political rent-seeking.The research results show that:under the background of low level in law and neglecting the property protection,to restrain perks and reduce the enterprises’ cost,it is not only to solve the traditional agent relationships,but also more important is to consider the system shortage brings high transaction costs to enterprises.更多还原